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A STUDY OF THE EXPORT FINANCING SYST_4
IN THE PHILIPPINES*
Mario B. Lamberte, Rosario G. Manasan, Erlinda M. Medalla
Josef T. Yap, Teodoro S. Untalan**
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Rationale and Objectives of tne Study
The Philippines went through a recession for two consecutive years.
Inappropriate economic policies, political instability, corruption at the
nighest level, and unfavorable external enyirormlent all contributed to the
crisis. In the last three years, the economy has rebounded at a relatively
faster pace under a new government which immediately instituted political
and economic reforms. In 1988, GNP grew by 6.7 percent in real terms with
the industry sector leading the pack. Merchandise exports increased by a
hefty 27 percent.
*This study is inade possible through _le financial support of t21e
Asian Develo_ment Ban_ (ADB).
**The authors are Vice-President, Research Fellows (Manasan, Medalla
and Yap) and •Research Associate, respectively, of the Philippine Institute
for Development Studies (PIDS).
The views express_ in this study are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
2Despite the remarkable economic recovery and ma3or reforms already
instituted by the gover_aent, still the economy faces serious constraints
to the attainment of a sustainable growth. One such constraint in which no
solution seam,s to be near in sight is the external debt burden that is
getting heavier each year. Borrowing to service external debt piles up
more debt, and an external shock could easily put the economy into serious
problem, perhaps far worse than the 1984 - 1985 crisis. The debt reduction
proposal along the Brady proposal is a long shot. The reluctance on the
part of creditor banks and governments of more developed countries is the
key stumbling block to such solution.
The Philippines should therefore look inward and examine its
strengths. Exports have performed remarkably well in the recent past, and
huge potentials still r_mained untapped. Perhaps, this is one area where
t_hePhilippines can further develop to sustain its growth momentum.
In recent years, there has been a renewed concern in the design and
administration of export promotion policies, worldwide, this interest has
been stimulated by the success stories of the Fast Asian dragons; success
that has been largely attributed to their export performance. At the same
time, the works of Bhagwati (1978), Krueger (1978), Michaeley (1977),
Balassa (1978) doc_nted with cross country data the positive link between
economic growth and exports. In the Philippines, recurring balance of
payments problems has highlighted the need to nurture exports.
Furthermore, the import suDstituting strategy pursued in the fifties and
sixties and the concomitant trade regime that has been carried over into
the seventies and early eighties is perceived by many as exhibiting an
overwhelming bias against export (Power and Sicat 1971; Tan 1979; Medalla
1986). In tnis context, exports promotion becomes i_oerative not only
3because exports are by themselves desirable because of the foreign exchange
they bring and the favorable •growth implications of increased exports but
also because of the need to counteract the anti-export •bias. Export
promotion would imply the use of instruments that compensate for •the
implicit penalties against exports •in the macroeconc_ic environment as well
as those that provide incentives to the exporting •activity over and above
that which would prevail in a neutral strategy.
This study therefore •examines the export promotion policies and
programs of the Philippines with special focus on export financing system.
More specifically,• it attempts to:•
i. review the export promotion policies of the Philippines;
2. analyze the Philippine export structure;
3. provide forecasts of exports and demand for post- and pre-shipment
financing from 1989 to 20_0;
4. descriDe and assess the •contribution of non-financial government
and private agencies providing assistance to exporters;
5. describe and evaluate the existing export financing system in the
Philippines; and
6. recommend policy and institutional reforms that can further
strengthen the export sector.
B. Sources of Data
The study uses both primary and secondary data. The primary data were
obtained from three groups of data sources. The first group consists of
key officers of export-oriented private institutions and goverr_nent
agencies providing financial and non-financial services to exporters.
4Interviews were conducted using open-ended structured interview schedule.
The information gathered from these interviews were supplemented with
unpublished reports of concerned agencies.
The second group consists of seven co,_oercial banks: one gover_nent-
owned bank; one branch of a multinational bank; three large domestic banks;
one medium'size bank; and one small bank. The aggregate assets of these
banks as of December 1988 amount to _156B comprising 48 percent of the
total assets of the commercial banking system. Non-random sanloling was
used in choosing the sample banks. A structured questionnaire was utilized
in collecting primary data from these banks.
The third group consists of 23 firms which are producing non-
traditional export products. Five are purely producers or indirect
exporters; six pure traders; and 12 producers-traders. The profile of
these sample respondents is summariz_ in Table I.l. A structured
interview schedule was utilized in gathering data from the sample
exporters. For Metro Manila based respondents, the questionnaires were
sent to them and clarifications regarding some of the answers given in the
returned questionnaires were done through the telephone, while for non-
Metro Manila based respondents, personal interviews were conducted. Non-
random sanpling was used in Choosing respondents. The regional offices of
the National Lconomic and Development Au_]ority a,_ the Deparhnent of Trade
i
and Industry helped in identifying respondents using the guidelines
provided by the research team.
The secondarydata were obtained fr_npublished reports, brochuresand
hand-outs generally available to the public from government and private
agencies.
5Table [ 1
PROFILEOFSAMPLERESPONu_Nmb
Assets Exporter Buszness No of Typeof Typeof Year BeganNumberof Years
No Address EmployeesBusiness Ownershlp Operation Exporting
A Small Scale
1 1 2 8 x trader corporation 1988 1
I 6 3 It x trader single proprietorship 1982 7
1 7 3 13 both single proprietorship 1983
I R 3 9 both singleproprietorship 1985 3
I 9 3 3g both singleproprietorship 1982 4
1 lg 3 7g both single proprietorship 1981 8
i II 3 15 x producer singleproprietorship 19B3 nap
I 12 3 28 both s_ngleproprietorship 198B I
i 14 4 25 both slngleproprietorship 1979 9
I 17 i 48 x producer corporation 1984 nap
I 2g 5 41 both corporatlon 1988 Ig
I 21 6 25 both slngleproprletorsh_p 198g 5
B MediumScale
2 2 2 IBB x trader corporation 1973 15
2 3 2 2g x producer corporation 1981 nap
2 4 2 3gg both corporation 1987 2
I 13 3 8g x producer corporation 19Rfl nap
2 15 4 45 x producer partnershzp 1983 nap
I 22 I 42 both corporation 1974 9
C LargeScale
2 5 2 7gO x trader corporation 1985 6
2 lb 1 4 x trader corporation 19B6 2
2 18 I n a x trader corporation 1953 3b
I 19 i 8 both corporatzon 1983 5
3 23 1 lg55 both corporation 1974 15
NOTE Assets I lessthanP5 m_lhon
2 P5 m_lllontoP20m1111on
3 morethanP_glilhon
BusinessAddress 1 Metro Manila
2 CebuCity
3 DavaoCity
4 TagbzlaranCity,Bohol
5 BaguloCzty
6 OagupanCity
n a no answer
nap notapphcable
6C. Existing Literature on Export Finance
This study has greatly benefited from recent studies on export finance
in the Philippines. In fact, many of the points raised in earlier studies
are reiterated in this study. It is therefore important at this point to
mention the following major studies:
i. Presidential Action Center for Trade Facilitation, Office of the
President, "Export Credit Insurance: A Dynamic Approach to Export
Development in the Philippines" (15 September 1981);
2. The World Bank, "The Philippines: Financial Sector Study" (23
August 1988) ;
3. Ifzal All, "Manufactured Exports from the Philippines: A Sector
Profile and an Agenda for Reform," Asian Development Bank
Economic Staff Paper NO. 4 (September 1988); and
4. First Washington Associates, "Report on Philippine Export Finance
Structure," A report prepared for the Industry and Energy
Operations Asia Region, the World Bank (September 1988).
D. Organization of the Study
The next chapter discusses the export promotion policies in the
Philippines. Trade policy environment and fiscal incentives are being
given emphasis. Chapter III analyzes the Philippine export structure since
1970 and presents forecasts of exports and demand for pre- and post-
shipment financing from 1989 to 2000. THe contribution of government and
private agencies providing non-financial assistance to exporters is
described and assessed in Chapter IV. Chapter V discusses the export
7financing system in the Philippines and export finance experience of banks
and exporters. Chapter VI• presents an overall evaluation of the existing
export financing system. The last chapter pulls together the major conclu-
sions of the study and •presents a set of agenda for policy and institu-
tional reforms.
II. EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES
This •• chapter discusses the export promotion• policies of the
Philippines from 1950 up to the present. The trade policy environment is
first analyzed followed by a review of fiscal incentives for exports.•
A. Trade Policy Environment
For more t/_an three decades, continuing up to the present, the over-
all Philippine trade policy has been generally protectionist in nature,
although in varying degrees during the period. This was inadvertently
began • in 1950, when the Philippines imposed strict foreign exchange
controls in response to a severe balance-of-payments difficulty resulting
from a drop in U.S. economic assistance. Foreign exchange was rationed
according to "essentiality." Virtually only producer goods could be
imported as foreign exchange could hardly be obtained •for "non-essential"
consumer goods. The system became a permanent• policy feature for the rest
of the decade, fully entrenching an import substitution policy, which, as
such, necessarily favors and highly rewards the finishing stages of
manufacturing while effectively penalizing backward linkages and exports.
Import substitution proved to be an expensive means of saving foreign
exchange while dependence of primary exports increased as the pegged
exchange rate and lopsided incentive structure towards iluport substitution
8effectively penalized exports and discouraged export growth. Thus, after a
decade, even the strict exchange controls could not hold down the recurring
balance-of-payments pressure. By 1960, the government had to devalue the
peso and opted for a relaxation of import controls.
With the completion of the decontrol program in 1962, the tariff
system which was promulgated in 1957 became the effective tool of
protection, replacing but largely preserving the structure of protection of
the 1950s control system. Import substitution in the finishing stages of
manufacturing remained highly rewarded while backward linkages and exports
were still penalized. With the same biases in the protection structure,
foreign exchange earnings remained dependent on primary exports while
foreign exchange saving increasingly became more costly and difficult to
achieve. Thus, the country r_mained vulnerable to balance-of-payments
problem. In the late 1960s, inloort controls were restored.
In the 1970s, import controls becamemore widespread. The Central
Bank started the system of classification by type of product. CB Circular
289 was issued requiring CB approval for imports of c(mmodities classified
as Unclassified Consumer (UC), Semi-Unclassified Consumer (SUC), and Non-
Essential Constm_r (NBC). More CB Circulars followed, adding more imports
to be covered. In the majoritY of cases, the motive for import licensing
was protection of local industry in the domestic market. The system of
quantitative restrictions, in general, buttressed the effect of the tariff
structure. Escalation of tariffs a_rding to stage of processing
remained.
By the late 1960s, government planners have become more aware of the
bias against exports. Instead of reforming the protection structure,
9however, export promotion measures, mainly through BOI, started to be
adopted in the 1970s. Clearly, however, such an offset approach could only
reach a limited number of sectors. While nontraditional exports grew,
these were mostly concentrated in semi-conductors and garments (which has
low value-added).
The exchange rate policy during these periods did not help reverse the
bias against exports. On the contrary, it added to the penalty already
received by exports by fixing the rate at unrealistically low levels. In
the 50s and the 60s, this was made possible, by import controls and high
tariffs. In the late 1970s up to early 1980s, huge foreign borrowing
(which• cannot indefinitely be •sustained)propped up the •peso, hiding an
underlying BOP disequilibrium. Table II.l shows the mov_n_ent in the
nominal and real exchange rate from 1973 to 1987. The real exchange rate
is the nominal exchange rate deflated by the •ratio between the domestic
price index and the foreign/world price index.
The Philippines has a history of trying to maintain a fixed nominal
exchange rate, until extr_ae BOP •difficultiesmade it impossible to do so.
with higher domestic inflation relative to the world, the relatively
constant nominal rate has meant a real appreciation of the peso.
Eventually, the Philippines had to devalue drastically (e.g., 1969, 1983-
84). -
With an .unrealistically low (real) exchange rate, exports were
effectively penalized. Non-tradeables, on the other hand (these are goods
or services which can neither be imported -- •naturally or because of
government policy -- nor exported) were rewarded, especially non-tradeables
dependent on imports •for•their inputs. Ranking different commodity groups
TaDle II.l
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE
(1973 = 100)
Real Effective
Year Exchange Rate Index
1973 100
1974 83.69
1975 92.17
1976 95.64
1977 98.04
1978 105.32
1979 93.72
1980 88.10
1981 85.91
1982 83.13
1983 102.36
1984 100.03
1985 88.37
1986 112.03
1987 111.10
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Key Indicators of ADB & DMCs
aewaau_u uo most penalized group, heading the list would be the
import-dependent "non-tradeables" -- composed mainly of import substitutes
binding import ban but whose inputs could readily be imported.
local production of high tariff items but are importable. In
would be the ',true" non-tradeables -- i.e., goods which can
exported nor imported due to natural reasons as bulk and other
making transport costs prohibitive. These are neither rewarded nor
The next group, which would be slightly penalized, is composed
import substitutes (e.g., some intermediate and capital goods)
of which are allowed at low duties. The most penalized is
this would belong agriculture which is a large net exporter.
11
It is thus not difficult to see how the policies in the past have
promoted import-dependent . import substitution. There was some growth
achieved, but given the resulting incentive structure which highly rewarded
production for the small dcmestic market and penalized exports, growth
could not be sustained.
Perhaps, recognizing these constraints, starting in the 1970, export
incentives were granted, but these were not enough• to offset the huge
penalty arising from the exchange •rate policy.
By the end of the 1970s, the inherent biases Of the protection
structure was recognized and the inadequacy of an offset approach through
various incentives became more and more apparent. Thus, in 1981, the
gover_nent finally launched the first major reform of the protection
system. First, the Tariff Reform Program (TRP) was impl_amented. Second, a
schedule of import licensing liberalization was formulated. Except for the
uniform additional import surcharge which was eventually removed, the TRP
proceeded as planned. Import liberalization had to be shelved, however,
with the 1983-1984 BOP crisis.
The TRP has substantially reduced not only nominal tariffs but the
effective protection rates (EPRs) as well (see Table II.2). The EPR
structure remained the same but at lower levels. Consequently, relative
penalty to exports has been reduced after TRP.
Achievements derived from the TRP would be totally nullified if no
similar efforts were done in import liberalization. Reduction in tariffs
while import barriers are being maintained would not only retain the old
protection structure but also shift the foregone tariff revenue to private
12
Table II.2
AVERAGE EPRs (in percent)
Pre-TRP Post-T
All Sectors 24 i_
Exportables -3 -:
Importables 44 25
Primary and Agriculture 1 -i
Manufacturing 40 23
Exportables 1 1
Importables 50 33
Source: Tariff Commisslon
rents. Thus, a schedule of import liberalization was planned
simultaneously with the TRP.
Starting in 1981, a schedule of import liberalization was implemented.
The first stage, in 1981, removed 263 items from the list of banned items.
In 1982, 610 more items were liberalized. However, CB circulars were
issued to regulate more importations, in 1983, 48 items were removed from
the banned list. In the second half of 1983, in response to the BOP
crisis, CB Circular 970 was issued pooling all foreign exchange receipts
and limiting foreign exchange allocation to payments for crude oil,
essential grain imports and raw materials for exports and vital domestic
products. Lesser priority items were allowed through a scheme of no-dollar
importations and pre-paid import L/Cs. The con_nitment to liberalize stayed
i_/
The EPR for a certain industry measures how much increase, in
percentage, in the value-added brought about by protection. For example if
DVA is the value-added given tariffs and import controls and FTVA the value
added without tariffs and import controls, then EPR = DVA/FTVA - i.
13
through, albeit not. without controversy, after the February 1986.
Revolution.• The new government liberalized more items between March 1986
L.
and April 1988. Some 951 items were liberalized in 1986, •171 items in
1987, and 129 items in •1988.• The number so far liberalized comprises
around 80 percent of the total number regulated based on CB circulars.
These are summarized in Table II.3. As of December 1988, some 673 items
remain regulated representing less• than 12 percent of the total number of
items.
Some tariff adjust_aents have been made to help smoothen the impact of
the recent import liberalization experience. On the whole, however, • these
appear to be minimal as indicated by the almost unchanged (unweighted)
•tariff average shown in Table iI.4.
As already •mentioned above, the exchange rate policy in the past has
been one of penalty, not protection, to not only the export sector but also
•to efficient but neglected import substitutes. With the current thrust of
an export-led growth, it is imperative •that the exchange rate should at
least be neutral, if not actually according "protection" to exports and
even import substitutes.
After a series of de facto devaluations following the 1983-84 BOP
2_/
crisis, a real depreciation of the peso could be noted. The peso went
up slightly in 1985 but with the world currency realignment, the composite
real price of the peso (weighted by trade with major trading partners)
2_/
What is more important than the trend in nominal exchange rate
is what happens to the real exchange rate, that is, the nominal exchange
rate including effects of"domestic and foreign inflation. (Specifically
RER = NER x FPI/DPI where RER is the real exchange rate, NER the nominal
exchange rate, FPI the foreign/world price index and DPI the domestic price
index) .
14
Table II.3
NUMBER OF ITEMS REGULATED, LIBERALIZED
AND NEWLY REGULATED BY YEAR
1977 TO 1988
No. of Regulated
Total Number Newly Liberalized Items or Percent
Regulated of PSCC lines
1977 1892 47 - 33.5
1978 1926 34 - 34.2
1979 2031 104 - 36.0
1980 2032 1 - 36.0
1981 1771 2 263 31.4
1982 1438 277 610 25.5
1983 1988 59_ 48 35'.3
1984 1994 6 - 35.4
1985 1924 - 70 34.1
1986 973 - 951 17.3
1987 802 - 171 14.2
i988 673 - 129 11.9
15
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again went down in 1986 and rising slightly in 1987. This indicates some
gain in the competitiveness of the peso at least in the recent years (cf.
Table If.l).
The more revealing indicator of the competitiveness of the peso, is
how it has fared with the currencies of our major competitors,
specifically, Thailand, Taiwan, S. Korea, and Hongkong. This is shown by
the movement in the real exchange rate index between the peso and the
currencies of these countries presented in Table II.5. As shown, the
peso/won real exchange rate index rises in 1983-84 but falls again in 1985-
1986. Hence, the peso became relatively cheaper in 1983-84 only to lose
sane competitiveness again against the Korean won in 1985-1986.
Preliminary estimate for 1988 shows however a real depreciation again of
the peso against the won. The peso/HK$ real exchange rate index has fallen
from 1973 index but at least has been maintained in the past three years.
The peso/baht real exchange rate index was falling from 1973 to 1982, but
the index rose in 1983-84. The peso lost again some competitiveness
against the baht thereafter and the index is still below that of 1973 in
1988. Taiwan, on the other hand, with its long-running BOP surplus has
been under pressure to revalue its currency. Thus, the peso/Taiwan dollar
real exchange rate index has risen substantially.
B. Fiscal Incentives for Expor_ts •
This section reviews and analyzes fiscal incentives for exports in the
Philippines, specifically, focusing on the incentives provided under the
aegis of the Board of Investment (BOI) and the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), and the tax and duty exemption/drawback schemes
administered by the Bureau of Customs and the BOI. It presents first a
17
TableH.5 "
NOMINALEXCHANGERATEAND-REALXCHANGERATEINDEX:
PHILIPPINES:KOREA,SINGAPORE,THAILAND,TAIWAN DHONGKONG
1973-1988
................................................................................... _-...........................................
YEAR Korea Sin9apore Thailand Taiwan. HongKong
Nominal Real • Nominal Real..Nominal-- Real Nominal....Real.• Nominal Real
__ ................................................................................................................................
1973 0.017000 100,00% 2.764900 100.00%0.327700 100.00%0.176600 100.00%1.311800 100.00%
1974 0,016800 90.24% 2.785500 89,47%0.333200 92.55%0,178600 115.30%1,337000 82,.88%
1975 0,015000 95.88%3,056500 93,22%0.355700 95.98%0.190700 119.60%1.467500 86.35%
1976 0.015400 107,27%3.011300 84.30%0,364700 96.73%0.195800 118.51%1,517100 87,04%
1977 0,015300 ,I08.91_3,034700 80.99_0,362900 95.75%0,194800116.91%1,58790089114%
1978 0.015219 115.85%3.239100 84,16%0,362200 95.95%0,198800117.22%i.57220086.83%
1979 0,015243 I15.39_3,392800 7574_ 0,361300 87.12%0.)04_700" It0.07%1.41470075.29%
1980 0.012365 105,72%3,507800 "'70,92%0.366800 89.81_"t0.208600 I13.05%1,509400. 74.97%
1981 0,011600 107.85%3.739300 72,20%0_362100 88,30%0,214400119.81%.41250070.93%
1982 0.011681 105,46%.. 3,990700 72,45%0,371300 86.19%0.218300 .113.42%1,406500 70,88%
1983 0,0142"70 121,82%5,259100 8'9,ii%0.483200 106.71%0.277400134.26%1.52800076,91%
1984 0.020719 118.28%7.828500 90.08%0,706400 I03,17_0.421700136.43%2,13600075.03%
i985 0:021387 97.71%8.45/000 76,90%0.685100 78.74%0..468900119,33%2.88300086.32%
1986 0.023128 107,17%9,372067 _3.63%0.779250 90,42%0.539967137.93%2.61360080.04%
1987 0,025180 Ii6.37%9.776900 84,74%0,800908 91.68%0,651375 162.34%2.66940081.42%
1988p/ 0,029000 132.65%I0.490400 85.06%0.834200 90,92%0.740100172.67%2.702000 --
p/ AsofAuust1988only
Source:InternationalFi ncialStatistics(IFS)
KeyIndicatorsofDMCsofADB
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theoretical framework for the design of an optimal incentive package for
exports, and then describes and evaluates the existing fiscal incentives to
exports.
1'0 Theoretical Framework
The rationale for the provision of export _ incentives is better
understood by taking a closer look at the bias against the export activity
relative to the import substituting activity. This bias against exports,
B, is defined as the proportional difference in the domestic value added
from i_port substitution and the domestic value added from exporting
(Balassa 1971). Thus,
is
V
d
B = 1 (i)
X
v
d
or
is
(I+T ) - a T
i ii
B = - i (2)
X
(I+T) - a T
ii
is
where v is domestic value added in import substitution
:d
industry,
X
v is domestic value added in the exporting industry,
d
is
T is implicit tariff rate on the output of the
substituting activity in industry j,
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x
T is the implicit tariff rate on the output of the
exporting activity in industry j,
a is the an%ount of intermediate input i used to
i
produce one unit of output and
3__/
T is the implicit tariff on input i.
i
B is positive. This results from the fact that for exports the
implicit tariff on output is zero unless there is a subsidy on exports (it
is negative if there is an export tax) while the implicit tariff on inputs
are positive. This measure represents the penalty on exports, relative to
import substitution, that the protection structure perpetuates. This anti-
export bias can be eliminated by reducing the expression in (2) to
zero. The first best and most direct way of achieving this is by the
outright removal of tariffs and restrictions on all imports. Doing this
reduces both numerator and denominator of the first term in (2) to the free
trade value added. It also implies that EPR is zero for all is.
J
Alternatively, low and uniform tariffs on all imports will approximate the
results of the first option. However, both economic (adjustment costs,
timing/sequencing issues, etc.) as well as noneconomic (political, etc. )
considerations indicate that the first best approach may not be feasible in
the short run or even in the medium term. The second best solution would
then compensate for the bias against exports via a combination of subsidy
on output and exemption/credit/drawback on taxes on inputs.
3_/
The implicit tariff is the ratio of domestic price to border price
of any given commodity less one.
2O
The appropriate combination of instruments in this second best
scenario suggests itself if we take equation (2) and ask ourselves what we
can do to domestic value added in the exporting activity (i.e., the
the denominator of the first term) to make it equal to domestic value added
in the import substituting activity (i.e., the numerator of the first
term) so as to remove the bias against exports. And the answer is:
X
si_itaneously reduce T and all T s in the exporting activity to zero
i
and augment the resulting value added by an amount equal to EPR (vj).
In other words, the bias against exports arising fr_n the protection
structure nay be counteracted by giving export producers access to inputs
(intermediate and capital) at world market prices and by providing
exporters the same protection or incentives accorded to producers in the
import substituting industry. The first adjustment equates domestic value
added in exports to free trade value added while the second one makes up
for the disincentive against exports relative to import substitutes.
2.0 Analysis of Fiscal Incentives to Exports
Given the perspective outlined above, we are now ready to evaluate the
existing package of incentives to exports. At present, the Philippines
employs a number of schemes all aimed at providing free trade status to
4/
"Providing access to inputs at world market prices" entail the
following: (i) tax and duty free importation of intermediate inputs and
capital equipment for use in export production, (2) a rebate to exporters
equal to the implicit tariff times the free trade value of locally sourced
importable inputs and (3) a rebate to exporters equal to the implicit
tariff times the free trade value of the traded goods content of non-traded
intermediate inputs, in addition to the elimination of import and foreign
exchange restrictions on imported inputs. The second and third adjustments
are necessary once one recognizes that tariffs drive the domestic price by
the proportion T relative to the border price. An alternative to ita_s (2)
and (3) would be the provision to indirect exporters of access to inputs at
world market prices.
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exports in terms of •their• intermediate •input use. These are discussed in
detail in Section 2.1. BOI •and EPZA also •grant various •incentives to
export producers. •In turn, these are reviewed and analyzed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Access to Intermediate Inputs at World Market Prices
2. i.1 Description
To ensure that exporters are competitive with their foreign
•counterparts as• far as intermediate input cost is concerned,• the
government administers •taxand duty exemption as well as tax and duty
drawback mechanisms. Exporters may avail themselves of tax and duty
exemption on imported •intermediate inputs via any one of the
following: (i) •locating in an export processing zone (EPZ) ;• (2)
using bonded manufacturing warehouse (B_) _acilities; and (3)
importing •under Customs •Administrative Order 3-78 (CAO 3-78). On the •
other hand, tax and duty drawback on imported intermediate inputs used
in export production may be obtainedunder the following modes: (i)
individual drawback scheme of the Bureau of Customs (BOC); and (2)
fixed drawback scheme of the •BOI.
EPZ enterprises are exempt from tariffs, taxes and other
restrictions that might otherwise be imposed on •their imports.
Furthermore, administrative •procedures covering importation of these
firms are highly simplified ••relative to those apPlicable to •non-EPZ
firms. For instance, EPz enterprises comply with a five step
procedural requirement supported by three doc_,ents when they import
while other exporters wishing to import under consignment r:cd at
least •13 documents. Also, non-CIF cost of imports of EPZ firms is
low. The processing fee charged by EPZA on each shipment is no more
22
than _200 (DTI 1988). In terms of value of exports, EPZ enterprises
ranked second amongst firms that availed of the various
exemption/drawback systems (WB 1987).
The bonded manufacturing system allows exporters to import inputs
free of tax and duty. It also facilitates the release of imported raw
materials from the BOC. The documentary requirements for the
establishnent of a _ number at least 15. Foremost amongst these
are: (i) BOI registration, and the firm's commitment to export at
least 70 percent of its output with a minimum value of US$1 million;
5/
(2) "formula of manufacture"-- ; (3) copy of feasibility study of
B_ operations. There are also specific requir_nents to be met
regarding the physical condition of the BMW (see Table II.6). B_s
are costly to operate. The following payments are required: (i) a
fixed annual supervision fee of Iz45,000; (2) a performance bond of
_200,000 to guarantee compliance with the laws and regulations
affecting Bt6Ns; and (3) re-export bond equivalent to the amount of
duties, taxes and other charges that would have been due otherwise.
Finally, all imports of B_s are required to be covered by a BOI
certificate of non-availability of local substitutes.
While access to B_s tend to be effectively l_mited to large
firms, small and medium exporters may import raw materials tax and
duty free by making use of the facilities of customs common Donded
warehouses (CCBWs) operated by the Philippine International Trading
s_/
The "formula of manufacture" consists of physical input coefficients
endorsed by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) and
differentiating between domestically produced and imported inputs.
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Table II.6
DOCUMENTARY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF BMWs
WITHOUT SUBCONTRACTING
i. Instruments evidencing absolute ownership or lease contract
covering the proposed warehouse;
2. Plant location showing means of access to the
property;
3. Plant layout showing and describing the size and
construction of the proposed warehouse together with
the intended use of each room, Section or compartment
as well as the surrounding premises;
4. Flowchart showing the nature of the work of manufacture/
processing;
5. Certified true copy of Registration Certificate with
the SEC together with the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of Co-Partnership, as the case may be;
6, Certified truecopy of Registration Certificate with
the BTRCP and BIR;
7. List of machineryand equipment;
8. Certlfied true copy of Certificate of Registration with
the BOI;
9. BOI Indorsement of the application (for garments, GTE_
issues the license to operate a BMW);
10. Copy of Inspection Permit from the Electrical Department;
II. List of articles to be manufactured;
12. List of all raw materials to be imported;
13. Formula of Manufacture, patterns or sketches of articles
to be exported;
14. Building (Mayor's) Permit; and
15. Copy of project feasibility study of BMW operation.
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WITH SUBCONTRACTING
i. Name of subcontractor;
2. Copy•of contract with the subcontractor;•
3. Certificate of accreditation of the subcontractor, if
already accredited by BOC; if the subcontractor selected
is not yet accredited, •a letter of application of the
subcontractor together with other documents required
for the application;
4. Flowchart showing the specific processing stage to be
subcontracted; and
5. List of materials _o De subcontracted. _
PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
i. Plant Location - The proposed BMW snail be located in
an accessible place to ensure easy inspection by Customs
officials. • •
2. Compartments for Materials/Articles
a. Every BMW shall nave permanent compartments separated
from the premises to be used exclusively for the
storage and safekeeping of all imported materials,
finished articles ready for export, and by
products/wastages;
b. The compartment shall be properly secured to prevent
any unauthorized person from having access thereto;
c. Such compartments shall each nave two locks:
thekey of one lock shall be kept by the Customs
bonded warehouse officer at all times and the key to the
other lock shall be kept by the operator;
d. The contents therein shall be properly arranged to
give all practicable convenience to authorized Customs
official making the required examination, inspection
or inventory.
3. Office Space for Customs Personnel - Accessible and
adequate office space shall be provided for the Customs
personnel to be assigned at the BMW.
FEES
i. Supervision fee equal to P45,0_ per annum.
2. Performance Bond in the amount of P200,000 to guarantee
compliance with laws and regulations affecting BMWs.
3. Re-export bond equivalent to the amount of duties, taxes
and other charges that would otherwise be due.
Source: DTI, (1988).
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Corporation (PITC), Philippine Exporters Foundation (Philexport),
Mindanao Textile Corporation (Mintex), Philippine Integrated
(Manufacturers) Exporters, Inc. (PIE), Red Flower Garments, Inc. and
Royal Undergarments Corporation (RUC). Entities that operate CBWs
essentially serve as import agents of small exports for a service fee
that ranges from one to five percent of CIF value of imports. The
exporters are generally required to be registered with either the BOI
or NACIDA or to be accredited by the BOI, NACIDA, BOC, etc. They also
have to comply with the "formula of manufacture" and the BOI
certification of non-availability of local substitutes and the posting
of the re-export bond requirements. B_s and CCBWs account for the
biggest chunk of exports (in terms of export value) with access to
duty free imports (WB Report 1987).
CA03-78 exempts small and medium exporters importing raw
materials on consignment frQn duties and taxes on imports. To be
eligible to this privilege, exporters have to satisfy the following:
(i) their total assets must be between i;500,000 and _5 million; and
(2) they must not be registered with the BOI as an export producer,
nor should they have access to Drawback and Warehousing schemes of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP) or the incentives
under the _abroidery Law. Firms wishing to avail of benefits under
CAO3-78 have to subnit nu_aerous (exactl_ 19).doc_r_ntary requirements
and to follow a rather c_nplicated procedure for the release of
importation (see Table iI.7 and Table II.8). Like the B_N scha_,
CAO3-78 calls for the suL_nission of a formula of manufacture and the
posting of a re-export bond. However, the necessary re-export bond
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Table II.7
DOCUMENTARY REQUIREMENTS IN APPLICATION FOR DUTY EXEMPTION
UNDER CAO 3-78
i. CB IMPORT AUTHORITY (IA)
Requirements for issuance of IA:
i.i Copy of the Certificate of Registration with the concerned
government agency, such as the BOI, GTEB, PITC, or CB; in
the absence thereof, a Certificate of Qualification from
the BOC;
1.2 Copy of the processing agreement between consignee and
foreignprincipal or supplier, or the confirmed purchase
order or export L/C;
1.3 For regulated items, commodity clearance from the
appropriate government agency;
1.4 Proforma Invoice; and
1.5 Mark-up Computation Report approved by the CB Export
Department (this requirement can be waived for the first
shipment).
RequiretRents for MCR
1.5,1 Copy of Processing Agreement of Confirmed Purchase
Order (PO);
1.5.2 Copy of Certificate of Registration as export producer
with the BOI, CB, GTEB, EPZA or other government agencies
(for new applications); or
Copy of Certificate of Qualification (if not registered
with any government agency);
1.5.3 If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is based
on the PO, Agreement or other documents - copy of
source document; or
If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is estimated -
explanation on how the estimated'were derived, i.e.,
assumptions used, basis of assumptions and supporting
documents/computations, if any;
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1.5.4 If the quantity/cost of the consigned materials is based on
the invoice or other documents -copy of source document; or
If the quantity/cos£ of consigned materials is estimated -
explanation on how the estimates were derived i.e., assumptio_
used, basis of assumptions and supporting documents/
computations, if any; and
1.5.5 Formula ofManufacturesubmitted to the Bureau of Customs.
2. BOI certificate of non-availability
3. Re-export bond equal to one and one half times the ascertained duties,
taxes and other charges.
4. Certificate of Qualification (CQ)
Requirements for CQ
4.1 Authentic copy of importer's Certificate of Registration with the
SEC, and the copy of the Articles of Incorporation or Articles
of Co-Partnership, for corporations or partnerships; and Certificat_
of Registration with the BTRCP (formerly BDT) for sole proprietor-
ships;
4.2 Financial Statement certified by the BIR;
4.3 Certified copy of a valid and subsisting contract between the
importer and foreign supplier/buyer;
4.4 Formula of Conversion certified by the Department of Science and
Technology or any appropriate government agency;
4.5 Plant's location map; and
4.6 Sworn Statelnent stating the following:
i. That the materials are to be imported on consignment basis,
and are solely intended for commercial export or sample
purposes, based on the design/pattern prescribed by the
supplier/foreign buyer.
ii. Procedures to be followed in the production of imported
materials; and
iii. That the applicant does not have the financial capacity to
make prior payment of the Customs duties, taxes and other
charges, or doe.s not have the necessary resources to establis
and operate a bonded manufacturing warehouse.
Source: DTI, (1988).
28
Table II.8
PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF IMPORTATION
UNDER CAO 3-78
The following are the procedures in the release of the importation:
i. The importer submits to the Entry Processing Division the following:
a. Import Entry and its supporting documents; and
b. Copy of the CQ.
2. The Entry Processing Division processes the entry and stamps the name
"SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES" and forwards the entry to the Special
Assessment Unit, Bonded Warehouse Division, Port of Manila (POM), or
the Warehousing Unit, Assessment Division, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA).
3. The Special Assessment of Warehousing Unit:
a. Undertakes an examination and appraisal of the shipment pursuant
to existing rules and regulations;
b. Verifies if the imported materials as declared in the entry documents
are the ones specified in the CQ;
c. Adds the quantity of raw materials imported to date and checks if
the quantity specified in the contract was not exceeded; and
d. Transmits entry to the Bonds Division.
4. The Bonds Division, on the basis of the documents presented:
a. Checks if there are due and demandable bonds from previous
importations;
b. Checks and approves ordinary re-export bonds; and
c. Transmits entry to the Cash Division, POM, or the Liquidation
Unit, Collection Division, NAIA.
5. The Cash Division or Liquidation Unit:
a. Receives entry and issues Permit to Deliver Imported Goods (POM)
or Gatepass (NAIA);
b. Forwards the same to the Piers and Inspection Division, POM, or
the Office of the Bonded Warehouse Supervisor, or the PAL Ware-
house, NAIA; and
c. Returns the entry to the Special Assessment Unit, Bonded WarehoUse
Division, POM, or the Warehousing Unit, Assessment Division, NAIA.
Source: DTI, (1988).
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under CA03-78 is one and a half times that required under the B_
scheme.
The requirements for drawback claims under the BGC sch_ne are
presented in Table II. 9. Common with the other schemes are
requirements on the formula of manufacture and BOI certification of
non-availability of local substitutes. Tax credits under this system
is available from 7 to 30 days upon submission of necessary documents.
It should be pointed out that at most 99 percent of duties and taxes
paid on imported materials may be refunded.
While the refunds under the individual drawback are based on
actual usage of imported inputs, tax credits under the fixed drawback
scheme are based on predetermined rates set by the BOI. The
requirements and procedures to be followed for firms to benefit from
the fixed drawback system are relatively simple (see Table II.10).
However, while this sch_ne is available to both BOI and non-B01
registered export producers, the number of export items covered is
rather limited (e.g., only 225 items in 1987) (WB Report 1987).
Finally, under the Value added tax (VAT) system that is currently
in place, exports are zero rated. This implies that a VAT registered
enterprise will have no taxes on its exported output but it can claim
a tax credit for value added tax paid on imported and locally sourced
raw materials used in export manufacture. The tax refund is due
within 60 days from the date of filing of claim which is 20 days
following the end of each quarter.
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Table II. 9
REQUIREMENTS FOR BOC DRAWBACK CLAIMS
i. Import documents;
2. Export documents;
3. Bank credit memo or similar document evidencing remittance of
export proceeds;
4. Abstract of record (Form No. i);
5. Certificate of non-availability of competitive substitutes for the
imported materials for regulated commodities under CB Circular 1029;
6. Formula of manufacture or conversion issued by DOST or other related
agencies;
7. Certificate of exportation (Form No. ii), if required; and/or
8. Constructive exportation documents (for indirect exporters);
a. Purchase Order;
b. Sales Invoive
c. Deliverl Receipt;
d. Certificate of sales and delivery confirmed by a Chief of the
Bonded Warehouse Division (Drawback Form No. I-A); and/or
e. Certificate of sales and delivery confirmed by EPZA (Drawback
Form No. 1,B).
Source: DTI, (1988).
31
Table II.10
REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR FIXED DRAWBACK SCHEME
Documentary Requirements :
I. Export invoice;
2. Bill of Lading;
3. Bank Credit Memo; and
4. A statement under oath stating that:
a. Taxes and duties have been paid on the raw materials/supplies;
b' Said raw materials/supplies are not enjoying preferential rates;
and
c. Said raw materials/supplies were purchased within one (i) year
from date of actual exportation.
Procedures for Availment of Standard Rebate
i. Importer/claimant files application including the required documents
with the Tax Rebate Center (TRC) through the Records Section of
the BOI.
2. If the documents are c0mplete, applicant pays the-application fees
with the Cashier. Otherwise, docwaents are returned to the applicant
for completion.
30 Tax Credit Application (TCA) is forwarded to the industry group
and evaluated by the Analyst. ..
4. The Analyst prepares an Evaluation Report and issues a Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC) amounting to the computed tax credit based on
the standard rate.
5. The deputized representative of the BOC and the BIR to the Center
sign, the TCC's in the following manner:
a. The representative of. the Customs Commissioner signs the tax.
credits against tariff duties.
b. The representative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
signs tax credits against value-added tax,
6. The TRC releases the TCC to the supplier/applicant within two (2)
working days from the time the application is officially accepted.
Source: DTI, (1988).
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2.i.2 Assess[nent
The fran_work outlined above suggests that an important component
of providing free trade status to exports is the absence of import
restrictions on inputs. Contrary to this precept, all exporters
except those located in an EPZ are asked to get a BOI certification of
non-availability of domestic substitute for the imported raw material.
This condition is over and above the more general restrictions on
imports pending complete import liberalization (Medalla 1989).
The tax and duty free importation of raw materials (item 1 of
footnote 4) is met with varying degrees of effectiveness by the
different exenlotion and drawback systems that are currently in place.
It should be emphasized that in practice all of these schemes account
for less than 50 percent of exports, values with the majority of small
exporters effectively excluded (WB 1987). Locating in an EPZ distorts
the price of imported inputs least if one takes into account both
direct and indirect (transactions) costs of importing materials.
While B_;s free exporters frorc actually paying taxes and duties on
imported inputs, the financial costs associated with this system in
the form of supervision fees and performance and re-export bonds are
by no means &%tall. In the Philippines, the procedural requirements
for BMWs are simpler relative to other schetnes but these are more
stringent than those in other countries where exporters using BMWs are
not required to submit a "formula of manufacture" and to post a re-
export bond. The operation of CCBWs is a coL_mendable development
since it minimizes the bias against small exporters inherent in the
B_ system. CCBWs have also introduced some laudable innovations.
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For instance, Philexport allows the issuance of a post-dated check in
lieu of a re-export bond.
CAO-3-78, which was instituted in support of small • and medium
exports, is rendered ineffective by •the complicated administrative
requirements and •the •implied high transactions Cost. Also, there
appears to be no rationale for the nigher re-export bond required
under CAO 3-78.
The drawback system under •the BOC and the BOI, on the other hand,
entails additional cost in terms of the implied interest cost on the
working capital used to pay the duties and taxes before refunds are
due and the concomitant transactions costs arising from the
c_aplicated import administration. The products included in the fixed
drawback system is also •rather limited.
While the advantages . of the B_W_s and CCBWs cannot be
underestimated these schemes are better suited to firms that produce
primarily for export. At•the same time, the edge of the exemption
over the drawback are obvious. Thus, one •cannot escape the need for
an efficient exemption system if one hopes to encourage firms that
produce both for the domestic and export markets, and marginal
exporters for these type of exports will become increasingly important
•in the medium term.
Rhee (1984) asserts that the regular publication of up-to-date
input-output coefficients for exports is an important element in
effective import administration for exports. World Bank (1987), on
the other hand, notes that the determination of the formula of
S4
manufacture appears to De unsystematic and is usually set on an ad
hoc basis in the Philippines.
The zero rating of exports under VAT partially addresses the
•requisites of item 2 of footnote 4 as it rebates the indirect tax
canponent of the implicit tariff for domestically produced traded
inputs, although the holding cost of capital involved in the advance
payment of VAT on raw materials is not taken into consideration. The
import duty portion is also not accounted for in this adjustment. Nor
is item 3 of footnote 4 met under the various sch_aes discussed. It
is interesting to note that the tax credit equal to 10 percent of net
local content that is provided to exporters under the old Investment
Code, (i.e., BP 391) may be viewed as addressing, albeit partially,
6_/
the duty component of item 2 and all of item 3. Therefore, it is
unfortunate that this provision was dropped with the promulgation of
the new Code.
7_/
2.2 Export Incentives under BOI and EPZA
2.2.1 Description
Incentives to exports in the form of investment and other
inducements have been in force in the Philippines since 1970 with the
enactment of Republic Act 6135 or the Exports Incentives Act. Since
6_/
This adjustment is less than that which is required because 10 per-
cent is less than the average tariff on intermediate inputs which stands at
25 percent in the eighties (Tariff C_rmission).
7_/
In addition to the special treatment of i_ported materials and
equipment in EPZs that effectively establish a free trade regime for
•exports, EPZA grants the sane incentives to exporters as the BOI so that in
the discussion that follows when we talk of BOI incentives we also mean
EPZA incentives to exporters.
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then, it has been amended and codified three times over. However, the
changes introduced under Batas Pambansa 391 (BP 391) in 1983 were
truly radical and deserve some comment despite the fact that it has
since been superseded by Executive Order 226 (EO 226) or the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (OIC 1987).
A comparison of the incentives granted under BP 391 and E0 226
is presented in Table II.ll. EO 226 replaces the provisions on tax
credit on net value earned and net local content by the income tax
holiday for a duration that ranges frcm 3 to 8 years. Duty free
importation of capital equipment is made available to both exporting
and non-exporting firms under EO 226 while this privilege was granted
8_/
to exporting firms only under BP 391.
EPZA registered firms produce solely for the export market. On
the other hand, BOI registration may be obtained if the proposed
project is included in the Investment Priorities Plan or, if it is not
so listed, at least 50 percent of its total production is for
9_/
export. The equity restrictions on foreign investors is waived if
they propose to engage in a pioneer project or if they propose to
10__/
export at least 70 percent of total output.
BP 391 allowed pioneer non-exporting firms to defer all duties and
taxes on capital equipment while non-pioneer non-exporting firms are
permitted to defer only 50 percent of these taxes for a period of 5 years.
9_/
The 50 percent export criterion was first introduced in 1983.
In general, foreign equity participation in any particular project
cannot exceed 40 percent.
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Table II,ll
COflPAR_SONOFINCENTIVESUNDERBP391ANDE0226
BP391 EO226
Incentive Domestic Export Domestic Export
Producer Producer Producer Producer
Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-Pioneer
1, ExempLionfrom duties IHZ 10eZ 1B0_ 106_ IU_ lUZ
andtaxes on imported
capital equipment
2, Defermentof duties 166Z 51_ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
andtaxes on imported
capital equipment5to
be repaid within 5 years
3. Taxcredit on domestic 166_ 166% 166% 1BBZ 1B6Z IUZ
capital equipeenL
equivalent to duties
and taxes on similar
foreign equipment
4, Tax credit on domestic 1N% 1NZ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
capital equipeentto
,be repaid Nithin 5 years
5, Taxcredit on net value IBZ 5Z lmZ 5_ N/A N/A. N/A NTA
earnedfor _ive years
6, Tax credit on net ' 16Z 16_ N/A " N/A N/A N/A
local content for
five years
a/ a/ a/ a/
7, Tax holiday N/A N/A N/A N/A 6-8 years 4-7years 6-8 years 4-7 years
8, Net operating Yes Yes Yes. Yes No No No No
loss carry over
b/ b/ b/ b/
9. Deductionfrom No No No No Yes Yes Yes .Yes
taxable incomeof 56_
of incremental labor
,
expensefor 5 years
a/
Theseare applicable to newprojects, Expandingfirms are entitled
to 3 year tax holiday. Existing fires are not antitied to the tax
holiday at all,
bi
Redundantfor firms enjoyinq tax holiday.
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2.2.2 Assessment
A cursory examination of Table II,ll indicates that BP 391
provided more benefits to exporters than to non-exporters while the
incentives under EO 226 are perfectly neutral with respect to these
two groups of producers. Following the approach developed in Manasan
(1986, 1988) we estimated the impact on the internal rate of return
(IRR) of the more important provisions of BP 391 and EO 226 on
hypothetical BOI registered firms. Table II.12 shows that the
incr_nent on the IRR of exporters is 3 to 4 times as large as that of
non-exporters under BP 391 while Table If.13 indicates that EO 226
differentiates between pioneer and non-pioneer enterprises only.
Consequently, the inducements given to exporters are reduced by half
while the benefits made available to non-exporters almost double
under the new Investment Incentives Code.
From the Vantage point of the framework presented above, EPZA/BOI
incentives may be viewed as providing compensating adjustments to
counteract the anti-export bias of the prevailing trade regime.
EPZA/BOI provisions on the tax and duty free importation of capital
equipment as well as the tax credit for domestically-sourced capital
effectively grant exporters access to capital inputs at undistorted
prices. It was pointed out earlier that the tax credit on net local
content under BP 391 partially addresses the adjustment called for
under item 2 of footnote 4. This provision is no longer available
under EO 226. Nor is an efficient mechanism that extends the access
to intermediate inputs at free trade prices to indirect exporters in
place.
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Table II°13
CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN OF HYPOTHETICAL
BOI REGISTERED FIRMS UNDER EO 226 _/
(IN PERCENTAGE POINTS)
Non Pioneer Pioneer
n=10 n=20 n=10 n::20
i. Tax holiday 2.5 1.75 3.5 2.5
without extension
2. Tax holiday 3.75 2.75 4.0 3.0
with maximum
extension
3. Duty Exemption b/ 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5
on Capital
4. 1+3 7.25 4.9 8.25 5.75
5. 2+3 8.75 6.0 9.0 6.5
As in Table II.12.
As in TaDle II.12.
4O
The tax credit on net value earned under BP 391 may be seen as
partially providing the second major ad3ushnent outlined in the
framework since it augments domestic value added in the exporting
11__/
activity by some proportion of value added. A value-added based
incentive like this one is "the ideal form of tax incentive for
exports" (Rhee 1984). This incentive, however, has been replaced by
t_e income" tax holiday under EO 226. A comparison of line 2 in Table
II.12 and line 1 in Table II.13 suggests that the tax credit on net
value earned and the income tax holiday provide roughly equivalent
benefits to exporters (at least in ter_s of their impact on the
internal rate of return.) However, the inducement provided by the
income tax holiday as estimated in Table II.13 is likely to be
overstated. First, our analysis on Table II.13 is based on the
asstmlption that the registered enterprise is uniformly profitable over
its life span. The firm might actually De incurring losses in the
years near its inception which coincides with the period when the tax
holiday is in force. In this case, the value of the tax holiday to
the exporter would be diminished considerably. Second, the absence of
tax sparing arrangements between the Philippines and most capital
exporting countries nullifies the potential benefits from the income
tax holiday to foreign investors.
To surm_arize, the combination of the ex_nption/drawback system
for intermediate inputs and BOI/EPZ_ incentives is not enough to
compensate for the anti-export Dias of the protection systeJn.
11__/
The average EPR for import substitutes is 25 percent in 1985
(Medalla 1986). It is considerably higher than the 10 percent adjustment
granted by the above mentioned provision.
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Furthermore, the changes introduced under EO 226 exacerbate this
deficiency.
While the export orientation of the incentives under E0 226 has
declined relative to those under BP 391, both versions of the
Investments Code share the same bias in favor of exports in terms of
project selection. Consequently, there has been an enormous increase
in the share of exports in BOI approved projects since 1984 (see Table
II.14).
The '_asured capacity" concept as a criterion in project
selection was a feature of all investment incentive legislations
including BO 226 except BP 391. This concept implies some limitation
on competition. It loses substance not only when exports are
potential but also when imports are not prohibited. Thus, if the BOI
uses it to regulate entry it will penalize exporters on two counts:
(i) potential exporters might not be allowed entry on grounds of
overcrowding; and (2) existing exporters will have to bear the higher
input costs implied by limited output (via the measured capacity
concept) in the upstre_,n industries.
There has been some concern about the competitiveness of BOI
incentives with those offered by other countries given the importance
of foreign investment implied by the country's financing gap. Manasan
(1988) compared the investment incentives granted by the ASEAN
countries and concluded that the ASEAN countries are equally
competitive with each other before as after incentives (see Table
II.15). Since EO 226 incentives were the ones used in this
comparison, we can infer that BP 391 incentives are more generous than
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TableIf.15
INTERNALRATEOFRETURNOFA HYPOTHETICALFIPM
UNDERSELECTEDINCENTIVESCHEMESINASEANCOUNTRIES,I_B8
Indonesia MalaYsia Philippines Singapnre Thailand
n:lO n:20 n:lO n:20 n:10 n=20 n:lO n:20 n:!_ n:20
I, RegularTaxesII,0 13,0 10.25 II.5 15_0 I6.5 ii.25 13,25
(noincentive)I0,0 12.5 I0,25 ll.l
9.0 12,0
2, TaxHoliday NA 16.5 15,0 12,5 t3.5 17,0 17.25 12,0 13,5
(min,no.of 19,0 18,75
yearsallowed)
3, TaxHoliday NA 16.75 17.0 14,1 15,0 20.0 19.0 14,0 !5,0
(max,no.of 20,0 1Q,75
yearsallowed)
4. DutyExemption15,0 16,5 12.25 12.25 13,75 14.0 NA 15.0 16.5
onCapital 14.25 15.75
13.5 15,25
5, (2 + 4) 15 16,5 19.35 17.35 17,5 17,0 17,0 17,25 16.5 17,0
14.25 15,75 19,0 18,75
13.5 15,25
6, (3+ 4) 15 16,5 20.0 19.25 19.25 18,4 20,0 19.0 19,0 IB.5
14,25 15.75 20.0 19,75
13,5 15,25
7. Investment NA 16,0 15.1 NA IB.O 18.25 HA
Allowance
Only
(max,allowed)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore ThaiTand
n:lO n:20 n:lO n:20 n:10 n:20 n:lO n:20 n:10 n:20
8. (T + 4) 17.7 17,0 NA 18.0 18.25 NA
9, Export 16,5 16.0 11.5 13.5
Allowance
Only
10,(2+ 4 + 9 NA 20.0 19.5 NA 17.0 17.5
11,(3+ 4 + 9 NA 20,0 20,0 NA 19.5 19,0
Remoitems'
tm .25 .12 .2 0 .2
u .15/,25/.35 .40 + .05 .35 .33 .35
t
Th_assumedincomestreamusedinthesecalculationsisthatwhichyieldsbeforeLaxIReoF .20
a/
Foru : 15, 25, 35_, respectively
b/
specialallowancefordepreciationnLaxholidayperiod,
c/
forI00_export.
Source:Manasan(1988).
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those of other ASEAN countries with respect to export producers.
Thus, the shift to EO 226 might have reduced the attractiveness of the
Philippines •to foot loose export industries. Also, the Philippines,
unlike Singapore and Malaysia, does not provide exporters incentives
based on export promotion/overseas expansion expenditures,
The sample exporter-respondents were asked whether they received any
special incentives from the government. It is noteworthy that half of them
admitted that they have not received or have no knowledge at all about any
incentives given by the government (see Table II.16). Others mentioned BOI
incentives, exemption from export tax, and some programs of the DTI as the
most important incentives they have received from the government. As
regards the New Omnibus Investment Code (NOIC), five respondents said that
the incentives contained •therein are better than the previous ones.
However,• a great majority of the respondents do not have any knowledge at
all regarding the new incentives given•under the NOIC, hence they do not
have any basis for comparing them with the incentives given under the
previous code.
•The respondents cited paper work involved in exporting, importation of
raw materials and machinery, regulations in gathering locally available
materials (e.g., rattan pools), quota allocation system (in favor• of big
exporters), and foreign exchange proceeds requirement (i'.e., the
requirement to immediately surrender all foreign exchange earnings) as
major regulations that adversely affect exports.
The Inter-Agency Study Group on External Trade Statistics and
Projections Foreign Operations Committee which met with exporters last
December 1987 prepared a comprehensive summary of the problems encountered
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Table II.16
SPECIAL INCENTIVES GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT
Assets Export NO. Incentives NOIC
A. Small-Scale •
1 1 none no knowledge
1 6 regular trade exhibition •better
1 7 product exposure better
1 8 none no knowledge
1 9 list of direct buyers no knowledge
1 10 nave not received any no knowledge
1 ii no knowledge no knowledge •.
1 12 BOI incentives, Kalakalan ng 20 no knowledge
1 14 market encounter better
1 17 export sales - exempted from VAT better
1 2_ no knowledge no knowledge
1 21 no knowledge no knowledge
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 BOI same
2 3 none not aware
2 4 B0I - importation of eqpt. & mach. same
1 13 BOI, tax incentives no knowledge
2 15 no knowledge no knowledge
i 22 no knowledge no knowledge
C. Large-Scale
2 5 BOI under BP 391 no knowledge
2 16 none no knowledge
2 18 VAT & other tax exemptions worse
1 19 no knowledge no knowledge
3 23 tax credit on NVE/NIC better
NOTE: Assets: i - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
NOIC - New Omnibus Investment Code
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by exporters and their recommendations. Those related to trade and fiscal
policies are reproduced in Table II.17.
III. PHILIPPINE EXPORT STRUCTURE AND FORECASTS OF EXPORTS AND D_MAND FOR
PRE-AND POST-SHIPMENT FINANCING
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses _]e
Philippine export structure from 1970 to 1988 while the second presents
forecasts of exports and demand for pre- and post-shipment financing.
A. The Philippine Expor£ Structure
From a level of only US $768 M in 1965, t_e level of Philippine
exports has grown to US $7.1 B by 1988. The most rapid growth occurred
during the decade Of 197_ to 1980 when exports grew byan annual average
of 20.7 percent. Export level declined during the first half of the 1980s
but has recovered steadily from i986 to 1988.
The composition of Philippine exports has changed substantially in the
last two decades. Even as late as the mid-1960s, t/qe Philippines was still
basically an agriculture and inineral exporter. By the 1980s, manufactured
exports comprised more than half Of total exports. These Changes are
readily discerned using different classification scn_es.
Table III.l shows that theshare of exports of natural resource-Oased
sectors has fallen markedly from around 44.5 percent in 1970 to 9 percent
in 1987. The share of logs and l_oer in the top ten principal exports
fell down from 29.5 percent in i97_ to 13.8 percent in 1987.
Using the one-digit PSCC classification scheme, the changes in _le
export structure are found to be very pronounc_d. This is presented in
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TableII,17
SUMNARYOFSELECTEDRADE-ANDFISCAL-RELATEDPROBLEm,RECOMMENDATIONSANDPR SPECTS
DECEMBERINDUSTRYDIAL_UESCONDUCTEDBYTHEIASG
INDUSTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECOMMENDATIONS ABENCYINVOLVED
A.Problems/RecommendationCommonToAllIndustrySectors
PRODUCTIONUnavailabilityofcompetitivelypriced Allowimportationofnecessaryraw BOI/CB/DTI
andgood-qualityrawmaterialsinthe materialsthesearenotavailablelocally
domesticmarket, inordertosustaindustries.
Highcostofproduction, Workforthereductionoftariffrateson BOI/DTI
importedrawmaterialsndequipmenti
Inadequatetechnicalassistance,techno-ordertocut hehighcostofproduction.
logicalskillsandbasicfacilities,
particularysmallentrepreneursor AllowtheapplicationofearnedcreditsBOI/DTI
farmers/planters, aspaymentforuseofpublicutilities
andothertaxestolessenthefinancial
Hightariffratesimposedonimportedburdenofrisingelectricpowercost,
rawmaterialsndequipment, waterandothertaxes,
Unreasonablecostoffreightbothin Providemoreinfrastructure,transport-Present
internationalendinter-islandshipping,ationandcommunicationfacilities, Administration
Inadequatedisseminationof nformationForgeamoreffectivelaborandmanage-DLE/DTI
tosmallexportersregardingmarket mantominimizelabordisputeswhichmay
developmentsandprospects eventuallyeadtotherosionfthe
competitiveedgofPhilippineexports-
Decreasedproductionduetotheeffectscheaplabor-ifnotgiventheproper
ofrecentaturalcalamitiessuchas direction,
droughtandtyphoons,
Addresstheprevailingpolitical Present
Mountinglabor-managementproblems, uncertaintybroughtaboutbymounting Administration
insurgencyproblems,
Deterioratingpeaceendor_rcondition,
FISCAL RisingcostofredtapeandbureaucracyPromoteefficiencyinallgovernment Allgovernment
ingovernmentchannels,specificallyin channelstominimizethecostofbureau-agencies
theprocessingofpertinentdocuments,crecyandredtapeandtoeliminate
uncoordinatedactivitiesofthe
Lackofinnovativeand ffective government,
incentives,particularlyforsmall
exporterswhoarebeingdiscriminatedin Reviewandrevise/amendexistingpoliciesDTI/BOI/DF/NEDA
favoroflargecorporations, perceivedbythebusinesssectorto
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INDUSTRYSECTOf_ BOTTLENECKS RECO_ENDATIONS fiBENCY]NVOLVEO
SluggishactionontheCARPhasstalled strengtheningstructuralsupporta the
plansforexpansiona ddevelopmentof" fiscal level.
nost-agri-andagro-industrial
enterprises, Requestfor thegovernmentto be,rare Present
"pro-active"andpromtiveratherthan adm!nistration
reactiveandregulativesoasnotto
scareawayinves_tsandothergrowth
opportunities,
Providea morehealthybusinessenviron- Presentad_inis-
mentthroughgovernmentandprivate trationand
sectorsjointeffortsinordertoattractIndustrymembers
moreinvestmentsi othecountry.
Rationalizetraveltaxesiparticular)'to DF/DTI/BOI
exporterswhotravelfrequentlyto
promots/selltheir productsabroad,
FornulatsandprovideappropriateschemesDTIandIndustry
to.improvethecometitivsnessof members
Philippinexportsrelativeto other
exportingcountries,
EXTERNAL Stiffcompetitionfr mproducers.who.Reduceoreliminatetariffandnon-tariffOTI/NEDA
enjoybetterincentivesand ubsidiesbarriersthroughinternationalagreements
bytheirgovernments, withtradingpartners.
Existenceoftariffandnon-taiifftradeConductonanon-9oingbasisreviewof DTIandIndustry
barriersa(lainstsomePhilippine currentmarkettrendsandopportunitiesmembers
exports, byboththe xportsectorandthe
governmentsector.
EstablishamarketintelligencenetworkDTI
inordertoprovidemarketinformationas
wellasdataonothercompetitor
countries,
PROCEDURALIneffectiveimportprocedures/SystemImproveonimportprocedures/systemto CB/BOI
whichdelayprocessingofpertlnent hastenprocurementofrawmaterial
documents, requirementsofmanufacturingindustries,
Lackofcomprehensiveandeffective Lessenxportdocumentationprocessby CB/BOl/Bureauof
classificationschemeforso_export establishing'o e-stopshop"forexport Custom
productswhichleadstoconfusionn shipmentapplications,permitsand
.reportingandpolicyinformation, clearances,
5O
INI}USTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECO_NI)ATIONS AGENCYINVOLVED
B,Problems/Rec{me_tion.ofSpecificIndustries
(1) Coconut
Products
ProductionDecreasedproductionbecauseofthe Implementa dsupervisecloselythe DA/PCA
effectsoftherecentatural replanting,tercroppingandfertili-
calamitieslikedroughtandtyphoons,zationschemesinordertoimprovethe
qualityandquantityofproduction.
Deterioratingpeaceandordercondition
in _t coconut-producingareas, ExtendtheresearchandstudyagreementDA/PCA
withtheHarvardMedicalSchoolto
Limitedde_esticmarketforcoconut developnewproductsorusesofcoconut
productswhichshouldcomIemntthe andtoprovidemedicalbasisagainst
exportindustry, thesmearcampaignofASA.
Introduceinnovationandmore_ffectiveDA/PCA
dryingproceduresandtechniquesto
limittheaflatoxinco tentfoundin
meal,
Fiscal SluggishactiontheCARPhasstalledMonitorcarefullythe stablishmentof DA/PCA
planforexpansionand evelopment,barangaycooperativesnorderto
meximizeth useoffunds,especiallyin
Thegrowingconcernoverthefollowingthegrassrootslevel,
recentdevelopmentsi the.international...
marketwhichwouldsubstantiallyreduce
External export.earningsofcoconutproductsif Continueth counter-offensivemove DTI/PCA
theseareallowedtotaketheircourse,againstthesmearcaml_ignundertakenby
theAmericanSoybeanAssociation.
a) thesmearcampaignoftheAmerican
SoybeanAssociationagainstcoconutoil Strengthenthelobbyagainstthebills DTI/PCA
andothertropicaloilsbeinglaunchedwhichbanthe ntryofcoconutproducts
intheU,S.,andthediscriminatoryintheU.S,nowpendingintheUS
billsbeingdebatedcurrentlyintheUS Congress,i,e.HB2148,SB110gand1699,
Congressaboutthedeteriorationofthe
degreeofsaturationofthetropical IntensifythelobbybeingstagedagainstDTI/PCA
oils. theproposedimpositionofthevegetable
oilconsumptionaxinEEC,
b) theproposedimpositionofavege-
tableoilconsumptionax:onlocal Penetrateo her.prospectivemarketssuch DTIIPCA
andimportedoilinEEC. asPRDC,Indonesiaandothersocialist
countrieswhichholdgreatpotentialsin
c) theproposedtringentmeasurein ordertooffsetthelikelynegative
EECtolimittheaflatoxinco tentfoundImctonthedmndforcoconutproducts
inimportedcopramal, duetotherecentdevelopmentsi theUS
andZEC_rkets,
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I_USTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS REOOI4ENDATION$ ABENCYINVOLVED
.............................................. _-- .....................................................................
(2)Sugarand
No]lasses
ProductionReducedprofitabilitydue oincreasingImplementacontract-farmingscheme SRk/andkssocia-
labordemands, betweenthesugarplantersandprocessedtionofSugar
foodexporters,wherebyothpartieswillPlanters
Lackoftechnicalandfarmfacilitiesbegivenafreehandinthedetermination
toattainefficiencyinproduction, ofprice.
Mountinginsurgency, Diversifydlesugarlandeto,othercropsDA
likeramie,cassavaandotherrootcrops
Risingcostofproductionrelativeto tomaximizetheuseofland,
worldmarketpricesduetofarmend
millinginefficiencies, Acceleratethepreparationofstudieson BTI/SRA
the thanolprogramndotherindustrial
usesof sugar.
Fiscal Redtapein governmentbureaucracy Formulatea comprehensiveprogramthroughSRAandIndustry
increasesthecostofproductionand aconcertedeffortbetweentheprivate members
operation, sectorandthegovernment,definingthe
policiesonadministration,pricing
marketinga dfinancingaspects.
External Low.worldmarketprices, Penetrateo herprospectivemarkets, SRA/DTI
Continuedd pendenceondecliningUS
quotaallocation. .,
ShiftinpreferenceofAmerican
consumerstoalternativeswe teners,
(3)Fruits
(a)Bananas
ProductionReducedproductionduetonatural Enhanceproductionbymaximizingthe Industrymembers
calamitiessuchasdroughtandtyphoons,allowablehectsrogeplantedtobananas.
Fiscal SluggishformulationandimplementationFormulatendimplementthefinalguide-OA/DAR/Congress
oftheguidelinesoftheCARPwhich linesoftheCARPtoeliminateuncertain-
stallplansofexpansionntermeof tiesthatsurrounditsimplementationnd
additionalhectsrageplantedtobananas,enabletheindustryodetermineth
propercoursesofaction.
ExternalTraditionalmarketshavegrownto Exploreorpenetratenewmarketssuch DTI
_turitysonotsuchimprovementin asSouthKoreaandthePeople'sRepublic.
volumeshipmentstothesemarketsmay ofChinatooffsetthedeclining
beexpected, Philippinemarketshareinthetradi-
tionalJapaneseandMiddleEastmarkets.
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INDUSTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECON_ATIONS, A6ENCYINVOLVED
-e
Strongre-entryof Co]uebiand
Equadorianexportersto theJapanese Explorethepossibilityof negotiating DTI
marketposingathreatonthealready withtheJapanesegover_ntthe
declingingPhilippineshareinthesaid reductionoforexemptionfromthetariff
market, ratesimposedonPhilippinebananasin
ordertoeaseupthetradeofthe
Existenceoftradebarrieragainst commoditynthesaidmarket,
PhilippinebananaslandedinJapanin
theformoftariffrates.
(b)Pineapple
Products
Fiscal Agrowingconcerno theimplementationWorkfortheimmediateimplementationDAR/Congress
ofthefinalguidelinesoftheCARP. ofthefinalguidelinesoftheCARP.
Export-orientedpineapplefarming
requirelargehectarageandinclusion
ofthesefarmsintheCARPmightlead
tothedeathoftheindustry,
ExternalTheremaybenegativereprcussiononthe Diversifyntotherpotentialm rkets,QTI
demandfortheproductsintheU8asan
aftermathoftheUSstockmarketcrash,
albeitminimal.
(c)Mangoes
ProductionHighcostofairandseatransportationReduceairandseatransportationcosts DTI/MARINA/PAL
forcargoesgoingtoU.S.& Europe toreasonablelevelsinordertoprotect
comparedtocostsincurredbySouth exportersspeedyaccesstotraditional
AmericanandAfricansupplierstherebyandprospectivemarkets.
impedingthecountry'sabilityo
stronglypenetrateU.S.andEECmarkets,Undertakecomprehensiveresearch DA
developmentofhigh-yieldingand
Furtherresearchisnecessarytoproducedisease-freevarieties.
andexporthigh-yieldinganddisease-
freevarieties, Disseminateinformationregardingthe DA/DTI/BOI
newtechnologyinfumigationcalledthe
vaportbeatreatmenttoothergrowers.
ExternalTheimmediateimplementationofthe Negotiationw ththeJapanesegovernmentDTI
Japanesebanonmangoeshavingbeen onhowtocompensatethedropinNovember
treatedwithEDBresultedinlower andDecember1987shipments.
shipmentsinHovemberandDecember19B7,
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IND_TRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECONME_ATIONS A6ENCYINVOLVED
(d)AllFruits
ProductionProhibitedimportationfcheaperof- Explorethpossibilityofprocurin9 SOl/Ca
the-roadorutilityvehicles, importedanlessexpensiveutility
vehicleswhicharenotavailablelocally.
Mountinglaborprobleme,
AddresstothepresentadministrationPresent
Deterioratingpeaceandordercondition,theconcernso labordisputesand goverreent
nationalsecurity.
(4)Coffee
ProductionLoWproductionlevelduetoinadequateUpgradetraditionalproductionand Ok
technologicalandagriculturalextensionmarketingtechniques.
assistancetosmellfarmers.
ProvideupdatedinformationaboutexportDTI/ICO-CA
Inadequatedisseminationofinformationquotaallocationandtherrecentexport
tosmallfarmersregardingexport developmentstoothercoffeegrowersto
marketdevelopmentsandprospects, beabletogivethemanincentiveo
producemore,
Fiscal Onlythebigtradersbenefitfr_the Implementvigorouslythebanon DF/CB
quoteallotmentsforexportgranted importationofc ffeeinanyform.
bytheICO-CA.
External Exportsarelimitedoquotam rkets Developthepotentialofexporting DTI
becausenon-quotacounVieshavenot tonon-quotacountries.
yetbeenexploredanalsobecause
thecountrycannotcompetequality-
wiseandprice-wise.
(5)Tobacco
ProductionLowyieldstoinsufficienttechnologyUndrtakeR&Dtoimproveyi ldand DTI/PVTA
ontobaccofarming, qualityoflocally-growntobacco.
PoorqualityOfPhilippinev rginia
tobacco,
Fiscal ImpositionOftaxesontobaccoproductsFormulateeffectiveincentivesto BOI
reducesprofitabilityofgrowersand mutivate9rowersandexportersto
processors, produceefficiently,
External T)egrowinganti-smokingcampaign Developnewmarketprospects,such DTI
worldwidedampensprospectsfor asChinawhichouldbeinitiatedon
growersandprocessors, a9overnmont-to-9overnmentbasis.
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IND_YSECT_ BOTTLENECKS RECO_ENDATION$ A_NCYINVOLVED
(6)FishandFish
Products
ProductionLowproductivitybecauseofthegovern-Implementffectivelyandenforce DNR/Bureauof
ment'sinabilitytoimplementstrict strictly,fishingregulationst conserveFisheries
mariner gulationsonproperfishing, thenaturalfishresourcesandmakethe
industryself-reliantnthelongrun.
Highcostofproductionnputssuchas
energyandthe20-11)0percentimport Reviewtheimportliberalizationprogram_I/DTI/CB/NEDA
taxslappedonthevalueofimported inthelightofitsadverseeffectson
fishingequipment, theIooa]fishandfishproductsindustry,
CeroI]arytothis,thereisaneedto
Importedfishproductsallowedunder monitorthesupplyrequirementoffish
theimportliberalizationprogramere cannerstodetermineth rightvolumeand
competingstifflywithlocalcatches, kindofspeciestobeimportedinorder
tokeepthelocalcanneries'operations
Limitedcapacityofcanneriesdueto going,
lackofsupplyofcannerygradefish,
Fiscal Lackofgovernmentsubsidyand Formulateneffectivencentivescheme SOl
incentivesforthefishsector, topromotetheindustry,
External Thereexistsstiffcompetitionfr m Penetrateortapotherprospective DTI
Thailandwhichgivessubsidytoits markets.
fishingindustry,
(7)ForestProducts
ProductionReducedlogexportearningsbecause Enhancethelocalvalueadded DTI/BOI
ofthebantoprotectthegrowthof contributedtowoodproducts.
theancillaryindustries,
Fiscal Inabilityoftheindustryooperate Allowtheindustryooperatehrough DNR/BFD
freelybecauseofgovernmenti er- marketforceswith3essgovernment
ventiontheallowabletimbercut intervention.
andloggingtobeexploited,
Ascertainthedurationorthesecurityof DNR
Theuncertaintyregardingthetenureof tenureofthelicensesofproducers/
timberlicensesasthenewconstitutionplanterswhichwillserveasasincentive
implicitlyprohibitsthegrantofti_er toreforestationndensureincreased
licenseagreements, production.
TheimpositionofI0%dutyandother WorkfortheeliminationoftheTDIduty BOI
non-tariffbarrrieresuchascontrolsn oninimportedlogstoarriveatamore
theimportationoflogsareburdensome,competitivelypricedmanufecturedwoo
productexports.
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......................................... _ ....................................................................................
Beinga partytothejointventure
orprofit/productionsharingarrangemnt
withthegovernmentdoesnotguarantee
theproducerthetenureof his license.
External StiffcompetitionposedbyIndonesia,Tapotherpotentialm rketsandproduceDTI/D_/BOI
SabahandSarawakwhichmanageto betterp oductstocompetewithother
producemoreyieldsatlowercost. producers;
(B)Furnitureand
Fixtures
ProductionDwindlingsupplyoflocalrawmaterials,WorkoutaschemeprovidingcontinuousDTI/BOI
particularly_attanpolesduetothe supplyofnecessaryrawmaterials(speci-
rapiddenudationofforests, ficaIlyrattan)throughimportationo
suppIemantthedwindlinglocalsupplyand
Inadequatetechnicalassistance,techno- thusustaintheindustry.
logicalskillsandnecessaryequipment
tosetupoperations. Formulatendimplementa effective DNR
replantingschemeofrattanpo]es,its
Agrowingconcerno laborunrestand propercareandhandlingwhenharvested.
nationalsecurityexertsfurther
pressuretolocalmanufacturers.= Encourageintegrationand/ortheuseof BFD/DTI
indigenousmaterials.
I11ega1exactionsbyrebelsandmilitary
personnelatforestconcessionsncreaseConducttrainingprogramstobeable Industry
thecostofproduction, toupgradeandstandardizeskillsand members/DTI
technicalknow-how.
Disseminatem rketdevelopments,trade DTI
opportunitiesandparticipationin
internationalfurnitureexhibitsand
tradeshows,
Lockintotheimplementationofa strikeDLE
moratoriumnordertoenhancelabor
productivity.
FiscaI Highcostofbureaucracyandred-tape DiscardthedocumentationrequirementsoF DNR
ingovernmentchannelsintheprocessingtheDepartmentofNaturalResourceswhich
ofpertinentdocumentsincreasesthe arenotnecessaryintheprocessof
costof production, securingconcessionsonrattanresources.
(9) Handicrafts
ProductionLowproductivitybecauseofrisinglaborImproveproductanddesigni novationDTI!BOI/
disputesandotherrelatedmanpower givenavi]ableraw_terial_pplyand Industrymember_
prob]eme, productionconstraints,
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Politicalinstabilityandnationalsecu-lwlementastrikemoratoriuminthe OLE
rityconcernsstirfearandappreh_isionmdiumtermtocountertheffectsof
amngforeignborrowers, strikesGn!__Uorproductivity.
Fiscal Therisingcostofgovernmentbureau- Encouragendpromoteefficiencyinall Concerned
cracyandred-tape,particularlyin governmentchannels, goverrwnt
securingapplicationsforimportationof agencies
rawmterialsonconsignmentbasis,
External HeavycompetitionposedbyThailand Provi_assistanceforthestablishmentDTI/BOI
Chinawhichenjoyfavorableedgover ofaproductandmarketdevelopment
localproducersbecauseofincentivescenter.
providedbytheirrespectivego rnments
whichtranslateintolowerp ices
(I0)MineralProducts
ProductionCB'shighrsfiningchargescomparedto Reachacompromiseagr ementbetweenthe ChamberofMines
otherforeigngoldrefineriesincreasegoldproducers(throughtheChamberof
thecostofproductionandperation,Hines)andtheCBonimprovingthe
recoveryratesappliedtogoldbullion.
ConductresearchandevelopmentstudiesChamberofHines/
onlowcostandhighr_coverymine BureauofMines
systemswithshortgestationperiodeand
explorationofbettero egrades.
Disseminateimportantgeologocisl,Industrymembers/
technicalandeconomicinformatonvital BureauofMines
tomineralinvestmentd cisions.
Fiscal Theproducersarenotallowedbythe Enforcethsellingofallgold CB
governmenttoselltheirp imarygold productionotheCBbysmall-scale
produceinthefreemarkstwhichsome- minersandgoldpanners,
timesoffershigherreturns.
StudythepossibilityofareductionDFthroughthe
Theproductionofsmall-scaleminersor orexemptionofgoldproducersfromthe recommndationof
goldpannersa ebeingsmuggledoutof 30ZsalestaximposedonmanufacturedCB
thecountryduetoinadequategov rnmentar iclesfabricatedwithgoldandother
surveillance/menitoringofthei preciousmetals.SalestoCBshouldnot
operations, betreatedasanordinarycomercial
transactionsincegoldbullionsbecome
The30_salestaxonmanufacturedmnetizedgoldformingpartofthe
articlesfabricatedwithgoldandothercountry'sinternationalreserves.
preciousmetalsi anaddedburdento
theproducers.
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........................... ................ ..L ........ L--._ ........ - ..... _.................................................. --
(11)Petroleu_
Products
Production Operationof hydro-powerplantswas Promoteanddevelopthelocalor indige- NEDA/BEU-
hamperedbythelowwaterlevelcaused nousourcesofenergyto beableto pro-
bytheprolongeddrought, ducethemeconomicallyandefficiently.
HeavyrelianceOf.xpdrtshipmentson Minimizeth dependenceofthe xportableBEU/Officeofthe
excessdomesticconsumptionof capacityonthesurplusindomosticcon- EnergyAffair
petroleumproducts,• sumptionf petroleum,productsbydevelo-
pingindigenousorconventionalsources
of energy,orbyaddingmorevalueadded
inthemthroughfurtherprocessingof
petroleumproductsto omehlgher-priced
exportablegrades,
External Unstableworldpricesofcrudeoil,
(12)Chemicals
Production:Supplyofc conutoil(themainingre- workforthereplacementofimported DTI/PCA/BOI
dientsforcoco-chemicalsmaybe • ingredients/materialspartfcuiarIythose
adverselyaffecetedbythedroughtand thatdirectlyaffectthe cological
thetyphoons_ichhitcoconut-producingbalanceofnaturewithcoco-ch_icals.
regions,
Fiscal Lackofproductstandardizationonthe Formulatend nforceproducts andard-DTI/PCA,
partofgovernmentparticularly-for,izationmeasuresinordertobecompeti-
coco-chemicals. .. tirequality-wiseintheinternational
•market,
Workfortheremovaloftariffrates
imposedonimportedrawmaterialswhich BOI
are.procuredatlessercostinthe
internationalmarket,
(13)Electronics
ProductionMountinglabordisputes, Implementas rikemoratoriuminorder DEE
toenhancelaborproductivity.
Inadequatesupportforthedevelopment
ofhigherassembliesbecauseoflimitedFormulatemeasuresthatwillprevent/ DLE
domesticmarketforsemi-conductorand minimizesuddenorunannouncedstrikes
otherelectronicdevices, (suchastheWelgangBayan)which
disruptorparalyzeop rations,
Facilitateagradualshiftfromsimple Industrymembers
assembliestohigher-levelassemblies,andOTII@OI
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Developefficiencyinproductionofhigh Industrymembers
qualityproductsinorderto improve
thecountry'sexportcompetitiveness,
Fiscal Inconsistencyofsomeprovisionswith CoordinateformulationandimplementationCB/BOT
regardtoiwortationbyforeign-ownedofappropriatepoliciesamongconcerned
firescontainedinCBCircular1029and governmentagencies.
theOmnibusInvestmentCode226.
External Red,cadbullishnessbroughtaboutbytheEncouragepotentialinvestorsbyprovi-BOl/DTl/Industry
August28coupattemptmayhavestalledingaclimateofpoliticalandeconomicmembers
plansofexpansionandmay_havee n securityandeffectiveincentives.
drivenawaypotentialinvestments,'
TheimpactoftheUSstockmrketfall
maydampendemandfor1988.
ProceduralThe30-deyrepaymentschemeonO/Asand Eliminatefurthercostsa aresultof CB
D/Asbec(_nosoverduefors_ecompaniesdelayedreleasesofdocumentso_.O_/DAs
becauseoftherequiremntthatabank repaymentsthroughexemptionfromthe
couldnotremitwithoutthedocumentsClCCOregistrationrequirementeverytime
bearingtheClCCOregistrationfirst, importationismade.Theinitialregis-
thereleaseofwhichisalwaysdelayed,trationshouldsuffice.
14)Garments/Textiles
Production Limitedgrowthof thelocaltextile Forgeastronginterfacebetweenthe Industrygroups
industrybecauseofthedependenceof textileandgarmentindustriestobeablewiththesupervim
thegarmentsectornimportedraw todevelopandenhancetheirrespectivesionofDTI.
materials,whichannotbeproduced capacities.
efficientlybylocalproducersorare
unavailableinthlocalmarket. Optimizethutilizationofquotasin DTI/GTEB
ordertoimprovethsupplyofgarments.
Highcostofproduction.
Lackoftechnologyandlocalraw
materialstomanufacturegoodquality
fabrics.
External Stiffcompetitionfromnewproducers.Penetrateotherace-quotacountries DTI
initiallyona9overnment-tOmgovernnN)nt
S_gglingofqualityfabricsbecauseof basis,
theinabilityOflocalproducersto
manufactureatreasonablecosts.
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.......................................................................................................................
(15)ProcessedFood
andBeverages
ProductionHighcostofpackingmaterialsdueto ReduceorscrapthetariffratesappliedBOI/DTI/DF
inavai]abi]ityofgoodqualitymaterialsonimportedpackgingmaterials,
intheIoca]marketandthehightariff
ratesimposedonimportedmaterials. Inc]udepackagingtemsandother CB/DTI/BOI/
necessaryinputsftheindustryinthe NEDA
Higherp icesofdomesticsugarrelativeimportliberalizationschemeinorder
totheworldmarketprice, tominimizethecostofproduction,
Unreasonablecostoffreightbothinthe Providefoodprocessorsandexporters DTI/SRA
internationalandinter-islandshipping,accesstolower-pricedsugarthroughthe
BRA'sassistance,Corollarytothis,
industryrepresentativesarer questing
toSRAtoreclassify/treatsugarusedas
inputsoexportproductsasexportsu9ar
whichispricedlowerthandomesticsugar.
Rationalizefrei9htrates,bothininter-DTI/MARINA
nationalandinter-islandtransportation.
ExemptorgivepreferentialrBteson
traveltaxtoenabletheexportero at
]eastrecoverpromotionc stsabroad,
Fiscal Lackofincentivesfor mallexportersImproveoncustomsdrawbackmechanismand BOI/DF
whicharebeingdiscriminatedinfavor onBOItaxcreditsystemonimportedraw
of)argecorporationsparticularlythe materia]sFormingpartoftheexport
multinationals, products.
Dup]icationoffunctionsftheBureau Conso]idateund ronecentralgency Bureauof
ofFoodandDrugsandtheNFA-FTIby theresponsibilityoftestingthequality$tanderds/FDA
virtueofthebilateralmemorandumof offoodexportsinordertoavoiddupli-
understandingbetweenUSFDAandNFAfor cationffunctionsamonggovernment
testingoffoodproductsbeforethe agencies,thusminimizingcostfor
actualshipment, exporters,
Disincentivepos dbythetraveltaxto Holdre9uIarforumbetweenfood DTI/BOI
smallandmedium-sizedfiresinthe processingindustries,r earchagencies
promotionofthierproductsabroad, and/orthergovernmentagenciesinthe
developmentofpolicies,plansorprog-
ramsproeotive/supportiveofthe ndustry
ratherthanregulative,
Excessivefe sarechar9edbytheFTI
inthetestingoffoodproductsfor
exportelativetothoseofBFAD.
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FTI,beingthemarketingandtestingarc
oftheNFAcompeteswithprivatefood
exportersintermsof marketshareand
capebilityto attractforei9nclients.
Highcostof dealin9withthegovernment
iredtape,exorbitantlicensingand
permitfees,graftandcorruption,
ProceduralCertainfoodproductslikethnicfoods CoordinatebetweenconcernedgovernmentDTI/BOI/CB
arenotcapturedingovernmentetatls-agenciestheformulationofa effective
tics(OTI,BOI,CB)onprocessedfood, monitoringandclassificationsystem
hence,theindustry'sealperformancefortheindustry'sproducts.
couldnotbeproperlyascertained,
Source:Inter-AgencyStudyGrouponExternalTradeStatisticsandProjectionsF reignOperationsComitteeC ntralBankofthe
Philippines,AnnualReport1987.
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TaDle III.2. In 1970, more than 80 percent of Philippine exports were in
the Food and Food Preparation (PSCC 0), Beverage and Tobacco (PSOC 2),
and Crude Materials, Inedible (PSCC 3). This share consistently went down
to only around 25 percent in 1988. The most drastic change occurred in
PSCC 3 which went down from 54.0 percent in 1970 to only 10 percent in
1988. On the other hand, exports under PSCC 9 (commodities and
transactions not classified elsewhere, the bulk of which consist of
B_ exports of garments and s_ni-conductors) rose dramatically from .05
Percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 1988.
Another way of analyzing the change in the export structure is by re-
classifying the commodities into the following categories: (i) fuel
priLnary commodity exports; (2) nonfuel primary commodity exports; (3)
labor-intensi ve exports; (4) moderately capital and ski 1l-intens ive
exports; and (5) highly capital- and skill-intensive exports.
While total exports fluctuated unpredictably during the period 1977-
1988, the composition defined along these five categories exhibited a
distinct pattern (see Tables III.3a and III.3b). Labor-intensive
manufactured exports, of which garments and furniture are the prime
examples, have accounted for an increasing share of the total, surpassing
priLmary nonfuel commodities for the first time in 1987. The latter
category had been the perennial number one source of exports. The new
international division of labor dictated this shift as lignt manufacturing
industries, characterized by a _igh degree of labor intensity, were
transferred to developing countries wit_] relatively low wage rates.
Moreover, world demand for primary nonfuel commodities has been declining
due to several factors including the development of synthetic substitutes
and changing tastes and technology. Added to these is the stiff
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Table III.3a
DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
(million FOB $)
Year FUEL NFUEL LI. MCSI HCSI
1977 19 2432 .576 59 52
1978 10. 2408 824 123 61
1979 ii 3156 1164 158 112
1980 50 3784 1634 231 89.
1981 .42 3318 2_13 244 106
1982 33 2649 2005" 230 95
1983 .11.4" 2519 1942 310 86
1984 87 2410. 2195 470 105
1985 42 2_63 1969 365 150
1986 66 "'2091 1883 447 243
1987 97 2171 2438 620 245
1988 113 2688 3113 849 311
1989 143 2852 3565 1030 333
1990 176 2990 4046 1187 396
1991 128 3251 4630 1428 414
1992 165 3530 5294" 1599 441
1993 214 3771 6159 1886 "541
1994 161 4234 7300" 2336 569
'1995 167 "4662 8492 2747 583
1996 281 4862 9631 3179 748
1997 253 5275 10972 3798 802
1998 261 5570 12561 4385 924
1999 320 5874 14418 5073 1015
2000 330 60_0 16500 6000 1170
- Fuel primary commodity exports
NFUEL - Nonfuel primary commodity exports
- Labor-intensive exports
MCSI- - Moderately,capital- and skill-intensive exports
.- Highly capital- and skill-intensive exports
-1989-2000 values are forecasted values
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Table III.3b
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
Year PFUEL PNFUEL PLI PMCSI PHCSI
1977 0.6 77.5 18.4 1.9 1.6
1978 0.3 7_.3 24.0 3.6 1.8
1979 0.2 70.1 25.8 3.5 2.5
1980 0.9 65.4 28.2 4.0 1.5
1981 0.7 58.0 35.2 4.3 1.8
1982 0.7 52.9 40.0 4.6 1.9
1983 2.3 50.7 39.1 6.2 1.7
1984 1.6 45.8 41.7 8.9 2.0
1985 0.9 45.0 42.9 7.9 3.3
1986 1.4 44.2 39.8 9.4 5.1
1987 1.7 39.0 43.8 ii.i 4.4
1988 1.6 38.0 44.0 12.0 4.4
1989 1.8 36.0 45.0 13.0 4.2
1990 2.0 34.0 46.0 13.5 4.5
1991 1.3 33.0 47.0 14.5 4.2
1992 1.5 32.0 48.0 14.5 4.0
1993 1.7 30.0 49.0 15.0 4.3
1994 i.i 29.0 50._ 16.0 3.9
1995 1.0 28.0 51.0 16.5 3.5
1996 1.5 26.0 51.5 17.0 4.0
1997 1.2 25.0 52.0 18.0 3.8
19_8 i.i 23.5 53.0 18.5 3.9
1999 1.2 22.0 54.0 19.0 3.8
2000 i.i 20.0 55.0 20.0 3.9
FUEL - Fuel primary commodity exports
NFUEL - Nonfuel primary commodity exports
LI - Labor-intensive exports
MCSI - Moderately capital- and skill-intensive exports
HCI - Highly capital- and sKill-intensive exports
* - 1988 figures are estimated values while
1989-2000 figures are forecasted value s
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competition mnong developing countries for markets for these types of
commodities.
Another •category that has experienced an increasing share is
moderately capital-and-skill intensive (MCSI) exports rising from 2 percent
in 1977 to ii percent in 1987. Semiconductors, the number one export of
the •Philippines at present, fall in this category. It is predicted that by
the year 2_00 the percentage share of these three categories will stabilize
at-20 percent for primary nonfueli 55 percent for labor intensive, and 20
percent for MCSI exports with the rest going to t_e other two categories.
These figures differ significantly.from those projected by the ADB which
puts the percentage snares as 36, 46, and 14 percent, respectively.
Tables III.4a, III.4b, and III.4c show the composition of exports by
12/
traditional/non-traditional categories used by the Central Bank. In
1970, the share of traditional •exports (coconut products, sugar, forest
products and minerals) was more than 91.5 percent. The share went down to
only 23.9 percent in 1987. Sugar,••forest and mineral products suffered the
largest decline frem around 18.5 percent, 26.2 percent and 20.4 percent
respectively in IH70 to only around 1.2 percent and 4.2 percent and 3.9
percent in 1987. Coconut products remain important although their share in
exports also declined from 19.7 percent in 1970 to 9.8 percent in 1987. On
the other hand, the snare of non-traditional exports grew from only around
8 percent in 1970 to 73.4 percent in 1987. Non-traditional manufactures
compose the bulk of these shares. However, although the healthy growth of
certain sectors (e.g., footwear, ch_aicals, processed food and beverages
12__/
Central Bank defines traditional exports as those sectors which
have exported at least uS $5 million in 1968.
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Table ll|.4a
VALUEOFEXPORTSDYHAJORCOHHODITYGROUP
1970-1997
(In H/Ilion US Dollars)
-CommodityGroup 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
I, Traditional Exports 972 1027 962 1606 2306 1767 1773 2097 1975
CoconutProducts 209 255 229 374 609 466 540 761 907
Copra 90 114 110 166 140 172 150 201 1_6
Coconutoil 96 104 84 153 381 230 299 412 - 620
DesiccatedCoconut 19 21 lB 32 60 31 37 ?O 62
CopraHeal/Cake 14 16 16 23 28 33 54 5G 69
SugarandProducts 196 220 2t7 293 765 615 454 532 213
Centrifugal Refined 189 212. 211 275 737 59] 429 512 197
Holasses O 8 6 18 28 34 25 20 16
Forest Products 278 259 226 416 292 225 270 263 _2U
Logs 237 215 164 304 216 167 135 134 145
Lumber 13 11 10 35 30 27 68 b7 85
Plywood 20 24 34 59 27 23 47 41. 72
VeneerSheetslCorestocks 8 9 iB IB 19 9 tg 20 22
Others 2 | 4
Hineral Products 217 218 239 439 519 332 ..371 386 375
CopperConcentrates 185 195 191 290 393 212 2_6 269 250
6old -- 8 27 ]04 74 76 65 71 7b
ChromiumOre 6 6 5 9 13 13 15 25 25
Others 26 19 16 35 39 31 25 22 24
Fruits andVegetables 26 24 23 24 37 44 59 73 77
CannedPineapple 21. 20 l? 20 31 35 47 56 60
PineappleJuice 2 1 1 1 l 3 I 3 2
Pineapple Concentrates 3 2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5
Others -- 1 1 1 • 2 3 5 9 10
AbacaFibers 15 13 13 20 38 14 IB 17 15
TobaccoUnmanufactured 14 14 17 26 30 34 29 28 29
PetroleumProducts 1T 24 19 ]5 16 37 34 _7 31
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Conodity group 1979 [980 1981 1982 198_ 19B4 1985 1986 19B7
], Traditional Exports 2561 3068 2742 2116 2068 1828 1302 1275 1_67
CoconutProducts 1024 811 750 590 680 727 459 470 56J
Copra " 89 47 _4 49 4 .... 18 _2
Coconutoi] 742 ••567 533 401 516 5BO 347 33_• _Bl
Desiccated Coconut 107 116 102 68 88 .106 76 44 75
CopraNea]/Cake 86 81 81 72 72 41 36 75 73
SugarandProducts 239 .657 604 441 316 279 185 103 71
Centrifugal Refined 212 624 566 416 299 .246 169 B7 bO
Molasses 27 33. 38 25 17 33, 16 16 11
Forest Products 490 425 352 294 33[ 271 199 201 24_
Logs 144 . q2 ?6 79 74 88 39 27 0
Lumber 198 .181 126 124 149 107 91 104 154
ely,ood 107 111 ill 67 76 56 51 56 _8
VeneerSheetslCorestocks 35 36 31 20 28 14 12 9 15
Others 6. 5 8 4 4 6 6 5 6
.. Hinero] Products 609 '.918 757 532 440 266 243 267 224
CopperConcentrates 440 _45 429 312 249 115 84 90. 109
gold 10_ 2_9 215 169 154 104 100 140 91
ChromiumOre 23 .33 25 15 10 J9 12 11 7
Others 42 101 B8 36 27 2B 47 26 17
•" Fruits andVegetables 100 111 121 128 107 133 J_b 137 J50
CannedPineapple 74 82 89 8B 74 97 89 8_ 86
PineappleJuice _ 6 6 9 .4 5 7 6 6
PineappleConcentrates 10. 9 7 10 ? 13 14 18 20
Others 1] '.14 19 21 20 28 26 30 38
AbacaFibers .25 27 21 20 19 30 17 1] 12
TobaccoUnmanufactured 33 29 4B. 47 34 29 24 21 IB
PetroleumProducts 42 .90 89 64 142 _ _9 6_ 88.
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Commodity6roup 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 .1976 1977 197B
II. Non-Tradition_Products B5 I00 119 269 407 504 749 1024 1422
-Non-Traditional Manufactures 72 74 77 212 328 367 546 711 1045
Elec. & Elec, Eqpt,/Parts & Telecom. -- -- 2 11 27 47 B5 124 253
Gareents -- 1 2 5fl 94 100 185 250 327
Textile Yarns/Fabrics 6 7 9 24 20 22 39 34 44
Foot.ear 1 1 1 2 4 ,3 5, 10 32
Travel GoodsandHandbags 1 I 2 5 8 1+0 4 b 9
MoodManufactures 11 7 B 24 35 29 32 2B 30
FurnituresandFixtures I I 2 3 6 5 10 22 27
Chemicals 5 6 6 I0 15 21 27 51 59
CopperMetal ?.................
Hon_Metallic Mineral Manufactures 3 10 S 25 37 33 28 38 4_
MachineryandTransport Eqpt. l 2 3 3 6 10 16. 26 37
ProcessedFoodand _everages B , 9 11 15 17 14 20 31 41
Misc.Manufactured_rticles,n.e,c. 5 4 10 20 23 4b 65 60 Bl
Others _0 25 13 12 36 27 30 _1 62
Non-Traditional Unmanufactures 13 26 42 57 79 137 203 313' 377
Nickel .......... 3_ '59 77 55
Iron Ore AggLomerates .............. 57 104
Bananas 5 ._6 24 28 45 73 7& 73 B4
Mangoes 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 4
Coffeet Rawnot Roasted .......... 2 25 45 34
Fishp Fresh or 8imply Preserved 2 5 11 20 17 16 26 41 57
Rice .............. 4 14
Others 5 4 6 8 15 II- 14 14 25
Ill. SpecialTransactions 1 I 9 9 21 2B 1& &
IV. Re-Exports 5 8 4 2 3 2 24 14 22
TOTALEXPORTS 1062 1136 1106 1886 2725 2294 2574 3151 3425
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CommodityGroup 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
II. Non-TraditionalProducts 2000 2650 2920 2851 2846 3430 3275 3447 4197
Non-Traditional.Manufactures 1474 2005 2374 2376 2387 2992 2765 2879 3642
Elec. & Elec. Eqpt./Parts & Telecom. 412 671 838 1000 1053 1329 1056 919 1119
Garments 405 502 618 541: 545 603 623 751 1098
Textile Yarns/Fabrics 55 74 69 56 44 38 39 44 68
Footwear 51 67 73 62 55 46 39 31 31
TravelGoodsandHandbags 8 .9 I0 I0 8 6 I0 12 16
WoodManufactures 40 35 46 41 53 50 43 49 62
Furnitures andFixtures 55 77 87 72 84 88 84 89 130
Chemicals 112 89 105 95 86 105 150 243 245
CopperMetal ........ 26 111 168 172 162 "
Non-MetallicMineralManufactures 31. 60 48 40 26 21 24 18 22
MachineryandTransport Eqpt. 47 47 47 48 35 36 30 45 78
ProcessedFoodand Beverages 46 92 154 150 1_7 109 106 116 126
Misc.ManufacturedArticles,n.e.c, I18 149 155 143 133 137 136 159 199
Others 94 133 124 118• 112 313 257 231 286
Non-Traditional Unmanufactures 526 645 546 475 459 438 510 568 555
Nickel 92 138 103 49 53 12 64 15
Iron OreAgglomerates 120 118 116 106 114 105 95 85 76
Bananas 97 114 124 146 105 122 113 1_0 191
Mangoes 5 7 6 8 9 7 7 8 12
Coffee, Rawnot Roasted : 44 45 39 49 47 76 70 119 32
Fish, Freshor SimplyPreserved 87 107 90 71 77 69 99 143 207
Rice 46 73 24 -- g .... :- 25
Others 35 43 44 46 45 47 62 68 82
• liT. Special Transactions 11 33 50 45 57 8 12 8 7
IV. Re-Exports 29 37 10 9 34 125 40 112 149
TOTALEXPORTS 4601 5788 5722 5021 5005 5391 4629 4842 5720
80URCE:Dept. of EconomicResearch,
Central Bankof the Phil.
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Table I11.4b
6ROHTHRATEOFPHILIPPINEXPORTS
(In %)
1970-1987
CommodityGroup 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1970 1979
I. Traditional Exports 5.66 -4.38 63.54 43.59 -23.37 0.34 16,27 -5.82 29,67
CoconutProducts 22.01 -10.59 64.04 62.83 -23,4B 15.88 40.93 19.19 12.90
Copra 42.50 -3.51 50.91 -15.66 22.86 -12,79 _4,00 -32.34 -34.56
Coconutoil 8.33 -[9.23 82.14 149.02 -39.63 30.00 37.79 50.49 19,68
DesiccatedCoconut 10.53 -14.29 77.78 87.50 -48;33 19.35 143.24 -8,89 30.49
CopraHeallCake 14.29 0,00 43.75 21.74 17,B6 63.64 7.41 18.97 24.64
SugarandProducts 12.24 -1._6 35.02 ]61.09 -19,61 -26.18 17,16 -59,96 12.21
Centrifugal Refined 12.77 -0.47 30.33 166.00 -21.17 -26.16 19._5 -61.52 7.61
Molasses 0.00 -25.00 200.00 55.56 21.43 -26.47 -20,00 -20.00 6B,75
Forest Products -6,B3 -12.74 84.07 -29.81 -22.95 20.00 -2.59 24.71 49,$9
Logs -9.28 -23.72 85.37 -2B.95 -22.69 -19.16 -0.74 9.21 -0.69
Lumber -15.38 -9.09 250.00 -14.29 -10.00 151,85 -1.47 26,97 132.94
Plywood 20.00 41.67 73,53 -54.24 -14.91 104.35 -12.77 75._1 48.61
VeneerSheetslCorestocks 12.50 100.00 0.00 5.56 -57.69 12%00 11.11 I0.00 59.09
Others -50.00 300.00 50.00
Hineral Products 0.46 '9,63 63,26 19.49 -36.03 11,75 4.04 -2.85 62.13
CopperConcentrates 0.00 3.24 51,B3 35.52 -46,06 25.47 0.75 -6.72 76.00
6old 237.50 295.19 -29.B5 2.70 -14.47 9.23 7.04 35.53
ChromiumOre 0.00 -16.67 80,00 44.44 0.00 15.39 66.67 0.00 -8.00
Others -26.92 -15.79 11B,75 11.43 -20.51 -19.35 -12.00 9.09 75.00
Fruits andVegetables -7.69 -4.17 4.35 54.17 L0.92 31,B2 25.96 5.48 29.67
CannedPineapple -4.7_ -5.00 5.26 55,00 12.90 34.29 19.15 7.14 23.33
PineappleJuice -50,00 0.00 0.00 0,00 200.00 -66.67 200.00 -33.33 50.00
PineappleConcentrates -33.33 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 66.67 0,00 0.00 lO0.O0
Others 0.00 0.00 100.00 50,00 66.67 00.00 II.II 30.00
AbacaFibers -13.33 0.00 53.85 90.00 -63.16 29.57 -5.56 -11.76 66,67
TobaccoUnmanufactured 0.00 21.43 52.94 15.38 13.33 -17.65 0,00 3.57 13.79
PetroleumProducts 41.19 -20.O_ -21.05 6.67 131.25 -O.ll 8.92 -16.22 35.49
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Table lll.4b (cont'd) nVER_EFORTHEPERIO0
Commodity6roup 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989 1986 1967 1_70-77 1978-87
l, Traditional Exports 19,60 -10.63 -22.8._ -2.27 -11.61 -28.77 -2.07 7,22 14,81 -2.73
CoconutProducts -20.80 -7.92 -21.33 15.25 6o91 -36_86 2.40 19,35 24.52 _-1,05
Copra -47.19 -27.66 44.12 -91.84 77.79 16.90
Coconutoil -2_.98 -6.00 -24.77 28.68 12,40 -40.17 -4.03 14.41 35.49 2.7L
DesiccatedCoconut 8.41 -12.07 -$3,33 29.41 20.45 -28,30 -42.11 70.49 $9,40 3.45
CopraNeat/Cake -5.61 0.00 -11.11 0.00 -43.06 -12,20 108,33 -2.67 24.10 7.71
Sugar andProducts 174.90 -8.07 -26.99 -26.34 -11.71 -33.69 -44.32 -31.07 25,49 -5.71
Centrifugal Refined 194.34 -9,29 -26.50 -28.13 -17.7_ -31.30 -48.92 -3L.03 26.09 -5.21
Iqolasse_ 22.22 19o15 -34.21 -32.00 94.12 -51.52 0,00 -$1.29 29.35 3.13
Forest Products -13.27 -17.18 -15.46 12,54 -18.13 -26,57 1.01 20.90 4.16 1.70
Logs -3&.11 -17.39 3.99 -6.33 18.92 -55.68 -30.77 -100,00 -2,74 -21,59
Lumber -8.59 -_0.39 -1,99 20.16 -28.19 -14.95 14,29 48,06 50.23 15,86
Plywood 3.74 0,00 -39.64 13.43 -26.32 -8,93 ?.80 21.4_ 22o53 9.77
VeneerSheet_lCorestocks 2.86 -13.89 -_5.48 40.00 -90.00 -14.29 -25,00 66.67 28.04 4,90
6thers -15.67 60.00 -50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 -16.67 20.00 -50,00 _9.57
Hinera] Products 90.99 -17.54 -29.72 -17,29 -39,95 -8,65 9.88 -16.10 13.09 -0.87
CopperConcentrates 23.86 -21,28 -27.27 -20,19 -53.82 -26.96 7.14 21.11 i0.11 -2,81
6old 132,04 -10.04 -21.40 -8.88 -32,47 -S.85 40.00 -$5,00 81,88 10.30
ChromiumOre 43.48 -24.24 -40.00 -_3.33 90.00 -36.84 -8.33 -$6.36 27.12 -5.36
(]ther_ 140.40 -12.87 -99.09 -25,00 3.70 67.85 -44.58 -$4.62 5.09 L1.99
•Fruits andVeqetables 11,00 9,01 5.79 -16,ql 24.30 2.26 0.74 9.49 17.61 8,15
CannedPineapple 10.81 9.54 -1.12 _15,91 17.57 2.30 -6.74 3.61 16.59 4._5
PineappleJuice 100,00 0.00 50.00 -55,56 25.00 40.00 -14.29 0.00 40.49 16.18
PineappleConcentrate_ -10.00 -22.22 42,R6 -10.00 44.44 7.59 28.57 11.11 11.90 19.25
Others 7.59 35.71 10,53 -4.76 49.00 -7,14 15.39 26,57 49.44 16.52
AbacaFibers 8.00 -22.22 -4.76 -10.00 55.67 -43._3 -23.53 -7.69 12.91 1.80
TobaccoUnmanufactured -12.12 65.52 -2.08 -27,66 -14.71 -17.24 -12.50 -14,29 12.21 -1.77
PetroleumProducts 114.29 -l,ll -28.09 121.fib -34,51 -58.06 51,54 39.6fl 19,70 23,49
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Table I|I,4b (cont'd).,
CommodityGroup 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976_ 1977 1978 1979
I|. Non-Traditional Products 17.65 19.00 126.05 51.30 2_.83 48.61 36.72 _8.87 40.65
Non-Traditional Nanufactures 2.78 4.05 175.32 54.72 11.B9 49,77 30,22 46.9B 41.05
Elec,& Elec. Eqpt.tParts & Telec_. , 450.00 145.45 74.07 80.85 45.88 104,01 62.85
Garments 100,00 2800.00 62.07 6.38 85.00 35.14 30.90 23.B5
Textile Yarns Fabrics 16,67 28,57 166.67 616,67 10,00 77.27 -12.82 29.41 25.00
Foot,ear _,00 0.00 100.00 100.00 -25,00 65.67 100.00 220.00 59,3B
Travel GoodsandHandbags _.,_ 100,,00 150.00 60,00 25:00 -60.00 50,00 50,00 -11.11
MoodNanufactures -36.36 14.29 200.00 45.83 -17.14 10.34 -12,50 7.14 33,33
FurnituresandFixtures 0.00 I00,00 50.00 100.00 -16.67 100.00 120.00 22.73 103.70
Chemicals 20.00 0.00 66.67 50,00 40.00 2B.57 8_.B9 15.69 89.B3
CopperMetal
Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures 233.3_ -20._0 212,50 48,00 -10.81 -15.15 _5,71 13.16 -27.91
RachineryandTransportEqpt. 100,00 50,00 0.00 100.00 66.67 60.00 62'.50 42,_1 27.03
ProcessedFoodandReveraqes 12.50 22.22 36.36 13.33 -17.55 42.B6 55.00 32.26 12,20
flisc, flanufacturedArticles, n.e.c. -20.00 150.00 100.00 15.00 100.00 41.30 -7.6_ ,35.00 45.68
Others -16.67 -4B.O0 -7.69 200,00 -25.00 11.11 3.33 lO0.O0 51.61
Non-Traditiond Uneanufactures 100.00 61.54 35.71 38.b0 73,42 48.18 54.19 20.45 39.52
Nickel 78.7,9 30.51 -2B.57 67.27
IronOreAgglomerates 82.46 15.38
Bananas 220.00 50.00 16.67 60.71 '62.22 4.11 -3.95 I).07 15.4B
Mangoes 0,00 0.00 0,00 I00.00 0.00 50.00 -l).33 i00.00 25.00
Coffee, Rawnot Roasted .1150.00 BO.O0 -24.44 29.41
Fish, Fresh or Siaply Preserved 150,00 120.00 81.82 -15.00 -5.99 62.50 57.89 39.02 52.63
Rice 250.00 228.57
Others • -20.00 50.00 33.33 87.50 -26.67 27.27 0.00 78.57 40.00
III. Special Transactions 0.00 _00.00 0.00 133.33 33.33 -42.86 -62.50 B3._3
IV. Re-Exports 60.00 -50.00 -50.00 50.00 -33.33 1100.00 -41.62 57_14: 31.82
TOTALEXPORTS 6.97 -2.64 70.52 44.49 -ID,B2 12,21 22.42 8.70 )4.34
75
Table llIo4b (cont°d) MERA6EFORTHEPERIOD
........................................................................................................ _ ..........................
Conodity Group 1980 1981 1982 :1983 1984 1985 19Bb 1982 1970-77 1978-87
........................................... ..._.i ....... -_- ........ _-_ ........... _--------_-_ ......................................
If. Non-Traditional Products 32,50 10.19' -2.36 ':;-0.1B 20.52 -4o52 5.25 21.76 46.17 16.27
Non-Traditional Hanufactures _6.02 18.40 0,08 0.46 25.35 -7.59 4.12 26,50 46.82 1%14
EleC._ E]eC. Eqpt.IPar_sl Teleco_, 62.8_ _24.89 19._3 5.30 26.2! -20.54 -12.fY 21.76 159.25 29.37
Garments 23.95 ,23.11 -12.46 0.74 10,64 3,32 :20,55 46,21 5'14.76 17.07
Textile Yarns/Fabrics _4.55 -6,76 -18,84 -21o4_ -13,64 2.63 12,82 54,55 38.53 9.83
Footwear : _1.37 8.96 -15.07 -11.29 -16.36 -15.22 _-_g.5I 0.00 4_.91 24.1_
Travel Goodsand Handbags 12.50 11.11 0.00 -20.00 -25.00 66.67 20.00 33.3_ 4_.43 13.75
Moo_Manufactuce_ -12.50 31.43 -10.87 29.27 -5,66 -14.00 I3;95 26.53 _9.21 :i_ 9°B6
Fureitures andFixtures 40,00- 12.99 -17,24 16,67 4.76 -4.55 5._5: 46,_ 6_.76 23.11
Chelicals -20,54: IT.DR -9.52 -9.47 22,09 42.86 62.00: _e_82 _0_ 21,17
CopperBeta] _ 326,92 51.35 2.3B.... 5._B1 %,71
Non-Beta]]ic Bineral Manufactures _3.55_'_I-20.00 -16.67 -35.00 -19.23 t4.2_ -2_;0_: 22:22 69.0B -0,06
Bachineryand Tr_mSportEqpt, 0.00 0.00 2.13 -27.08 2,B6 -16,67 50.00 7_._ 62.74 15.39
ProcessedFoodand_everage_ 100.00: 67._ -2.60 -15.33 -14.17 +2._ _ ?.4_ 8,'62 _.5_" 19.50
_isc. BanufacturedArticles, n.e.c. 26,27 4.03 -7.74 -6.99 3.01 -0.7I: 16.91 25,16_ M;09: 14.06
Others 41.47 -6.77 -4.84 -5.09 177.46 -17.89 -10,12 23.81 16.73 35.17
Non-Traditional Unsanufactures 22.62 -15.35 -13.00 -_.37 -4.58 16.44 11,_7 -2.29 58,8W 7,1B
Nickel : 50,00 -25.38 -52.4_ _,16 -77._b_:_,_|_ -76,_ fftO0,O0 , p4,65 -• 19o85
Iron Ore Agglomerates -1.67 -1.69 -B.62 7.55 -7.89 -9.52 -10.53 -10.59
•Bananas 17.53 8.77 17.74 -2D,08 16.19 _-_._8 _5,0_, ,6.92 _8,54 6.34
_angnes 40.00 -14.29 33.33 12.50 -22.22 0.00 14.29 5_.00 16.67 2_.86
....Coffee, Ra. not Roasted 2.2_. -13.3_ 25.64 -4.OR 61.70 -7.89 70,00 _3.11 615.00 6.62
Fish_ Freshor Sieply Preserved 22.99 -15.89 -21.11 B,45 -10o39 43,48 44.44 44.76 64.45 20.84
Rice 58,70 -67.12
Others 22.86 2._3 4.55 -2.17 4.44 31.91 _.6B 20.59 21.63 21.28
Ill. Special Transactions 200.00 51.52 -10.00 26.67 -B5.% 50.00 -33.33 -12.50 153.97 20.72
IV. Re-Exports 27,59 -72.97 -10,00 277,7B 267.65 :69.00 180.00 33.0_ 147.86 72.40
TOTALEXPORTS 25.80 -1.14 -12.25 -0.32 7.71 -14.1_ 4.60 18.13 19.73 7°14
SOURCE:Dept. of EconomicResearch,
Central Bankof the Phi],
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T.ble I I.4c
STRUCTURE OF PHILIPPINE EXPORTS
(In _percent)
1970 1980 1985 1987
.......... " ................... - : • ,'- ' . ,_-.-..,----
A. COMMODITY GROUPS
I. Traditional Exports 91.53 53.01 28.13 23.,90
:oconut Products 19.68 14.01 9.92_ ,9.,81
Sugar and Products 18i.46 ii.35 4,_00 1.24
Forest Products 26!.18 7.34 4.30 4.25
Mineral Products 20.43 15.86 5.25 3.92
Fruits and Vegetables 2.,.45...._ 1..92 2.9.4 2.62
_baca Fibers 1.41 0.47 0_37 0..21
Tobacco t_nma_ufactured 1.32 0.50 _,52 0.31
Petroleum Products 1.6_ 1:.55 0...84 1.54
II. Non-traditional Products 8.M0 45.78 70.75 73.37
Non-Traditional Manufactures 6.78 34.64 59.73 63.67
Non-Traditional Usmanufaeture_ I..22 11.14 11.02 9...70
III. Special Transactions 0.0_ _ 0.57 0.26 0..12
IV. Re-Exports 0.47 0.64 @.86 2.60
TOTAL 100.00 100. _0 100.00 100.00
B. MARKETS
ADB Developing Member Countries 7.50 16.60 21.40 18.50
European Economic Community (EEC) 8.70 16.70 13.60 L8.50
United States of America 41.50 27.20 35.70 34.60
Japan 39.60 26.50 18.90 17.20
Others 2.70 13.00 10.40 11.20
TOTAL 100._0 i_0.00 100.00 100.%0
Source of basic data: Dept. of Economic Research,
Central Bank of the Phils.
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and furnitures and fixtures which grew by an average of more than 15
percent for the period 1978 to 1987)is worth: noting_ non-traditional
manufactured export is still concentrated in garments and electronics.
Garments and electronics together, already makeup a_our_ 39 percent of
total exports in 19871, i.Theincrease in the share iof non-traditional
manufactures has also been substantive from around 1.2 percent in 1970 to
9.7 percen_ _ in 1987. Bananas, Raw Coffee and Fish, FreSh or Simply
/
• %
Prepared, are among it/lemore important non-traditional unmanufactured
exports.
If we define tradi%ional exports to be equivalent to PriL_ary goods
and non-traditional exports as manufactured goods, there are slight
changes in the compositio_ of exportsalongtheselines. Th_ definition
of traditional/non-trad/itional exports will be used in forecasting their
future values. TaDle III.5 shows that in 1987 the share of traditional
exports was 33.6 percent while the share of non-traditional exports was
63.7 percent, with the rest falling under re-exports and others.
There is some change, although not as marked, in the direction of
trade as well (see Tables III.6a, III.6b and III.6c). Tne share in
Philippine exports by traditional trading partners namely the US and Japan
has declined. The US share fell from around 41.5 percent in 1970 to 34.6
percent in 1987 while that for Japan fell fram 39.6 percent in 1970 to 17.2
percent in 1987. The slack was taken up mostly by EEC and ADB developing
member countries particularly Hongkong, South Korea and ASEAN. The share
of F_C rose from 8.7 percent in 1970 to 18.5 percent in 1987 w_ile that of
ADB developing imm%ber countries rose from around 7.5 percent in 1970 to
18.5 percent in 1987 (Table III.6c). The growth in Philippine exports to
7B
Table I_II.5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL EXPORTS,
TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL
(1971 '- 1987)
Year Non-Trad_tioqal Traditional Others
1971 _ 6.5i _ 92_69 0.79
19_ 6._6_ 92.59 0.45
1973 ft:2_ _ _8.18 0_58
1974 12.04. 87.5.2 0.44
1975 16.00 _ 83_.0_ I_00
1976 21.21 76.77 2.02
1977 22.56 76.48 0.95
1978 30.51 68.67 0.82
1979 32,04 67,_9 0.87
1980 3_4_'64 6'4_i5 1.21
1981 41.49 57.46 1.05
1982 _.32 51.60 i. Z8
1983 47.69 50..49 1.82
198_ 55._0 42_0_3 ' _2.47
1985 59.73 39.14 1.12
i_86 59.46 38.'06 2_48
1987 63.67 33.60 2.73
79
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ADB developing member countries (DMC) and ASEAN in particular is especially
worth noting. Philippine exports to DMCs grew at an average annual rate
more than double that of world exports during the period 1975-1988. The
growth rate was most spectacular for ASEAN, which grew at an average annual
rate of 75 percent and 23 percent respectively for the period 1965-1975 and
1975-1988 (see Table III.6b).
ADB developing member countries (DMC_), especially ASEAN, have thus
increasingly become important Philippine trading partners. The composition
and trend of exports follow •the general pattern in that there was a noted
shift away from traditional exports. A comparison, however, shows.• the
P_ilippines exporting a greater proportion of non-traditional products,
especially non-traditional manufactures, to DMCs than it exported to t_e
rest of the world. The snare of non-traditional manufactures in Philippine
exports to DMCs was around 4_ percent compared to 29 percent to the world
during the period 1975 to 1980. This share• grew to 73 percent for
DMCS and 62 percent for the world in 198b and 1987. The most
phenominal •growth was in electronics and chemical. The share of garments
r_ains stagnant unlike the trend for Philippine exports to the world (see
Table III.7a).
With respect to ASEAN,•coconut products are among the high-growth
exports (in contrast with the declining trend for the world). Electronics
export grew at an enormous pace during 1975-8H, modestly during the period
1981-85 before failing during 1985-1986. It picked up again in 1987,
growing by around 32 percent. Exports of garments, textile and footwear to
ASE_N in the recent years nave also been encouraging (see Table III.7b).
The value of Philippine exports classified according to coranodity groups by
destination is given in Table III.Tc.
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TableIII.7a
.._ERAGE
PERCBT_IiE-DISTRIBUTIONOF
EXPORTPRODUCTSTOTOTALEXPORTS
ExportstoAsean,DMCsandWorld
(In %)
1975-1980 : 1981-1985 : 1986-1987
•CommodityGroup ASEAN DMCS WORLD ASEAN DMCS WORLD ASEAN DMCS WORLD
..................... _.._ .................................................................................................
I, Traditions]Exports 34.66 49.34 59.82 13,35 31.75 38.68 7.25 13.2325,12
CoconutProducts 1,94 4.59 15,80 2,15 3,74 12,37 2,55 3.05 9.76
223,1 Copra 0,00 0,16 2,71 0,00 0,06 0.33 1,68 1,44 0,47
Coconutoil 1,88 4,06 9.86 2.09 3.41 9.17 0,85 1.41 6.77
057.72 DesiccatedCoconut 0.05 0,37 1.82 0.05 0,28 1.70 0.03 0.20 1,11
081_3700 CopraMeal/Cake 0.00 0,00 1,41 0.00 0,00 1,17 0,00 0,00 1.41
SugarandProducts 20.16 16,26 15,74 8,27 12,04 6.96 0,00 0,79 1,68
CentrifugalRefined 20.16 15,51 14,91 8,26 11,15 6,47 0,00 0,30 1,42
06115200 Molasses 0,00 0,75 0,83 0,00 0,88 0.49 0.00 0,50 0,26
0,00 0.00
ForestProducts t.03 7,70 8.04 0.33 4.09 5.59 0.10 2,29 4,20
247 Logs 0,14 4,20 3.20 0,00 1,62 1.37 0,00 0,20 0,28
248 Lumber 0,60 0.49 2.57 0.23 0.44 2.32 0.07 0.34 2.42
634.2 P1)rwood 0,00 2.62 1.66 0,08 1.84 1.39 0.03 1.64 1.17
VeneerSheets/Corestocks 0.29 0.27 0.54 0.02 0.06 0.40 0.00' 0.02 0.22
Others 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.12 0,11 0.00 0.10 0.10
MineralProducts 0.06 14,86 15,47 0,05 8,64 8.56 0,10 2,79 4,72
287,1102 CopperConcentrates 0,00 I0,52 9,37 0.00 5,76 4,53 0.00 1,721,88
Cold 0,00 3:92 3.90 0,00 2,80 2,86 0.00 0,752,24
287,9101 ChromiumOre D.05 0,15 0.67 0,05 0.17 0,31 0,03 0,17 0,17
Others 0,01 0,27 t.63 0.00 0.41 0,87 0.07 0,16 0.42
FruitsandVegetables 0,21 0,39 1,92 0,23 0,64 2.44 0,81 0.92 2,73
058,9908 CannedPineapple 0.01 0,20 1.45 0,01 0.30 1,66 0,00 0,20 1,61
058,5400 PineappleJuice 0.01 0.02 0,II 0,01 0,02 0,12 0,02 0,030,11
058,5705 PineappleConcentrates 0.00 0,00 0,15 0.00 0.00 0.21 0,00 0,00 0.36
Others 0.20 0,16 0,21 0,21 0,32 0,45 0,79 0,70 0.64
OTHERS II,26 5.54 2,86 2.32 2,59 2,76 3,69 3,39 2.03
265,5 AbacaFibers 0,00 0,25 0,51 0,02 0,I0 0,41 0.00 O,Ol 0,24
121 TobaccoUnmanufactured 0,29 0,17 0,78 0,08 0,27 0,70 0,09 0,12 0.37
PetroleumProducts 10,96 5,12 1,57 2,22 2.21 1.65 3.60 3,19 1,42
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: 1975-1980 : 1981-1985 : 1986-1987
CommdityGroup ASEANDMCSk_ORLDASEANDNCSWORLDASEANDMCSWORLD
11, Non-TraditionalProducts 60,02 47.09 39.02 82,76 65,23 59,81 83.60 79,8672.28
Non-TraditionalM nufactures 47,63 39,65 29.35 77.43 59.59 50,35 75,68 72,5961,57
Elec.Eqpt,/Parts&Telecom. 24,23 15.22 8,88 61,36 36,09 20.61 55,62 32,7319,27
Garments 1,57 1.90 7.45 0,54 1.50 11,42 0,51 1.79 17.35
65 TextileYarns/Fabrics 1,43 3,32 1,19 0.57 1,52 0,95 0,52 1,40 1.05
85 Foobear 0,06 0,27 0,87 0,05 0,40 1,06 0,07 0.19 0,59
83 TravelGoodsandHandbags 0.02 0,02 0,24 0,01 • 0.01 0,17 0,01 0,01 0.26
WoodManufactures 0,22 0,11 0,79 0,11 0,12 0,91 0,09 0,13 1.05
82 FurnituresandFixtures O,N 0.10 1,01 0,07 0.20 1,62 0,12 0,26 2,06
5 Chemicals 3,79 2,99 1,36 3,19 3,65 2.13 9,96 12.87 4.65
682,1205 CopperMetal 0,00 0,01 0.00 0,00 0,00 1,24 0.00 0,00 3,19
66 Non-14etallicMin,Manuf, 5,60 5,32 1,15 2,29 2,35 0,61 0.29 0,85 0.38
MachineryandTransportEqpt, 2;02 1,90 0.71 1,79 1,27 0,76 1,29 1,05 1.15
ProcessedFoodandBeverages 1,24 1,53 1,31 1,74 1,83 2.51 1.12 1.47 2.30
89 Hisc.Manuf,Articles,n,e,c. 1,32 1,07 2,41 0,86 0,86 2,74 0,99 0,75 3.38
Others 6,07 5,89 1,98 4,85 9,80 3.62 5,09 13,10 4.89
Non-Traditions1Unmanufactures 12.39 7,43 9,68 5.32 5,64 9,46 7,91 7,28 10.72
Nickel 0,07 0.38 2,12 0.03 0.15 1,09 0,00 0,13 0,15
931.2805 IronOreA991owates 0.00 0,00 1,46 0.00 0.01 2.08 0,00 0.00 1.54
057,3100 Bananas 0.00 0,19 2,31 0.04 1.22 2,38 0.10 0,92 2,40
057,9703 Man9oos 0.08 0,83 0,11 0,22 0,56 0,15 0.18 0,37 0.19
071.11 Coffee,RawnotRoasted 0.79 0,33 0.58 2.69 1,32 1,10 4,36 1,89 1.51
Fish,FreshorSimplyPreserved 2,17 1,00 1,52 0.41 0.57 1,59 0.53 0,82 3,29
042.2102 Rice 9.11 3,97 0.90 1.38 0.58 0.12 2,43 1,08 0,22
OLhers 0,16 0,94 0.67 0.55 1,24 0.96 0.32 2.08 1.42
III, SpecialTransactions 3.90 2.31 0,67 2.05 1.53 0,66 0,38 0.26 0.14
IV, Re-Exports 1.42 1,27 0.48 1,84 1.50 0.84 8.76 6.64 2,48
TOTALEXPORTS 100,00 100.00100,00 100.00 100.00100,00 100.00 100,00100.00
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TableIII,7b
AVERAGE_OWTHRATEOFPHILIPPINEEXPORTS
TOOHCSANOWORLDEXPQ_TS
•{In_)
• 1976-1980 1991-1985 1985-1987 1986-1987
CommodityGroup ASEAN OtiCS WORLDASEAN OMCS WORLD ABEAN I)MC5 WORLD ASEAN OMCS WORLD
I, Traditions]Exports 155.44 82.17 14.73 -23.35 -18,61 -15,22 79,91 -3,00 -7,88 235,42 47,73 7,22
CoconutProducts 3036,33 40,41 14.8! 80,28 0,83 -8,71 234,98 31,49 -5.04 47.17 55,25 19,36
223,1 Copra 0,00 23,87 _14,53 53,30 58,23 -35,08 21,26 32.67 25,93 63.85 98,02 77.78
Coconutoil 0.00 42,20 29,30 8.7,33 4.88 -5,97 74,60 -4.12 -9,93 i9,80 29.76 14,41
057.72 DesiccatedCoconut 43,92 31.34 54.84 7,78 -1.38 -4,77-16.07 -9,62 0.02 19.74 0.66 70.45
081,3700 CopraHeal/Cake 0,00 0.00 29.09-20,00-22,8S:13,27 0.00 -33,3331,16 -2,67
SugarendProducts 0,00 701,56 1,37 -23.96 -9.69 -21,76 -57,91 10.45 -36,36 -33.68 !04.47 -31.07
CentrifugalRefined 0,00 1048,61 1.48 -23.44 -9,46 -22,59 -33.33 405,25 -36,95 1282,54-31.03
061.5200 Molasses 0,00 57,50 -0.59 19,80 13,66 -1,69 -33.33 -18.19 -27,59 0,57 -31,25
ForestProducts 103.46 10,05 IT,7E-35,61-14,38-13.I5-7,65 -2,08 -I.50 37.33 46,80 20.90
247 •Logs -20,00 -9,83 -8,98 0.00 -7,86 -11,3! 0,00 -69.57 -62,15 -100,00-100,00
248 Lumber 19321,314T4,77114,07-32,03-7.21-10,99-18.251!,4__15,60-16,8345,22 48,08
634,2 Plywood -20.00 151.30 76,52 -20,46 -17,20 -12.29 226,28 30.28 7,43 790,87 105,73 21,43
Veneer$heets/Corestocks O.O0 0,00 70,00 -20.03 -21.48 -14.73 -32.35 595,11 9.13 -53,48 1931,88 66,67
Others 0,00 0,00 0,00 -20,0042,40 12,00-65,41 55.38 1,11-100,00-65.9120,00
MineralProducts ; 205,72 116.36 35.30 86,60 -25,62 -22,55 01,81 -17.22 -4,96 16.20 -T6,37 -16.10
287,1102 CopperConcentrates 0.00 117,71 31,42 0.00 -29,T4 -29,90 0,00 -!3,07 0,43 -8.95 21,11
Gold 0,_0 110.8_. 42.89 0,00 -20,98 -]5,33 0,00 -10,85 0.38 -20,89 -35,00
287,9101 ChromiumOre 0,00 479,05 30,77 _,34 ;5,49 -8,88 0.69 -I0.06 -27,18 -100,00 -75,61 "-38,36
Others -15.25 93,43 45,!@1375.46 82,67 :5,08 2532.42 -40,90 -3,81 146,72 -20,01 -34,62
FruitsandVegetables -2.04 56.61 30.45 !30,86 20,!0 4.99 30,55 10,64 4,16 65.72 21,48 9,49
058.9908 CannedPineapple -5,04 147,6626.85 93.74 15.38 2,27 110,08 -15,27 -0,_8325,63 -19,79 3,61
058.5400 PineappleJuice !3,00 27,26 20,00 15.52 8,17 11.89 3,36 20,6I 8,57 -14.89 28.84 0.00
058,5705 PineappleConcentrates 0,00 0,00 40,00 0.00 424,92 12,55 0,00 708,20 15,79 11.11
Others -2,43 22.2t 73.33 295.90 28,97 14,87 33,82 25,70 11,64 67.22 36,11 26,67
0,00 0O0 O,O0
OTHE_ 2_,79 3,7,05 14.35 -25,72 __o8,33-5,96 297,98 77.16 -1,49 983.62 129,88 21,65
285.5 AbacaFibers =70,00 ;7,30 18.57 40,00 --2,70 -2,73 -33,33 16,14 -24.85 -10,71 -7,69
12I TobaccoUnmanufactured -4,63-I0.21-2.94 -8,46233.02 0.77 16,36 73,06-14.68-34.46 2,97 -14.29
Petro]eumProducts 30.62 42.70 29.55 -27,16 -25.54 0.02 351,36 89,36 14.39!148.00 143,33 39.68
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T •
1975-1980 1981-1985 1985-1987 1986-1987
CommodityGroup ASEA_DMCS _I.D ASEANDMCS WORLDASEANDMCS WORLDASEANOMCS WORLB
If,Non-TraditionalPr ducts 89.00107,4585,1619,1413.76 4.73 0.85 5.08 7,50 34,20 17.8421.76
Non-TraditionalManufactures 65.2892,$889.2624,6016.43 7,34 1,49 5.04 7,68 38.28 19.1826.50
Elec,ZElec,Eqpt,/Parts&Tel. _2q.882009,07285,5332,8423,42!1.04-3,25 0.32 -3,9231.6934.1021.76
C_rmnts 4,54 31.37 80.40 -15,49 -5.39 5,07 3229 39,90 23,36 104.68 -1.34 46.21
65 TextileYarns/Fabrics 4.95 105,35 47.27 172,571537,78-11,51 341,402645.07 23,33 25.32 82.03 54,55
85 Footwear -T.24 134.01426.67 39,05 =1.00 -9.80 27.65 -2.70 -11,91 63.33 -1.16 0.00
83 TravelGoodsandHandbags -9,34 21.97 -2,00 30.39 -4,44 6.56 114.31174.34 40.00 152,71 7.39 33,33
WoodManufactures -11,35 43,45 4,I4 72,08 60,02 5.03 -14,40 21,13 8,83 -79,56 -3,96 25.53
82 FurnituresandFixtures _0,25 68,13 288.00 61,54 2I,!2 2,53 29,95 9,08 15,82 9.98 35,44 46.07
5 Chemicals 6.85 14,6964.7647,0937.5912,79100.8583,7235,2364,9116.35 0.82
682.1205CopperMetal 0.00-20.00D,OO 0.00 0.00 75,65 0,00 0.00 15,97 -5,81
66 Non-Meta]]icMineralManufactures-0.8822,38 18.36*20.95-;4,8645,92-39,29-28.273,84-20.24-21.2322,22
MachineryandTransportEqpt, 0,!8 53,2074,00 7.92-II.76-7,7512,I329.2435,56-64.7653,12 73.33
ProcessedFoodandBeverages 137,35115,59111,43 5,79 1.41 6,51 -0,28 5,23 5,10 1.91 13.71 8,82
89 Misc.ManufacturedArticles,n, !71,56 160.51 _,78 -8.14 -10,75 -1.69 !1,21 10,13 13.78-17,42 12.11 25,16
Others 46.03 58,84 78,52 11.47 71.05 28,98 29.00 2.73 -1,40 111.30 -0.38 23.81
Non-TraditionalUnm ufactures922.24331.1674,16 1,90 -4.59-3,97 5,42 8.76 8.51 15,81 5.26 -2,29
Nickel 0.00 0,00 63,64289,10643.2157,27 0.00 6.92 85,59 -lO0.O0-lO0.O0
931,2905 IronOreAgglomerates G,O; 0,00 C,OO Q.00 -16.11 -4,04 0,00 -60,19 -10,21 -10,59
057,3100 Bananas 0,00 122,46 1t,23 50,06 135,7_ 1,45 -0.52 -6,88 0,25 -14.99 -39.33 -8.92
057.9703 Mangoes 3533,88 40,99 50,00 23,!9 -2,11 !,87 16,95 24,0I 21,43 100,49118,86 80.00
071.11 Coffee,RawnotRoasted _8.87 34,15 430,00 94,83 92.7_ 12,4! -21,68 -16.74 -3,87 -76.26 -78.43 -73,11
Fish,Freshor SimplyPreserved O,O0 0.00 113,75 41,82 18,38 0,91 100,22 68.22 44.23 -12.85 52,50 44.76
842,2102Rice 0,0079681,76 0,00-48,90 0.00
Others !23.16 102,57 58,18 73,07 11.53 8,21 10,07 22,87 20.73 7.42 16,48 20,59
IIhSpecialTransactions 326,21204,1291,43-12.56!0.07 8.44 18.8540.84 1,39 33,72-0.60-12.50
IV.Re-Exports G,O0 _.00 _0,00 12!,_6 _2,50 ?_,_9 68,34 8!.30 48,35 52,79 33,63 33,04
TOTALEXPORTS !!3._9 9E,50 30.4E 9,37 !.59 -4.03 4.20 4,07 2,87 44.20 22.37 18,13
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TablellI,Tc
_ITIONALANDNDN-_AI)ITIONALEXRJRTS
TODEVEL_I_NEMBERCOUNTRIES
ANDNORLDEXPQITS
{)975-1987)
(In MillionU.S,$)
: 1975 : 1980 : 1985 : 1987 :
ComexJityGroup * ASEANDNCS WORLD ASEAN OMCS WORLD ASEAN DNCS WORLO AGEAN DMCS WORLD
[, TraditionalExports 18 92 1,767 137 471 3,068 9 144 1,302 51 166 1,367
CoconutProducts O 13 466 8 39 8ti 1 12 489 13 39 561
223.l Copra 0 1 172 0 I 47 0 0 O 9 20 32
Coconutoil 0 11 230 B 35 567 1 9 347 4 17 381
057.72 DesiccatedCoconut 0 I 31 0 3 118 0 2 76 0 2 75
001.3700 CopraHeal/Cake 0 0 33 0 0 81 0 O 36 0 0 73
SugarandProducts 0 5 615 88 181 657 0 65 185 0 11 71
CentrifugalRefined 0 3 581 88 174 624 0 59 169 0 6 60
061.5200 Holasses 0 2 34 0 7 33 0 6 16 0 5 11
ForestProducts 1 35 225 4 53 425 0 23 199 0 29 243
247 Logs 1 32 167 0 16 92 0 8 39 0 0 0
248 Lumber 0 0 27 3 5 TaT 0 3 91 0 4 154
834.2 Plywood 0 3 23 0 27 111 0 10 51 0 23 68
VeneerSheets/coresLocks 0 0 8 1 3 36 8 0 12 0 1 15
Others 0 0 0 I 5 O 2 6 O 0 6
NineralProdocCs 0 22 332 0 t48 918 0 29 243 0 25 224
287,1102 CopperConcentrates 0 15 212 0 105 545 0 16 84 0 77 109
Gold 0 6 76 0 39 239 0 8 100 0 7 91
287,9101 ChromiumOre 0 0 13 0 2 33 0 2 12 0 1 T
Others O 0 31 0 3 101 0 3 47 0 1 17
Fruits andVegetabTes 0 1 44 0 3 111 2 7 136 ¢ 10 150
058.9908 CannedPineapple 0 0 35 0 2 82 0 3 89 0 2 gg
058,5400 PineappleJuice 0 0 3 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 6
058,5705 PineappleConcentrates 0 0 3 0 0 9 0 0 14 0 0 20
Others 0 1 3 0 I 14 2 4 26 4 8 38
OTHE_ I4 16 85 35 47 146 5 8 80 33 50 lt8
265.5 AbacaFibers 0 i 14 0 2 27 0 I 17 0 1 12
121 TobaccoUnmanufactured 1 1 34 1 I 29 0 0 24 0 1 18
Petro]eumProUucts 14 14 37 34 44 90 5 7 39 33 48 68
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: 1975 : 1980 : 1985 : 1987 :
CommodityGroup _ ASEANONCS WORLDASEANDHCB WORLDASEANDHCS WORLDASEANDNCSWORLD
t
II. Non-TraditionalProducts 41 73 504 223 465 2,650 510 825 3,275 408 893 4,197
Non-Traditiona]H nufactures 40 68 367 169 385 2,005 487 770 2,785 372 817 3,642
Elec.Eqpt./Parts&Telecol. 1 2 47 106 172 671 410 470 t,056 269 390 1,119
Garments 4 6 100 3 16 502 I 8 623 3 18 1,098
65 TextileYarns/Fabrics 3 5 22 3 33 74 X 11 39 2 18 88
85 Foot_ar 0 0 3 0 3 67 0 2 39 0 2 31
83 TravelGoodsandHandbags 0 0 10 0 0 t 0 • 0 10 0 0 16
WoodManufactures 1 1 29 0 0 35 I I 43 0 I 62
82 FurnituresandFixtures 0 0 5 0 I 77 I 2 84 1 3 130
5 Chemicals 7 13 21 10 22 89 32 67 150 54 143 245
882.1205 CopperMetal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 168 0 0 162
66 Non-NetallicMin.Nanuf, 13 19 33 12 41 60 2 16 26 I 8 22
MachineryandTransportEqpt. 4 5 10 4 17 47 3 6 30 3 13 78
ProcessedFoodandBeverages I 2 14 5 15 92 5 13 I06 5 16 128.
89 Nisc._nuf.Articles,n.e.c, 1 1 46 5 11 149 3 6 136 4 8 199
Others 6 14 27 20. 54 133 29 188 257 31 195 286
Non-TraditionalUn_nufactures 1 5 137 53 80 645 23 55 5t0 36 77 555
Nickel 0 33 0 4 138 0 1 64 0 0 0
931.2905 IronOreAgglomerates 0 O 0 0 0 118 0 0 95 0 0 76
057.3100 Bananas 0 0 73 0 2 114 0 9 113 O 7 121
057.9703 Mangoes 0 2 2 0 5 7 I 4 7 1 5 12
071.11 Coffee,RawnotRoasted I I 2 2 3 45 17 17 70 6 6 32
Fish,Freshorpreserved 0 0 16 9 11 107 3 9 99 2 10 207
042.2102 Rice 0 0 0 40 45 73 0 0 0 25 25 25
Others 0 2 11 I 9 43 2 16 62 I 23 82
[II, SpocialTransactions I 2 21 16 24 33 2 3 12 I 3 7
IV. Re-Exports 0 2 6 15 37 10 17 40 48 79 149
TOTALEXPORTS 57 167 2,294 381 975 5,788 530l 989 4,629 506 1,140 5,720
• t Fi9uresdoesnotsumuptotaldueto roundin9
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It is predicted t_at the share of exports to developing member
countries will rise frcm 18-.5 percent in 1987 to 25 percent in the year
2800 (see TaDles III.8a and III.8b). Similarly, exports to Japan will
increase, though slightly, from 17.2 percent in 1987 to 22 percent in the
year 2000. On the other hand the share of the United States and EEC
countries will decline, from 34.5 percent to 27 percent in the case of the
U.S., and from 18.5 percent to 12 percent for EEC countries. The reason
for this shift in the pattern of the direction of trade would be the
realignment of economic forces that will see the rise of protectionism in
the Western capitalist countries. !ntra-regional trade then will becane
Lnore prevalent. It is also worth noting that the share of exports to
countries outside these four categories will rise from 11.3 percent to 14
percent. This will result mainly from increased trade with the socialist
countries as the latter open up their economies to the outside world.
B. Forecasts of Exports and Demand for Pre- and
Post-Shipment Financin 9
This section attempts to forecast merchandise exports from 1989 to
2000 with the end in view of determining pre- and post-shipment financing
requirements. The forecasted values will then be disaggregated along
various classifications of exports, namely: (i) the ten single digit PSCC
categories; (2) the five aggregated categories (primary fuel, prilmary non-
fuel, labor intensive, moderately capital- and skill-intensive, and highly
capital- and skill-intensive) ; (3) by country of destination; and (4)
traditional and non-traditional.
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TaDle I_I.8a
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE
EXPORTS BY DESTINATION
(1987 - 2_00)
Year Developing European United Japan Others
Member Economic States
Countries Community
1987 18.54 18.53 34.55 17.16 11.22
1988 18.96 17.46 34.00 19.85 9.73
1989 19.46 17.00 33.42 20.03 10.08
1990 19.97 16.55 32.83 20.21 10.44
1991 20.47 16.09 32.25 20.39 10.80
1992 ......20.97 15.64 31.67 20.57 11.15
1993 21.48 15.18 31.08 20.74 11.51
1994 21.98 14.73 30.50 20.92 11.86
1995 22.48 14.27 29.92 21.10 12.22
1996 22.98 13.82 29.33 21.28 12.58
1997 23.49 13.36 28.75 21.46 12.93
1998 23.99 12.91 28.17 21.64 13.29
1999 24.50 12.45 27.58 21.82 13.64
2000 25.00 12.00 27.00 22._0 14.00
Table III.8b
DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE
EXPORTS BY DESTINATION
(1987 - 2000)
Year Developing European United Japan Others
Member Economic States
Countries Community
1987 1032.86 i_32.31 1924.7_ 955.98 625.0662
1988 1341.23 1235.12 2405.16 14_4.19 688.3002
1989 1541.82 1346.91 2647.87 1586.98 111.79
1990 1756.36 1455.57 2887.40 1777.47 128.52
1991 2016.3_ 1584.87 3176.63 2008.42 148.93
1992 2312.99 1725.09 3493.20 2268.87 172.16
1993 27_0.04 1908.13 3906.76 26_7.02 202.58
1994 3209.08 2150.58 4453.00 3054.32 242.42
1995 3742.92 2375.96 4981.68 3513.15 284.85
1996 4297.26 25_4.34 5484.71 3979.36 329.34
1997 4956.39 2_i_.96 6_66.25 4528._b 381.95
1998 56_5.63 3059.67 6676.29 5128.68 440.96
1999 6541.5_ 3324.i5 7363.86 5825.94 509.8b
2000 7500.00 3600._0 81_0.00 66_0.00 588.00
91
In order to forecast total exports, the dollar equivalent was
disaggregated into its various components thus:
x$ --x - P/E
X
where X is the peso equivalent of exports at constant prices, P
is the implicit peso price deflator, and E is the implicit exchange rate
X
applying to exports. A log-linear model was fitted to these three
variables using data covering the period 1967-87 and the following
compounded growth rates were obtained: 6.7 percent for X, 12.5 percent
for P and 3.1 percent for E . Since
X
X$=X+P-E
X
the compounded growth rate for dollar exports should De approximately 16.1
percent.
Ad3ustments were made when making projections. For example, since
there is an impending economic slowdown in the world economy, the growth
rate of real exports is placed at 7 percent (from a growth of 21 percent in
1988). This was combined wit_ a rate of peso depreciation of 3 percent and
an inflation of 8 percent with a net result of 12 percent growth in 1989
for dollar exports.
The forecasts of merchandise exports are presented in Table III.9.
From a level of $8B in 1989, exports are expected to reach $30B in 2000.
The export projections up to the year 1994 are lower than similar forecasts
13__/
presented by the Central Bank of the Philippines. The forecasts are
13/
A similar methodology was applied by the Central Bank.
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compared in Table I•II.10. The downward bias in our forecasts was
introduced in order to account for the impending slowdown in the U.S.
economy which in turn would nave a significant impact •on world trade.
Recessionary forces would be present up to 1992 when the EBC finally
consolidates its contain market. Hopefully, after this time the uncertainty
that would • have resulted from these events would disappear leading to a
renewed expansion in • world trade. This prospect is reflected in the
relatively nigh growth rates of exports from 1993-95. •After this, a
constant growth rate of approximately 12.•5 percent was applied (9 percent
for P, 6.5 percent for X, •and 3 percent for E ). •
• X
Pre-snipment financing requirements• were calculated based on the
figures used in the sample •c_nputations presented in the ADB terms of
reference. The former is equal• to 14 percent of total exports and it
incorporates financing needs for both domestic and imported components. It
is quite difficult to estaDlish trend behavior on the percentage of exports••
under guarantee and insurance coverage and percentage of exports which are
officially financed. Data on these variables are not •readily available and
most of the exporters interviewed are self-financed.
As no data on past post-shipment financing (which is surely
negligible) are available, an educated guess had to be made on how much
credit demand would arise from this need. At present about 95 percent of
exports are covered by letters of credit. The remaining amount is assumed
to be supported by post-shipment financing. • It is estimated that this
percentage will gradually rise to 10 percent by the year 2000. The• amount
of financing required is then adjusted by ass_ning a 90-day turnover rate.
Table III.10
COMPARISON OF CENTRAL BANK AND
PIDS FORECASTS, 1989-1994
Year PIDS Forecast CB
1989 7923 7980
1990 8795 9015
1991 9850 10725
1992 11030 11930
1993 1257_ 13415
1994 14600 15230
Sources: Table III.7 of this study, and
Inter-Agency Study Group on External
Trade Statistics and Projections of
the Foreign Operations Committee,
Central Bank of the Philippines,
Annual Report 1987
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The forecasted pre- and post,shipment financing requirements are shown
in Tables III.lla and III.llb, respectively. For pre-shipment, the
financing requirements are expected to increase from $1.1B in 1989 to $4.2B
in 2000, while for post-shipment, the financing requira_ents will increase
from $50M in 1989 to $750M in 2000.
The disaggregated forecasts for total exports (both in percentage
terms and value) are shown in Tables III.3 and III.4 and Tables III.ll
through III.12. Pre-shipment and post-shipment financing requirements are
also disaggregated but only along two modes of classification: the ten l-
digit PSCC categories and traditional/non-traditional exports (see Tables
III.12a, II_12b, III.12c and III.12d).
Tables III.lla and III.12c show that the bulk of financing
requirements will come from manufactured exports, This is an indication
that much of the credit requirements will be relatively long term in nature
(i.e., a shorter turnover rate is involved). This is based on the
assumption that primary exports are easier and cheaper to finance.
However, because of lack of data, it is not possible to distribute the
total financing requirements across the spectrum of maturities.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE EXPORT SECTOR
•• To a large extent, institutional support plays a vital role for the
growth and direction of Philippine exports. It provides the necessary
"infrastructure" by which a fledgling export sector can thrive. A subs-
tantial share of this support is provided by the government with a supple-
mentary role coming from the private sector.
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Table llI.llc
PERCENt'AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS BY
1 - DIGIT PSCCCATEGORY
(1987-2000)
,_,
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1987 15.94 0.50 9.60 1.74 7.13 4.40 8.42 9.93 13.61 28.74
1988 14.94 0.45 10.02 2.16 6.81 3.63 10.14 9.81 13.49 29.34
1989 14.45 0.43 9.67 2.06 5.75 3.48 10.00 10.16 13.87 29.98
1990 13.95 0.41 9.33 1.97 5.50 3.32 10.00 10.51 14.24 30.62
1991 13.44 _.39 9.00 1.87 5.25 3.17 10.00 10.86 14.62 31.25
1992 12.96 0.37 8.67 1.77 5.00 3.02 10.00 11.21 15.00 31.89
1993 12.46 0.35 8.33 1.68 4.75 2.87 10.00 11.55 15.37 32.53
1994 11.97 0.32 8.00 1.58 4.50 2.72 10.00 11.90 15.74 33.17
1995 11.48'0.30 7.67 1.48 4.25 2.56 10.00 12.25 16.12 33.81
1996 10.98 0.28 7.33 1.39 4.00 2.41 10.00 12.60 16.50 34.45
1997 10.48 0.26 7.00 1.29 3.75 2.26 10.00 12.95 16.87 35.08
1998 10.00 0.24 6.67 1.19 3.50 2.10 10.00 13.30 17.25 35.72
1999 9.50 0.22 6.33 1.10 3.25 1.95 10.00 13.65 17.62 36.36
2000 9.00 0.20 6.00 1.00 3.00 1.80 10.00 .14.00 18.00 37.00
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Tamle III.12a
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE
EXPORTS CLASSIFIED AS TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL
(1987 - 2000)
Year Traditional Non-Traditional Others
1987 33.6 63.7 2.7
19_8 32.5 64.6 2.9
1989 31.5 65.4 3.1
1990 3_.5 66.3 3.2
1991 29.4 67.2 3.4
1992 28.4 68._ 3.6
1993 27.3 68.9 3.8
1994 26.3 69.8 3.9
1995 25.2 70.7 4.1
1996 24.2 71.5 4.3
1997 23.1 72.4 4.5
1998 22.1 73.3 4.6
1999 21._ 74.1 4.9
2_0 2_.0 75.0 5.0
Table III.12b
DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
CLASSIFIED AS TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL
(1987 - 2000)
Year Traditional Non-Traditional Others
1987 1871.9 3548.7 150.4
19_8 2299.1 4569.8 205.1
1989 2495.7 5181.6 245.6
1990 2682.5 5831.1 2_1.4
1991 2_95.9 6619.2 334.9
1992 3132.5 7500.4 397.1
1993 3431.6 866_.7 477.7
1994 3839.8 i_19_o8 569.4
1995 4195.8 11771.6 682.7
1996 4525.4 13370.5 804.1
1997 4874.1 15276.4 949..5
1998 5i37.7 17372.1 1098.2
199_ 5607.0 19784.7 1308.3
200_ 6_0.0 225_0._ 15_0.0
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•Table III.12c
PRE-SHIPMENT FINANCING REQUIREMENTS CLASSIFIED AS
TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL
(1989 - 2000)
(Current $ Million)
Year Traditional Non-Traditional Others
1989 349.3 725.3 34.4
1990 375.5 816.2 39.4
1991 405.4 926.7 46.9
1992 438.5 1049.9 55.6
1993 48_.5 1212.6 66.9
1994 537.6 1426.7 79.7
1995 587.4 1648.0 95.6
1996 633.6 1871,9 112.6
1997 682.4 2138.7 132.9
1998 733.3 2432.1 152.6
1999 785.0 2769.9 183.2
2000 840.0 3150.0 210.0
Table III.12d
POST-SHIPMENT FINANCING REQUIREMENTS CLASSIFIED AS
TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL
(1989 - 20_)
•(Current $ Million)
Year Traditional Non-Traditional Others
1989 15.8 32.7 1•.6
199_ 16.8 36.5 1.8
1991 21.8 49.7 2.5
1992 "" 31.2 74.8 4.0
1993 42.9 108.2 6.0
1994 57.6 152.9 5.0
1995 73_3 205.7 11.9
1996 84.9 251.0 15.1
1997 103.5 324.4 20.2
1998 117.8 39_.7 24.5
1999 •• 133.1 469.8 31.1
2000 15_.0 562.5 37.5
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The first section of this chapter provides an overview of goverr_lent
support to •enhance local exports afterwhicn the private sector initiative
is presented. The latter focuses on the role played by major exporter
organizations toward the develo_nent of exports.
A. The Goverl_nent's Export Development Progr_a
This section is an attempt to review the existing export
development program of the government. The primary concern is to look
into the existence of a coordinated policy towards the development of
Philippine• exports and at the same time, attempt to assess the
effectiveness of the system. First and foremost is that there must
be an objective to meet - that is the need to achieve an increasing
share of Philippine products in foreign markets. Secondly, there is a
concensus that this objective can best be achieved through the institution
of an export development program.
Export development is a process of enhancing viability of local
exportable products in foreign markets. It involves first the
identification of products which are marketable, and second, the need to
enhance their marketability and competitiveness. Dealing with the former
is to nave knowledge of foreign demand for particular products in order to
be able to assess the country's comparative advantage, in terms of the
availability of local raw materials and other resources to engage in their
production in meeting such demand. To enhance the products'
marketability, on the other hand, includes product development, and
promotions and marketing. Product development encompasses the technical
knowhow of its production, skills training, product concepts and design,
and production manag_nent. Promotions and marketing involve selling
I03
t_rough the exposure and promotions of the product, negotiations for a
share of the market, such as negotiations for quotas, and market
penetration, such as negotiations for lower tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Given this background, this chapter proceeds by asking the following
questions:
(a) What is the present support given by the government for export
development - the agencies involved, the policies and programs of
action?
(b) How amply covered are the various aspects of export development?
(c) How effective is the program in terms of implementation and
accessibility to its intended beneficiaries?
1.0 The Present Export Develo_nent Program
The task to develop Philippine exporters is assigned to the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI). As the primary government office for business
and trade, the Deparhnent expands the exports as one of its implementing
strategies. As such it has under its wings the International Trade Group
(ITG) which is mainly concerned with the formulation and implementation of
the country' s export development program (see Annex B for the
organizational structure of the Department of Trade and Industry).
The ITG is composed of ten agencies which are brought together to
ensure a comprehensive formulation and a focused implementation of the
government's export program. These agencies are involved in (i) policy
formulation, (2) program development, (3) monitoring, (4) regulation, and
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(5) service delivery pertinent to international trade and commerce. These
agencies and their mandate are described below:
(a) Philippine Trade Training Center (PTTC)
The PTTC is responsible for upgrading the knowledge and skills of
Filipino exporters through a comprehensive training program. The agency
offers three major services: (i) training; (2) product testing; and (3)
exhibition training.
The first aims to develop the competitiveness of local exporters in
the international market on the aspect of marketing their products.
This includes knowledge on efficient production, costing and pricing,
sources of financing and financial manageaent, techniques in market
research and market penetration.
Product testing includes testing of raw materials and finished
products on garments and textiles, furnitures and fresh and
preserved foods. The Center has linkages with other specialized
agencies such as the Food Development Center (FDC), Philippine
Textile Research Institute (FI'RI), Forest Products Research Institute
(FPRI), Cottage Industry Technology Center (CITC), and the Bureau of
Product Standards (BPS) for product quality testing.
Exhibition training involves the effective use of exhibition for
promoting products. This includes presenting products, as well as
planning and managanent in participation to trade fairs.
In addition, the Center is involved in the upgrading of the
skills of government personnel in the field of international market
I05
researcn, market information dissemination, and planning and management
of export training and seminars.
Year ated : 1986
Budget : [m21M
Personnel Complement : 88
(b) Bureau of Export Trade Promotion (BETP)
The • BETP is an export assistance and information agency under the
Department of Trade and IndUs£ry. The agency is involved in (i) export
assistance and facilitation, (2) marketing and •promotion, (3) market and •
product studies and (4)•policy revlew and coordination.
Considered _the prlmary agency on export assistance under DTI, it
offers consultancy services ••on export procedures, doc_m_entation, marketing,
and financing for exporters and Would-be ex/x_rters.. It also operates
a one-stop export doctm_entation center and an export assistance unit.
An exporter can register his product with •the agency which
circulates an internationally-distributed Registry of Philippine •Exporters
•as •part • of its •marketing and promotions program. Likewise, it is
engaged in promoting •international sub-contracting between foreignbuyers
and local manufacturers and producers.
It conducts studies on • product and raw materials sourcing,
international-market profile and formulate country and product export
strategies. The agency is also involved in identifying and recommending
measures for appropriate export-import procedures. It monitors
private• and foreign-trade missions and •conducts industry-sector dialogues
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with local exporter organizations as part of its policy-review and
coordination efforts.
Year operated : 1987
Budget : P26.7M
Personnel Complement : 150
(c) Center for International Trade Expositions and Missions (CITEM)
It is the main marketing and promotions arm %mder the DTI.
Basically, its activity is the organization and participation in
trade exhibitions here and in foreign countries as a way of exposing
Philippine export products.
The Center provides assistance in the planning and organization of
exporters participating in trade fairs and exhibits. It is also involved
in on-site matching of buyers and producers/manufacturers. Lastly, it
provides merchandising assistance and consultancy services. The latter
provides Filipino exporters specialized, updated and accurate
information about new products, and developments of new products.
The Center also conducts exhibition and trade fairs locally on a
regional basis as a way of exposing the products of exporters.
Year operated : 1987
Budget : P47.5M
Personnel Complement : 150
(d) Garments and Textiles Export Board (GTEB)
GTEB's primary ob3ective is to oversee the overall administration of
exports of garments and textiles. This agency is given the task to issue
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quota allocation and export authorizations on the exports of garm_its and
textiles. It issues licences for the importation of textile materials and
other raw materials and in the operation of a bonded garments warehouse.
It provides international exporters information on industry/market
data, such as prices and demand, up-to-date developments in the industry,
trends in garments, and other developments pertaining to garments.
Year operated : 1979
Budget : @57M
Personnel Complement : 268
(e) Foreign Trade Service Corps (FTSC)
This agency gathers commercial and marketing information as an input
in the formulation of market strategy. This involves identification of
investment areas, investors and specific products that have potential in
specific markets. As such, the agency is also involved in the
implementation of product-market strategies.
FTSC makes representations to organizers of trade exhibitions and
fairs in foreign countries which enables the • country to
participate. It also conducts on-site promotional activities such as
scheduling foreign buyers visit to the country and servicing incoming
selling missions.
Year Operated : 1986
Budget : @II9M
Personnel Complement : 80
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(f) Bureau of International Trade Relations (BITR)
This agency is responsible for all matters pertaining to foreign
trade relations especially on matters pertaining to market access. As
such, it is involved in formulating positions and strategies for trade
negotiations and consultations. The primary issues it tackles is
the elimination or reduction of tariff and non-tarlff barriers,
inclusion of local products in the different preferential trading schemes
(GSP, GSTP, ASEAT-PTA), and in negotiating for quota allocation for
specific products. This requires coordination with other agencies to
assume government-wide consistency of positions on trade negotiations.
Year Operated : 1979
Budget : P4.7M
Personnel Complement : 91
(g) Philippine Shippers Council (Shippercon)
Shippercon is tasked to provide adequate, reliable and economic
shipping services and as a clearinghouse of information on shipping
assistance and services.
The agency provides assistance to shippers especially to exporters
by negotiating for lower freight rates for various export products,
and in assuring adequate supply of containers of all types in the
country's major ports. It conducts a training program for exporters
on the proper techniques on shipping one's products. In addition, it
provides assistance to exporters regarding booking and chartering.
Shippercon also provides exporters information on basic freight rates,
various surcharges, and shipping terms and conditions. It also gives
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assistance to exporters in computing freight co_ts and in securing
insurance.
•The agency have field offices outside Metro Manila and are represented
in the regions by the DTI Regional Offices :
Year operated = 1982
Budget : PI.2M
•Personnel Complement : 18
(h) International Coffee Organization-Certifying Agency (IC/)-CA)
•This agency• is•responsib! e for• the administration of Philippine coffee
exports and represents the country in the International Coffee Organization
- an organization of coffee buyers and producers. Its primary task is to
develo p •and promote •coffee exports to quota and non-quota countries.
Specifically, it •accredits coffee exporters, assigns and monitors ••quota
_ ." ..
allocations to exporters, provides certification of the coffee's origin as
required by ICO, andprovides •the clearance for •coffee exports.
The agency also provides information to exporters pertaining coffee
production, quota and export guidelines. Similarly, information on market
opportunities and world prices of coffee is provided by the agency.
Year operated • 1981
Budget : @4.3M
Personnel Complement : 21
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(i) Product Development and Design Center of the Philippines (PDDCP)
This agency contributes to the marketability of Philippine exports
through product • quality and design. •Its primary function is product
research and development. In this connection, it provides exporters
assistance •in product and package evaluationand in product design, free of
charge. Producers are assisted in the development of new products as well
as in the design of existing ones. This allows export products to adapt to
changing market conditions, materials, and technology.
In addition, it provides exporters information in the latest in
design trends, such as color and style of products to suit foreign
market preferences. The Center also • provides consultations on the
proper utilization materials as well as the source for such materials.
Its two design mobiles bring design awareness to the region and•
conducts its seminar workshops to help exporters in adapting to the latest
technology and processes in design.
Year operated : 1978
Budget : @20.8M
Personnel Complement : 145
(j) Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC)
PITC is the government' s international trading arm. It thus
engages in export and import of products not normally pursued by
private enterprises. AS such, there are two types of trading that PITC
engages in. First is trading of new non-traditional products which the
private sector is hesitant to engage in. Second is trading with
socialist countries that are normally inaccessible to the private sector.
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PIT(: also engages in the importation of raw materials for local
producers. On this aspect PITC operates custom's bonded trading
warehouses (CBTWs) for export producers who may import their raw
materials requirements. This has the added benefits of faster
processing and shipment for imports and eliminates the importation of raw
materials under the duty-drawback system.
Lastly, PITC operates a @IOM financing facility for small exporters.
Year operated : 1977
Budget : own revenues
Personnel Complement : 217
All of these ten agencies are involved in the delivery of
front line export services. Of the ten, three are regulatory namely
ICO-CA, GTEB, Shippercon. The agencies comprising the ITG are under
the supervision of one undersecretary whose main task is to address the
need for a focused and comprehensive export strategy. Among the ten
agencies, BETP is considered the lead agency. Its mandate is considered
to be general in nature vis-a-vis the nine agencies.
As a sign of the government's thrust to encourage exports, the
Department of Trade and Industry provides, free of charge, exporters
and would-be exporters information on setting-up export business, export
procedures and documentation, export marketing and promotions, export
financing and incentives, product and raw-material sourcing, product design
and development, tec_Lnical services and quality control. A separate
unit under the BETP, the Export Assistance Network (EXPONET), has
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been set up to provide these services. EXPONET is represented in the
regions by DTI's regional offices and has been operating since 1984.
One of the innovative features of the present export development
program is the government's policy to ease on export procedures to minimize
the time by which exporters will go through the process. Most exporters
shy away from government services because of time-consuming, paperwork.
Extensive paperwork also gives rise to red tape. In this regard, t_e One-
Stop-Export Documentation Center (OSEDC) has been established to simplify
export Procedures and documentation.
This office brings under one roof various government offices to
facilitate application, processing, and approval of export documentation.
These are the Bureau of Customs (BC), Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI),
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Bureau of Plant Industry
(BPI), Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB), and Department of Trade
and Industry-NCR (see Table IV.I). The OSEDC is located at the
International Trade Center and has offices in key export-oriented regions,
such as Cebu, Davao, Zamboanga, and Baguio.
Similarly, a One-Stop Import Documentation Center (OSIDC) has been set
up to facilitate the importation of raw material requirements by exporters.
The OSIDC houses the Bureau of Custom's Assessment Division, Bonds
Division, and the Bonded Warehouses and Conduction Division.
In addition to these, GTEB has its oWn 0ne-stop action center that
assists exporters on matters such as policies and procedures on the
export of garments, provision of information regarding market
opportunities • and in entertaining complaints. Likewise, a one-stop
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Table IV.I
ONE-STOPEXPORTOOCURENTATIONCE TER:PARTICIPAT]N6AGENCIES
Agency Commodity Oocuments [ssued
Bureauof CustomsExport $ Authority to Load
CoordinationDivision(BOC-ECD) ! Special Permit to Load
• ! Certification of Origin
(GSPandnon-GSP)
; Certificate of Shipment
! Certificate of Re-exportation
Bureauof, AnimalIndustry (BAI) AnimalandAnimal by- ! Export Clearance
products
Bureauof Fisheries and Fish andFishery aquatic ! Export CIearnance
Aquatic Resources ! CITESClearance
Bureauof Plant Industry (BPI) Plants ! Phytosanitary Certificate
PepartJentof Tradeand Industry, Handicrafts I Special Ooculentation
National Capital Region (OTI-NCR) Certificate for Preferential
,Treatment to Australia andEEC
Philippine CoconutAuthority {PCA) Coconutandby products $ Export Clearnance
Philippine Ports Authority(PPA) $ Exemptionfrom #harfageFee for
901 and EPZARegistered
Exporters
$. Accepts Paymentsfor _harfage
Fee
Fiber Industry Development Natural Fibers ! CommodityClearance
Authority (FIDA)
Garmentand Textile Export GarmentsandTextiles I Textile Export Clearance
Board(6TEB)" products
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action center that serves as a complaints, assistance, and information
unit has also been set up by the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine
Ports Authority.
The government has also created the Commission on Exports Procedures
(CEP). The Commission periodically undertakes an overall review of the
procedural and documentation requirements on exporting in response to the
need to amend or introduce new policies and guidelines to simplify export
procedures. It is headed by the DTI Secretary with the CB Governor, NEDA
Director-General, Customs Commissioner and four representatives frQm the
private sector as members.
To further underline its support for exporters, the goverrhment
t/_rough DTI in cooperation with Philippine Exporters Foundation
(Philexport) has instituted an exporters ' accreditation scheme as an
incentive to bonafide exporters. All exporters who have been operating
for at least three years or most have exported at least $100,000 and have
had at least 10 exports transactions for a 2-year period, are given the
following privileges: (a) the use of Philexport-operated customs bonded
warehouses for importation of materials; (b) full listing in the
Philippine Exporters Registry; and (c) availment of the services of the
Special Customs Group in the OSEDC.
Also, a subcontractors exchange known as SUBCONEX has been
instituted by the DTI. The program matches manufacturer-exporters with
sub-contractors. This enables the former to have access to reliable sub-
contractors in meeting export orders. The program also serves an
important contribution of the export sector in the development of backward
linkages. SUBCONEX assistance covers the garments, gifts and houseware,
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furnitures and fixtures, footwear and leathergoods, and fresh and processed
foods sectors.
To supplement these services, DTI produces publications. One of these
is the Exporters Manual, a 4-volume puDlication for circulations to
exporters and would-be exporters which contains all information about
exporting including export financing. It is for sale to all exporters and
would-be exporters. It also publishes a Registry of Philippine Exporters,
a compilation of present DTI registered exporters circulated world-wide
complete with their addresses and products. This Das been found to be very
helpful to exporters since it exposes their products to foreign buyers
without extra cost on their part. Likewise, each of the ten agencies is
also encouraged to produce its brochures as a way to inform exporters of
their services.
Recently, in addressing the need to draw up an export strategy BETP
with all the other agencies under the ITG in consultation with the private
sector, such as the various exporters organization, has identified priority
products for exports to serve as a basis for a 3-year product-market
export strategy. The reason behind this product and market classification
scheme is for the government to focus its support on products that exhibit
good export potential. This will enable the government to channel and
concentrate its resources to products that are marketable and to markets
that exhibit a potential demand for local exports.
Table IV.2 presents the level of government financial support to ITG
Agencies in 1989.
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Table IV.2
GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND SUPPORT, 1989
(DTI AGENCIES)
Agency Fund Allotment % of Total
million)
Office of the Secretary 615.423
8OI 67.465
BEMB 3.76i
ClAP 19.587
CMOF 13.686
CITC 5.411
EPZA 65.000
ICO-CA 4.335 0.41
PTTC 20.542 1.90
PDDCP 20.865 2.00
CITEM I/ 47.480 4.50
BITR 4.'771 0,46
FTSC i19.183 11.52
BETP 26.965 2.60
Snippercon 1.200 0.111
PITC 2/ -
GTEB _/ -
23.5
i/
Subsidy requirements on top of operating budget
2/
Self-supporting government agencies or corporations
Source: General Appropriative Act, 1989
Note: Total government support for its export development
effort is reflected in the 23.5% share of all
agencies comprising the ITG to the total government
funds alloted to the Department of Trade and
Industry
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2.0 Service Coverage
•A comprehensive export development program can be gleaned on how the
different aspects of the program are aaply provided for. If one is to
3udge it from the respective programs and services offered by these
agencies, then it can be said that the Primary elements of an effective
export development strategy are amply covered. This includes market and
product research •and strategy (BETP, FTSC), trade negotiations (BITR),
training for exporters •and government •personnel involved in export
development, and product ••testing (PTTC), product develoim_nt and design
(PDDCP), product marketing and promotion (CITEM, BETP), export'product
administration (GTEB, ICO-CA)•, international trading (PITC), and transport
services (Shippercon)•i.
Having personne ! • based abroad, _'_SC identifies •new exportable
products, works for the country's participation in trade fairs and
exhibits, helps in the development and implementation •of product-market
strategies. BETP, on the other hand, conducts product studies on
these identified commodities.
engages in training exporters on basic • export production and
marketing • techniques and in testing products for quality control.
BITR • is • involved in trade negotiations among which are inclusion of
Philippine• products in various GSP, quota negotiation and negotiation
regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers.
CIT_M is the vehicle by which local products are exposed to buyers
through its trade fairs and exhibits here and• abroad. BETP complements
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Exporters. PDDCP provides service on designs, proper use of raw materials,
and information on trends such as color and shape.
Both GTEB and ICO-CA are involved in quota allocation and
accreditation of exporters for garments and coffee, respectively, while
Shippercon helps exporters transport their products through lower shipping
rates, chartering, booking and assistance on freight handling and shipping.
Majority of these agencies conduct seminars on their respective
services in various parts of the country. Shippercon has conducted 14
seminars last year. CITEM regularly holds trade fairs in major cities in
the country. In addition, it has design mobiles that go to the regions to
increase design awareness. There are, however, agencies that conduct
seminars in Metro Manila only for lack of facilities. One is the PTTC. In
January of 1989, PTTC conducted a total of 13 seminars alohe in its new
facility.
All of t_ese agencies are represented in the regions Oy DTI's Regional
Offices. These offices are located in cities like Davao, Cebu, Cagayan de
Oro. For others such as Shippercon, it _as also field offices in other key
shipping ports, such as Legazpi, Iloilo and Zamboanga.
3.0 Effectiveness of Export Development Program
The effectiveness of the government's export develo_nent program may
not De directly inferred although the country's export performance has
greatly improved despite constricting overseas inarkets brought about
by declines in d_nand and increasing protectionism.
An important consideration to make, however, is the contribution of
these agencies to grab a larger share of the export market than what it
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used to be when these were not in existence. Statistics on tl_eperformance
indicators sucn as the number of exporters serviced by these agencies
attest to this fact. For instance as of 1987, the BETP has provided 4,054
exports direct assistance in marketing their products abroad, about 2,424
exporters were given information on raw material sourcing and about
384 foreign buyers were linked with Filipino suppliers. FTSC has
matched 1,440 exporters with foreign buyers. CITEM through its
pr_notional efforts abroad has brought in 2,239 foreign buyers that
resulted in total sales of $26M. Shippercon directly assisted 1,017
exporters in shipping-related problems and trained 2,162 other exports on
freight handling. ICO-CA has already accredited 96 coffee exporters fr_n
an original of six. PTTC by year-end of 1987 has already trained 180
exporters using its new facility.
The increase of P_ilippine exports for the past two years may be
partly attributed to a guided export strategy and policy and this is
exemplified by a shift in emphasis from the usual traditional exports to
the non-traditional exports to the classification of priority products.
Another contributing factor has been the inception of a focused and
comprehensive export develo_nent program which enables goal-setting. This
was vital in channeling the government's meager resources to one direction.
This was done through a streamlining of the bureaucracy by bringing
together all agencies dealing with international trade into one group each
with a clear mandate and objectives to work on. This has greatly reduced
overlapping and duplication of functions for the various gover_nent
agencies and increased accuracy in pinpointing accountability. These
agencies also functioned according to the gover_aent's overall export
policy. In the performance of their specific tasks, the various agencies
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came to appreciate the need for closer coordination through regular
exchange of information as well as referrals among themselves. This is
facilitated by having a regular monthly meeting among the agencies chaired
by the DTI Secretary.
A great majority of the respondent-exporters admitted having availed
of the services/assistance of certain gover_aent agencies (see Table IV.3).
Most popular among the government agencies mentioned by exporters is CIT_
which helps exporters find markets for their products through various
programs, such as market encounter, trade exhibits, brochures listing
products and exporters, etc.
Respondent-exporters were asked to rate the overall non-financial
export services of the government. Thirteen of them said that the
government' s export services were adequate; seven said that they were
inadequate; and three admitted having no knowledge at all about
government' s export services.
Despite the government's renewed drive to intensify the country's
exports, bringing these services closer to its intended beneficiaries
especially outside Metro Manila is still to be desired. This is hampered
by lack of funds in extending the facilities to the region or hire
additional personnel for their respective operations. Majority of these
agencies are aspiring for a separate staff in the regional offices who
would look after their respective services. This has hampered their
accessibility as evidenced by the fact that most exporters do not know of
_he services offered Dy these agencies. This point will be taken up
further in the next chapter.
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Table IV. 3
SERVICES OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
AVAIT_ OF BY EXPOI_ERS
Assets Export No. C_v' t Agency Services
A. Small-Scale . _
1 1 56 CITEM exhibition
1 6 15 Exposure of products
•1 7 156 FF_C -Exhibit
PI%_ - Source of potential buyers
1 8 5 Product exhibition
1 9 15 Exposure of products, list of buyers
1 10 35 CIT_M- International exposure
GTEB - no red tape
1 ii • 5 Exposure of products
1 12 15 PITC - Source of potential buyers
1 14 25 gov't promotion of Filipino •products
to foreign countries
1 17 nap• nap
1 20 35 regular information about foreign buyers,
trends, new decrees
1 21 5 •fair/exhibits
B. Medium'Scale
2 2 5 CIT_4
2 3 12 PDDCP
2 4 15 CIT_ - Exposure of products
PITC - Raw materials
1 13 16 Provide information about buyers
2 15 nap n.a.
1 22 135 PI%_C/CITEM
C. Large-Scale
2 •5 5 n.a.
2 16 7 none yet
2 18 nap nap
1 19 nap nap
3 23 nap nap
NOTE: Assets: 1- less than _6b million
2 - P5 million to _20 million
3 - more than _20 million
nap - did not avail of the services
n.a. - no answer
Gov't Agencies: 1 - PITC
2 - PDDCP
3 - GTEB
4 - ICO-CA
5 - CITF_
6 - PT%_
7 - others (BF2T)
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B. The Private Sector and Ex_orts
Private sector support for exports comes by way of the various export
organizations. There are two main reasons why exporters band together:
(i} to promote their own interest; and (2) to provide themselves with a
medium for collective representation with the gover_nent.
Export organizations are nonstock, nonprofit corporations with the
main purpose of pr_noting the business interests of their members. These
organizations assist their m_m_ers through the pr_aotions and marketing of
their products, manpower training programs, financial packaging, raw
material sourcing, product design, and information sharing.
In addition, private export organizations serve as a vehicle for
maintaining linkages with the government and the various agencies involved
in export promotions and development. Collective representation provides
an appropriate forth for the exporters to point out inefficiencies and
deficiencies in the gover_nent's export development program and in
reco_nending specific programs for the government to adopt in order to
encourage exports. The latter may come in the form of requests for
goverlaaent support andassistance either through fiscal and financial
incentives, importation of inputs, financing, shipment, promotions and
marketing of their products, product development, and manpower development
and exporters training programs.
The Philippine Exporters Foundation (PHILEXPORT) is a nonstock, non-
profit semi-government organization intended to mobilize the private sector
towards the development of the country's exports. It boasts of a
membership of about 50_ active and inactive exporting companies and
individuals the me_ership of w_ich contriOutes to more than three-fourths
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of the total traditional and non-traditional exports of the country.
PHILEXPORT was established in 1984 with the prLmary objective of promoting
the general welfare of local exporters through a joint government and
private sector initiative. It is managed by a 21-man Board of Trustees,
fourteen of these are heads of the different export industries and seven
undersecretaries of the different gover_nent agencies.
The presence of government representatives in its Board serves to
underscore its role asia primary link between exporters and the government
in fostering the develo_nent of local exports. PHILEXPORT's strong linkage
provides a starting point to lobby for govermnent incentives for exporters
and a forum to propose effective measures and policies pertinent to
exports
The Confederation of Philippine Exporter (COPE) is private nonstock,
nonprofit organization of exporters established in 1973. Like PHILEXPORT,
its main objectives are to promote the interests of its member-exporters
and to seek government support and assistance for exports. COPE's
msnbersnip of 300 individual exporters and corporations comes from
the different industry groups and trade associations involved in exports.
Some m_nbers of COPE are also members of PHILEXPORT. Lately, they
have agreed in principle to merge. The details of the merger are still
being worked out.
The Philippine Chamber of Handicraft Industries, Inc. (PCHI) is
another private organization ofmanufacturers, producers, and exporters
engaged in local _andicra£ts. It was established in 1984 and _as about
250 members to date. PCHI's efforts are geared towards the development
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of small and medium enterprises in ten product sectors all in
handicrafts such as toys, ceramics, baskets, shellcrafts, woodcrafts
and paper products, house ornaments, house textiles, and handlooms.
Aside from these big umbrella organizations of exporters, there are
other smaller trade associations within each of the different export
sectors whose aim is to maintain close links among themselves in order to
promote t/leir business interests. Anexample is tX_ Philippine Federation
of Food Exporters (Philf_)dex), an association of local food exporters. It
was established in 1980. To date, it has 62 active members including some
of the established food corporations in the country. Like their bigger
counterparts; trade associations are examples of self-help efforts on the
part of exporters belonging to a particular industry. For Philfoodex, the
benefits come in the form of exchanging the latest and up-to-date trade
information among exporters dealing with the same producers of a product
•line as well as in see_ing assistance from the government on matters
pertaining to the food industry. A listing of some of these trade
associations per industry is given in Table IV.4.
The existence of umbrella organizations or trade associations arises
out of the need for stop-gap and/or supplementary measures in response to
the deficiencies or inefficiencies in the goverr_ent's export development
program. Membership in these organizations provides an exporter additional
benefits aside from those already provided by the government through its
program to develop exports. These benefits come in the form of
marketing services for exporters, acquisition of local or imported
inputs, raw-material sourcing, information on market and trade prospects
such as market demand, price and recent trends, and training assistance for
exporters.
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Table IV.4
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS OF EXPORTERS
INDUSTRY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
Footwear, Bags and Belts Association of Footwear Industries
of the Philippines
Marikina Footwear Development
Council
Association of Philippine
Leathergoods Exporters and
Manufacturers
Footwear and Integrated Leather_
goo_s Industries Foundation
Jewelry and Fashion Fashion Accessories and Jewelry
Accesories Associations of the
Philippines
Fashion Designers Association of
the Philippines
Giftsand Toys Community Crafts Association of
the Philippines
Philippine T_y Manufacturers
Association, Inc.
Baskets Handloom Weaving Association of
the Philippines
Philippine Toy Manufacturers
Association, Inc.
Fruits and Other EdiDle Philippine Association of Fresh
Commodities _ Coconut Exporters, Inc.
Philippine Mango Exporters
Foundation, Inc.
Philippine Banana Growers and
Exporters Association
Coffee Exporters Association
o£ the Philippines
Linens, Handweaves and Knitting and Weaving Association
Houseware of the Philippines
Philippine Association of Einuroidery
and Apparel Exporters
Construction Export of Metals Industry Council
G.I. Wire Association Of the
Philippines
Philippine Electrical Suppliers
Manufacturers Association, Inc.
Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp
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INDUSTRY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
Home Decor, Furniture Antique Dealers Association of
Accessories, Furnishings the Philippines
Ceramic Association of the
Philippines
Ceramic Export Manufacturers
Association, Inc.
Lamps and Allied Electrical
Products Manufacturers
of the Philippines
Marine Products and Ot_er Association of Shrimp Producers
Processed Food and Exporters
Philippine Food Exporters and
Processors Organization
Philippine Tuna Producers and
Exporters Association
Philipplne Federation of Food
Exporters
Tuna Canners Association of
the Philippines
Industrial Supplles, Parts Philippine Association of
and Equipment Electronic Exporters
Metals Industry Council
Metalworking industries Association
of the Philippines
Semicoaductor Electronics Industry
Foundation, Inc.
Non-Rattan Furniture Philippine Wood _roducts
and Components Association
Pipes and Tubes Association
of the Pnilipplnes
Garments Confederation of Garment Exporters
of the P_ilippines, Inc.
Garments Business Association
of tne Philippines
Textiles Producers Association
of tile Philippines
Others Association of Philippine
Coconut Dessicators
Association of Philippine Copra
Exporters, Inc.
Philippine Bonsai Society
Samailan sa Pilipinas ng _nga
Industr iyang Kimika
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An essential service rendered by these organizations is in the form of
product promotion and marketing. These organizations have linkages with
foreign buyers and/or foreign organizations and therefore an added •
advantage for an exporter in the exposure of his products as well as
referrals to prospective buyers. Opportunities for contacts of potential
buyers come about when these organizations participate in foreign trade
exhibits and when they sponsor trade fairs. Enlistment with these
organizations, likewise, provides foreign buyers with a single,
convenient, and reliable contact with local producers and exporters,
Another important benefit for an exporter in joining exporter
organizations is in the sourcing of raw materials especially for imported
inputs. PHILEXPORT for examplemaintains common customs bonded warehouses
(OCBWs) for the importation of raw materials needed by its members. This
provides members with an economical way of obtaining inputs through tax and
duty-free importations as well as the convenience of a simplified import
facility. Most exporters are burdened by tedious processing for the
release of their input requirements when dealing with goverD/nent agencies.
PHILEXPORT' s CCBWs is open to members and non-members alike. In
availing of this service, the exporter should have at least a cumulative
export performance of $100,00_ and ten transactions for any two-year period
or must De a BOI-registered exporter of good-standing. Otherwise, the
exporter must be personally guaranteed by any member of PHILEXPORT's
accreditation committee. For new exporters or those who are not yet
accredited, they may qualify if they can get endorsement from BOI while
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endorsement from any two of PHIr_XPORT's Trustees, or from DTI, CB, and/or
BOC in order to be able to avail themselves of the facility.
An important feature of PHILEXPORT's CCBWs is that it is also open
to indirect exporters. Indirect exporters must, however, first secure
certification from the direct exporter whom they are linked with that the
end-products will be exported.
One of the most important services these organizations provide to its
members is helping individual msmbers secure a loan package. One such
program is the joint Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) - PCHI
financing program. T_e PCHI-TLRC financing program has three schemes. One
type of loan is the letter of credit financing which, may be availed of by
an exporter who has already reached his packing credit limit but has a
confirmed or irrevocable [/3 in his favor. Another form of loan of the
program assists indirect exporters or subcontractors through purchase order
financing. This is for those who have yet to establish track record in
exports or for those who are short of collaterals and find it hard to
borrow from other financing programs. Lastly, the PCHI-TLRC financing
program has the small subcontractors loan scheme for small subcontractors
who can pool their resources together sufficient enough to offer these as
security for a loan. These financing packages are open 0nly to PCHI
members. The details of these three programs are given in Table IV.5.
In addition to these benefits, these organizations provide exporter-
members consultancy services, information on trade and market prospects,
and training through sponsorship of export training and manpower
development programs. One such service is that provided by the PCHI
Research and Development Foundation which was established in 1984 as a
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Table IV.5
THE PCHI-TLR_ FINANCING PROGRAMS
.__ , ,
: LC Financing Purchase Order Socialized Credit :
: "Balikatan sa Financing Under Scheme :
: Kabuhayan" ULFP :
•v
:Maximum Loan Limit P200,000.00 P100,000.00 PI0,000. _0 :
:NegotiaDle Document Letter ofl Credit* Purchase Order Purchase Order :
: From Exporter FrQm Exporter with :
: PCHI Endors_aent :
:Collateral/Security Soft*** Soft*** Collateral Pool**** :
:
:Maturity 60 to 120 Days or 60 Days 60-90 Days or Life :
: Life of LC of Purchase Order :
m
:Loanable Amount 80%of LC 50% of Purchase. 50%-70% of 'I_tal :
: Order-One R_lease Appraised Value of :
: 70% of Purchase Collateral (for :
: Order-Staggered Single/Staggered :
: Release Releases ) :
v u
:Interest 12% Per Annum 14% Per Annum 15% Per Annum :
• •
:TL_C Filing Fee 5% Per Annum 2% Every Six
: Months :
:
:PCHI Processing Fee 500.00 300.00 200.00 :
: :
:Principal Borrower LC Beneficiary Purchase Order 5-15 Members :
: Beneficiary Signing Jointly :
: and Severally. :
:
Notes:
* Only Confirmed and Irrevocable Letter of Credit payable at sight with more
than 60 days maturity data.
** Purchase Orders 60 days or more in Duration.
*** Soft Collaterals: Office Equipment, Household Appliances.
Issuer of Purchase Order Co-signs the loan.
***** If t_zecollateral of the loan is not enough, the Purchase Order
Issuer co-signs the loan.
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clearinghouse for subcontracting, trading, and information sharing for both
members and non-members alike. It has also exposed exporters and traders
to foreign buyers and has provided them with wider opportunities for
market and product development.
There are three ways by which these organizations can• effectively
represent the interest of their members with the government. First, these
organizations serve as a platform for exporters to air their grievances or
to point out deficiencies in the system. Examples of these are the
elimination of red tape in government agencies, the simplification of
import-export procedures, and quota allocations. Second is through
collective bargaining with the government in the form of fiscal or tax
incentives or liberal financing assistance for exports, such as lower
rediscounting charged by the Central Bank for export papers. Lastly, these
organizations @rovide valuable endorsements for individual exporters when
seeking government assistance or availing of any of the government services
especially if the exporter is •small or new. These endorsements may be
either for accessing the manpower and development training programs offered
by the government agencies such as pTrc •or _MYC; for expeditious
processing of export documents with the different agencies such as the
• Bureau of Customs; for gaining •accessibility to a guarantee facility
like Philguarantee in the case of PCHI; for financing in cases where there
is a tie-up between the organization and other government agencies
regarding export financing such as the PCHI-TLRC financing program; and for
product prcm]otions such as enlistment in DTI's Registry of Philippine
Exporters jointly undertaken by PHILEXPORT and the DTI. On the latter,
PHILEXPORT is charged by DTI to handle the registration/accreditation
system for exporters. PHILEXPORT, therefore, evaluates applications and
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issues certifications, which in turn are used as a basis for the enlisb_ent
in the registry.
Overall, local exporter organizations are an indispensable by-product
of local producers and traders' earnest efforts to increase the share of
local products in foreign markets.
V. EXPORT FINANCING SYST_ IN THE PHILIPPINES
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes the
export financing system in the Philippines and the second discusses banks'
finance experience and policies as well as exporters' experience with
export financing.
A. The Export Financing System in the Philippines
Actually, there exist a number of export financing schemes in the
Philippines. Some of them are administered by government financial
institutions, while others, by non-financial government institutions. The
Central Bank's refinancing scheme will be discussed first. This is
followed by a discussion of the role of the co_nercial banking system on
export financing and the various lending programs to exporters. The export
guarantee schemes will be discussed toward the end of this section.
1.0 Export Refinancing ScHeme of the Central Bank
The export refinancing scheme of the Central Bank is a part of its
overall rediscounting facility. To better appreciate the role of the
rediscounting facility in providing credit to the export sector, it is
important to understand the overall monetary policy of the Central Bank.
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Liquidity management is one of the major functions of the Central
Bank. This is anchored on the classical hypothesis of a strong inflation
rate-money supply-monetary base linkage. Once an inflation rate target for
a certain period is decided on, the Central Bank then determines the level
of monetary base that is deemed consistent with that target. It does this
by manipulating the components of the monetary base over which it has
greater control.
The major components of the monetary base are the Net Foreign Assets
(NFA) and Net Domestic Assets (NDA). The latter can be more readily
controlled by the Central Bank. NDA can be further decomposed into net
credits to the public sector (NCPS), net credit to the deposit money hanks
(NC[AMB), and others (NDAOTHERS). The action of t6e Central Bank with
respect to its rediscounting window is reflected in the NCDMB. For
instance, if the Central Bank increases its rediscounting of export loans,
then NCDMB increases, ultimately resulting in an increase in the monetary
base, assuming other things being equal. Increases in the monetary base
arising from tile rediscounting window may be completely offset by
conducting an open market operation. The Central Bank may do this by
selling either its own liabilities (e.g., CB bills, reverse repos) or
National Treasury's liabilities (i.e., Treasury bills). In the former
case, _DMB is literally kept constant, while in the latter case, NCDFB is
allowed to increase, but the increase is offset by an equivalent decline in
the NCPS.
The rediscounting facility of the Central Bank took a major turn in
November 1985. Before this period, the rediscounting facility was used to
allocate credit to high priority sectors, including the export sector.
Within the export sector, the non-traditional export sector was given a
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preferential rate over the traditional export sector. The rediscount rate
for the former was three percent per annua with a prescribed ceiling on the
lending rate of banks at 12 percent per annum, while for the latter, it was
eight percent per annum with the ceiling on the lending rate of banks fixed
at 14 percent per annum.
Starting in November 1985, the rediscounting window of the Central
Bank has been used more for stabilization purposes rather than for
allocating credit to priority sectors. Thus, the proportion of the loan
value that the Central Bank rediscounts has been standardized for all
eligible papers at 8_ percent. Eligible papers include agricultural
production credits, cottage and small industries credits, general purposes
working and capital financing, and other short-term credits. The Central
Bank grants rediscounting for 90 days renewable for another 90 days.
Moreover, a uniform rediscount rate that is aligned with the market rate•
14__/
has been applied (see Table V.I). This is adjusted every quarter.
Although there is no more ceiling on banks lending rates, nevertheless, the
Central Bank regularly monitors t/%e interest rates especially on loans that
have been rediscounted, and when necessary exerts• moral suasion on banks.
In effect, loans refinanced by the Central Bank have lower interest rates
than those funded by hanks' own funds. For example, one bank included in
our study indicated that it charges between•17 to 19 percent per annum •on
export loans before Central Bank rediscounting and 14 to 16 percent per
i:
14--/
The rediscount rate is based on the MRR90 (Manila Reference Rate).
The old MRR is based on the interestrate on promissory note with a 90-day
maturity. TOe new MRR90 which appeared starting January 1989 is based on
the weighted average of the interest rates on promissory notes and time
deposits with a 90-day maturity.
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Table V.1
CENTRALBANKREOISCOUNTIN6POLICY,INFLATIONRATE
ANDVARIOUSINTERESTRATES
CB I Lending Time Treasury Reverse Domestic U.S. U.S,
Rediscount Loan ] Rate a/ Deposit Bill RepurchaseInflation Inflation Prigs
Circular Rate Value ](Secured Rate a/ Rate c/ Rate Rate Rate Rate
Year Date Number High Low High Low : Loans)
(%p.a.} (Z p.a.) l(Z p,a.} (Z p.a.I (_ p,a.) (Z p.a.) (_p.a.) j% p.a.) {_ p.a.)
B5-19-78CLR618 9.B0 1.Bi IH 50 :
198B_9-24-91 CLR762 9.Bi I.BB IH 58 : 14.8e 12.14 . 17.b8 15.24
198182-27-81 CLR784 8.88 3.88 1g8 88 I 16.g8 16.74 12.55 12.39 18.4 18.88
83-18-81 CLR786 8.88 3.08 IBB 88 [
g6-18-81 CLR883 8.88 1.8g 188 88 I
I
198285-23-82 CLR938 B.g8 1,88 188 88 _ 17.13 15.81 13.79 18.21 6.2 14.81
1983 B.8g 1.g8 188 Bg ] 21,28 15,38 14.23 1_.93 18.17 3.2 18.78
1984BI-23-84 CLR991 LR-6 I.R 188 88 I 39.18 24,16 27.16 29.25 58.35 4.3 12.84
83-12-84CLR994 HRR-6 MRR-12 98 88
]
198585-38-85CLR1863 BRR-3 MRR-12 98 88 _ 28.38 21.83 19.65 24,18 23.18 3.6 9.93
11-22-85CLR1886 12.75 12.75 88 88 ]
198689-1-86 CLR1114 11.75 11.75 8B 88 ] 17.38 14.77 16.98 13.25 8.75 2.1 8.32
12-15-86CLR1125 IB.H 18,00 88 81
AVE12.27 12.27 I
1987 CLR1125 18._8 ll.H 88 BOI 13,38 9.77 11.58 11.64 3.79 3.6 8.28
1988 CLR1125 10.88 18.08 88 88 I 15.92 13.16 13.59 9.85_b/ 9,06 4.8 9.31
NRR- HonetaryBoardResolution
LR- LendingRate
a/ - NeightedAveragefor all maturities
b/ - Neighted_verage for TransactedRates
c/ - MeightedAveragefor 91-day T-Bill rates
SOURCES: CBReview(variousi sues)
CBAnnualReport (various issues)
IMFInternationalFinancialStatistics(variousissues)
IMFSurvey(_arch1989)
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annum after rediscounting. Banks usually' refer to the former as the
commercial rates.
In terms of the loan value and rediscount rate, the export sector
seems to have lost its advantage over other priority sectors under the new
rediscounting policy. In reality, however, the Central Bank has been
silently pursuing an export-oriented rediscounting policy. This is
understandable since the Philippines has been confronted with a balance-of-
payments situation in the. last few years.• Indeed, it is easier for banks
to obtain rediscounting on export loans than on non-expOrt loans. Within
the export sector, the non-traditional sector is given priority over the
f
non-traditional sector.
Banks can be credited in their account with the Central Bank on the
same day that _they apply for rediscounting provided that all papers are in
order and are su_nitted before noon.
Currently, the Central Bank sees to it that the export sector's access
to the rediscounting window will not be grossly affected by any change in
the monetary policy (i.e., a change from easy to tight monetary policy).
This is reflected in the way it manages liquidity. The Central Bank makes
a forecast of exports every quarter. This forms the basis for determining
the net increase in the rediscounting of export loans that the Central Bank
could allow for the reference quarter. Aside fr(_n this, the Interagency
Study Group on External Trade Statistics and Projections Foreign Operations
Committee which is headed by the Central Bank meets with exporters twice a
year to validate its medium term forecast of exports. Thus, going back to
our framework above, the projected net increase in the rediscounts of
export loans will cause an increase in NCDMB, which in turn will exert an
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upward pressure on the monetary, base, other things being equal. If the
projected increase in the monetary base arising from the net increase in
t_e rediscounting of export loans exceeds the level that is thought to be
consistent with the inflation rate target, the Central Bank will not adjust
downwards its rediscounting of export loans. Rather, it will engage in
open market operation to bring down the increase in the monetary base to
its targeted level.
Table V.I shows that the interest rates on reverse repos and Treasury
bills nave consistently been above the Central Bank's rediscounting rate.
It suggests that rediscounted loans have been subsidized byCentral Bank,
in the case where reverse repos were used to mop up liquidity, and by the
national government, in the case where the Treasury bills were used.
So far, the discussions lead us to the following conciusions: (i) from
the point of View of the Central Bank, exporters have somewtmt automatic
access to its rediscounting window; (2) the Central Bank's approach
towards liquidity managemen£ ensures export sector's continued access to
the rediscounting window regardless of the prevailing monetary policy; and
(3) rediscounted loans including export loans appeared to have been
subsidized by the Central Bank and the national government.
The Central Bank requires the following as collateral for its loans to
commercial banks: original copy of the promissory note of the exporter
duly endorsed to the Central Bank by commercial banks; original coPY of
deed of assignment; and copy of the L/C, purchase order (PO) or sales
contract (SC). In effect, only loans of direct exL_orters are being
refinanced by the Central Bank. Indirect exporters who may be holding
domestic L/C, purchase order or sales contract with final exporters are not
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given access to the rediscounting window of the Central Bank. There are at
least two reasons we could think of why the Central Bank does not refinance
loans of indirect exporters. One probable reason is that the Central Bank
is afraid that it might lose control of the monetary base if it opens its
rediscounting window to a wider range of borrowers, It is to be noted that
the pre-shipment export financing system in the Philippines is still
traditional. Modernization of the pre-shipment export financing system
could help allay fears of the Central Bank regarding the possible impact of
refinancing loans of indirect exporters on the monetary base. This is
discussed in greater detail in the last chapter. The other probable reason
is that presently there are several special financing schemes that indirect
exporters can access. Whether these alternative financing schemes can
adequately meet the financing requir_nents of indirect exporters is, of
course, a big issue which will be discussed below.
The World Bank study (1988) uses the ratio of loans outstanding of the
Central Bank to commercial banks to export value as an indicator of the
aggregate access to the Central Bank export loan rediscounts. Table V.2
shows that the ratio has fallen from nine percent in 1980 to about one
percent in 1988, suggesting a decline in the access of the export sector to
the rediscounting window. However, this should not be construed as a
result of the Central Bank's effort to reduce the export sector's access to
the rediscounting window. In fact, the ratio of outstanding export
rediscounts to total outstanding rediscounts to commercial banks has risen
especially in the last two years. Also, the loans granted by the Central
Bank to commercial banks for refinancing exports have been above 85 percent
of the total loans granted to commercial banks since 1984 (see Table V.3).
The decline in the ratio of loans outstanding of the Central Bank to
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Table V.3
LOANS GRANTED BY THE CENTRAL BANK TO COMMERCIAL BANKS
(In / M)
(a) (b) (c) b + c
i/ Traditional Non-Traditional
Total Exports Exports a
1980 38,707 20,000 11.,607 0,82
1981 46,096 19.,571 13,684 0.73
1982 39,121 15,459 10,833 0.67
1983 28,229 8,256 12,028 0.72
1984 14,392 1,568 10,805 0.86
1985 7,040 575 5,787 0.90
1986 9,696 2,251 6,322 0.88
1987 5,173 1,485 3,493 0.96
1988 9,582 2,150 6,959 0.95
i/
Includes other loans.
Source: Central Bank
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commercial banks to export value could perhaps be attributed to the highly
liquid situation of most banks. This will be further discussed below.
2.0 The Commercial Banking Syst_n
The commercial banking system has had a long history of supporting
exporters. It dates back to the Spanish colonial period when the Manila-
Acapulco trade was established. During the American colonial period,
commercial banks were supporting exporters of primary products to the US.
At present, there are 30 omnnercial banks of which two are goverr_ent-
owned and four are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Their combined assets
comprise about 61 percent of the total assets of the financial system (see
Table V.4). Ten commercial banks are authorized to operate as a universal
bank.
Commercial banks offer both pre- and post-shipment financing
facilities to exporters. Pre-snipment loan may be granted by c(_mercial
banks to exporters in each stage of business operations from raw material
acquisition to the shipment of goods. Exporters may obtain post-shipment
financing from banks in at least two ways. One is through the Export Bill
Line. Under this arrangement, the bank provides funds to the exporter by
purchasing his collection documents with recourse to him should the
collection not be paid. The other is through Doc_nentary Acceptance
Financing. Under this arrangement, the bank can immediately provide funds
to the exporter by discounting the bankers' acceptance.
Table V.5 shows the loans outstanding of ccn_ercial banks from 1980 to
1987. Unfortunately, the loan categories are too aggregative. There is no
way by which we could determine pre- and post-shipment loans since both are
141
Table V.4 i/
TOTAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
(In Million Pesos)
1988
March
2/
Commercial Banks 318.2
Thrift banks 285.0
Specialized Government BanKs 26.5
Rural BanKs 10.0
Non-Financial Institutions 122.7
1/
Starting December 1986, data reflect the transfer
of assets/liabilities of one specialized govern-
ment bank and one commercial bank to the
National Government.
2/
As of November 1987.
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.
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1_ together wlth other types of loans under the item "loans and
dlscounts." A rough estlmate of the slze of pre- and post-shliammt loans
Is obtalned from our survey of a sample of ccmmerclal banks whlch is belng
dlscussed in the next sectlon .
15__/
3 0 Speclal Credlt Programs
Desplte flnanclal hberallzatlon, the Phlllpplnes st111 malntalns a
n_nber of speclal credit programs There are several reasons for thls
One is that the country st111 lacks flnanclal resources to support growth
It should be noted that most of these speclal credlt programs, especlally
the larger ones, are externally funded Obvlously, one of the purposes of
these programs is to augment resources of the country Another reason is
that some sectors of the economy (e g , agrlculture, small and medlum
enterprlses) are st111 glven low prlorlty by the banking system because
they are percelved as elther too rlsky or unprofltable buslness ventures
And donor agencles too have thelr procllvlty to dlrect thelr asslstance to
speclflc sectors of the economy because in th_s manner, it is easler for
them to monltor the effectlveness of thelr asslstance 0
It should, however, be noted that most of these programs have features
cc_pletely dlfferent from the myrlad of speclal credlt programs launched by
the previous government For one, these programs are less speclallzed in
the sense that they target a much wlder range of beneflclarles For
instance the Agrlcultural Loan Fund (ALF) caters to practlcally all
agrlcultural and agro-processlng industrles, In contrast to the prevlous
credlt programs w_ich are dlrected to spec_flc commodlty groups Also, the
15/
. Thls section partly draws from the Lamberte study (1989).
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interest rates of most of these programs have been aligned with the market
rate, in contrast to the highly subsidized interest rate of the previous
credit programs.
The major features of these programs are summarized in Table V.6.
Note that we have included here the industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund
(IGLF) because it is utilized mainly as a lending mechanism, rather than as
a guarantee mechanism. Some of these programs cater to both domestic-
oriented and export-oriented industries, while others, only to export-
oriented industries. The features and performance of these programs will
be discussed individually below.
(a) The Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF)
The ALF is managed by the Central Bank with assistance coming fr(_n
IBRD ($100M) and USAID ($20M). It iS envisioned to supplement the
traditional sources of farm credit. Single proprietorship, partnerships,
corporations, or cooperatives may avail of the ALF credit to finance their
working capital requirements and fixed assets acquisition, excluding land
purchase, for their agricultural and agro-processing projects. It is
available to both domestic-oriented and export-oriented agricultural
producers through a network of accredited participating banks. The ALF is
designed in such a way that the end-user borrowers and banks participate in
the financing of the project. Specifically, an end-user is required to
have an equity of 10 percent of total project cost for loans of _IM and
below, 15 percent of total project cost for loans over pIM but exceeding
_5M, or 20 percent of total project cost for loans over _SM, while
participating banks are required to put up 10 percent of subloans
(referring to total cost less borrowers' contribution) of _IM but not
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exceeding _5M and 25 percent of subloans over _5M. There is no limit as to
the loan amount, provided that it does not exceed the single borrower
limitation under existing Central Bank regulation. Short-term loans should
not exceed 12 months, while long-term loans should not exceed 15 years
inclusive of a grace period.
The interest rate that the Central Bank charges on its ALF credit to
banks is based on either the cost of borrowings to the ALF, related
administrative costs, and an element of foreign exchange risk; or the
weighted average cost of the banking system, s savings and time deposits,
whichever is higher. This is reviewed every quarter. At present, the
interest rate on ALF credit to participating banks is 10.7 percent, which
is 0.7 percentage point higher than the rediscounting rate. There is no
ceiling on the relending rates of banks. As of December 1988, there was a
total of 83 participating banks.
Table V.? shows the loan availments of ALF by investment area in 1988.
A total of 549 loans were granted valued at ;J799.TM. About 47 percent of
the total loan value went to the export and commercial crops (i.e., sugar,
ramie, banana, coffee, cacao, and fishery prawn), with sugar and prawns
covering most of it. Thus, ALF is one of the largest sources of funds for
the export industry. Banks consider the ALF facility more attractive than
the rediscounting window of the Central Bank despite its relatively higher
interest rate. One reason is that ALF loans have longer maturities than
the Central Bank's rediscounts. Another reason is that banks' contribution
is limited to only 10 percent of the project cost (net of borrower's
contribution) compared to 20 percent in the case of rediscounts with the
Central Bank. This could be one of the reasons why banks recently slowed
down their rediscounting with the Central Bank.
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Table V.7
• ALFAiD I6LF LOANAUA]LMENTSBYINVESTMEHTAREA
(Jan.-Oec. 1968)
ALF IbLF
] ............................ _........ )
No. Value No. Value )
I (P M) (P M) I
=....................................... : .............................. - ............ _.........................
)A. Primary I
). Fuels ....
I Non-Fuels
: Live Animals 134 22B.56e I
I.. neat, preparations I
I Dairy products, birds eggs
I Fish, preparations 143 18g,44fl I.
Cereals, preparations 7 2.131
VegetablesandFruits 15 62.258
: Sugar, preparations 165 213.894
: Coffee, Lea, cocoa| spices 5 1.688
I Feedingstaff for animals
: Hist. Edible Products| Preparations 6 3.85? 83 216.752
) Beverages 1 6.866
: Fertilizers/Minerals
Animals, VegetableOils andFats Processed 1 8.69g
) Hoodand HoodProducts 42 116,624
) PaperandPaperProducts 14 93,U6
_S. Manufactured
Labor Intensive (LI)
Hon-HetallicHineralProducts 27 44.897
Furniture and Parts 35 69.181
Footwear,Apparel,Barments 136 274.453
Misc,Hanufactures 41 58.191
Moderately Capital andSkill Intensive (MCSI)
LeatherandLeatherManufactures 9 29.856
RubberandRubberManufactures 13 72,968
Ironand.Steel 55 179.595
Electrical_ndNon-ElectricalMachineries 13 46.966
TransportEquipment II 36.366
HJglyCapitalandSkillIntensive(HCSI)
Chemicalmaterials,products 39 127.764
NotElsewhereClassified 73 126.562 43 56.258
_lce_il!ing,F_edwilling,MarketingFacilities,
Transport__rint£nglPublishing|Other Services)
_;mm mm;_m;mie ..............
Total _49 799_716 556 1499,886
Sources: UnpubI£shed_LFand IbLF Reports (February 1989)
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In its first two years of operation, ALF incurred Isome losses. In
1988, hoover, it realized a net income of _43.5M. Up to the present, ALF
boasts of a 100 percent collection rate.
(b) Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF)
The IGLF is a •revolving fund established in 1952 by an agreement
between the Philippine government and the United States for the purpose of
meeting the financing •needs of cottage, a_all, and median scale
enterprises, regardless of whether they are producing for Ithe export I or
16__/
domestic market. The fund is administered by the Central Hank.
The USAID was initially themajor contributor to the Fund. (see Table
V.8). ISince 1975, IBRD has been Iproviding additional funds. Over the
years, the share of the Philippine government's counterpart had been
declining from 40 percent to i5 percent. The new program which started
last January 1989 projected that IGLF would require $32iM to support its
activities during the period 1989 to 1991. A major portion of it would
come from ADB ($100M), •IBRD ($60M), and ASEAN-Japan Development •Assistance
Program (_40M). Thus, IGLF will remainIa major source of funds for the I
Cottage, s_all, and medium scale enterprises in the future.
The IGLF has three main programs, namely: (i) straight refinancing;
(2) refinancing and guarantee; and I(3) straight guarantee. The last is the
least popular among banks. In fact there are no takers in this progra_
16__/
Cottage industries refer to enterprises excluding agriculture
whose total • assets are over _50,000 but not more than )_500,000 before
financing. Small industries refer to enterprises excluding agriculture
whose Itotal assets are over _500,000 but not more than _5M before
financing. Medium industries refer to enterprises excluding agriculture
whose total assets are over pSM but not more than _20M before financing.
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Table V.8
IGLF SOURCES OF FUNDS
Foreign Government
Counterpart Counterpart Total
Amount % _mount % Amount
(_M) (PM) (_M)
Original:
USAID (1956) 13.04 13.04
USAID (1957) 14.99 19.00 33.99
USAID (1964) 1.00 i._0
Sub-Total 29.03 6_% 19.00 40% 48.03
Additional:
IBRD 1120 PH (1975) •88.96 75% 3b.00 25% 118.96
IBRD 1727 PH (1979) 189.89 78% 55.00 22% 244.89
IBRD 2169 PH (1982) 979.9i 85% 171.0_ 15% i15_.92
Source: Magno (1988).
ISI
since 1973. The main reason is that in case of default, banks are first
required to exhaust all possible means to collect from borrowers before
calling on the IGLF guarantee. And this normally takes more than a year.
Thus, banks have now opted for the first program.
Loans obtained from IGLF may be used for permanent working capital
(with a maximum maturity period of seven years inclusive of two years grace
period) acquisition of fixed assets (with a maximum of 12 years inclusive
of three years grace period), and for production (with a maturity period of
one year). In March 1987, a decision was made to include in the IGLF
program the financing of snort-term working capital requirements of export-
oriented cottage, small and medium enterprises. For export packing credit,
the loan maturities should not exceed 180 days, while for production credit
loans, it should not exceed 360 days, This is one of the most important
developments as far as export financing is concerned.
The interest rate that the Central Bank charges to IGLF loans to banks
is based on the average rate of time deposits with maturities of two years
or more during the preceding six months if the fixed interest rate is
applied, or on the average rate of time deposits with maturities of up to
six months if the variable interest rate is applied.
Banks may charge the market rate to end-user borrowers. However,
borrowers located in underdeveloped areas of the country are supposed to be
charged a rate that is two percentage points below the market rate. IGLF
encourages banks to do it by differentiating its lending rate to banks
located in various areas of the country. The lending rate structure of
IGLF loans to participating banks for the period 23 January 1989 to 30 June
1989 is presented in Table V.9.
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Table V.9
INTEREST RATES ON IGLF AVAILMENTS OF
PARTICIPATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(For the period 23 January to 30 June 1989)
Interest Rate
Per Annum (%)
Location of Project
Fixed Variable
National Capital Region (NCR) 14.1 12.1
Region I 12.1 10.1
Region II 12.1 i_.i
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) ii.i 9.1
Region III 14.1 12.1
Region IV (except Quezon, Aurora, Romblon,
Marinduque, Palawan, and Mindoro) 14.1 12.1
Region V ii.i 9.1
Region VI (except Antique, Aklan and
Capiz) 13.1 ii.i
Region VII (except Bohol, Negros Oriental
and Siqui3or) 14.1 12.1
Region VIII ii.i 9.1
Region IX ii.i 9.1
Region X (except Camiguin) 13.1 Ii.i
Region XI 13.1 ii.i
Region XII 12.1 19.1
Quezon, Palawan, Capiz and Aklan 12.1 10.1
Bohol, Antique, Siquijor, Mindoro, Aurora,
Rombolon, Marinduque, and Camiguin ii.i 9.1
Negros Oriental 13.1 ii.i
Source: CB Circular No. 89-01 (January 1989).
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Unlike the ALF loans, IGLF loans are subjected to predetermined
ceilings depending on the size of the firm concerned. The loan ceiling for
cottage, small, and mediumscaleenterprises are _.4M, _4,0M, and _16.0M,
respectively.
In 1988, IGL_" granted a total of 577 loans valued at _1,499M (see
Table V.7). The predominantly export,oriented industries •(i.e., footwear,
non-metallic mineral products, apparel, garments, furniture and parts,
miscellaneous manufactures, leather and leather products,•• and electrical
and non-electrical machineries)•received about 32 percent of the total
loans granted. With the new •emphasis •on export financing, the IGLF• will
become a very important source of funds to export-oriented small and medium
•• enterprises in the near future.
•• IGLF •-has a history of bad ••repa_n_entrates. In 1978, collections
amounted to only 17 percent •of principal and interest falling due. This
has increased to about •57 percent in 1986. In 1988, however, only two and
a half percent of principal and interest falling due are past due. The
remarkable performance of the IGLF in the most recent years augurs _ii for
its future.
IGLF realized a net income of _48.1M in 1987. Figures for 1988 are
not yet available at this time.
(C) Export Industry Modernization Program (EIMP)
Unlike the ALF and IGLF, EIMP is a financing facility which was
launched in 198_ solely•for•export-oriented industries. Managed by the
Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), a government non-financial
institution, EIMP is designed to meet the needs of non-traditional export-
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oriented industries for the modernization of their facilities, production
technologies and services so that they can be competitive in the export
market. The funds mainly came from the ¥5B soft loan from Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan.
The maximum loanable amount per borrower is _SM with a maximt_
maturity of 10 years. The interest rate is fixed at 10 percent per annum
which is substantially below the market rate. The service fee is three
percent of the total amount of the loan.
To qualify under the program, the following conditions must be
satisfied:
i) The project must be resource-based, export-oriented (preferably 50
percent for export after second year of expansion or establishnent
with EIMP assistance), labor-intensive or _ust generate
substantial labor through linkage with other industries;
2) Assets must not exceed _20M after EIMP assistance; and
3) There should be modernization input in the project which will lead
to production cost reduction, improvement in quality or expansion
of capacity.
This facility is also available to indirect exporters or sub-
contractors provided that they can show proof that at least 50 percent of
their output will be exported by the final exporter. Since TLRC is a non-
financial institution, loans are released through and collected by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
As of December 1988, TLRC granted a total of 140 loans under the EIMP
valued at _400M. Ten percent of it was availed of by sub-contractors.
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Most of the loans went to the garments, furniture, food processing and
gifts and houseware sectors. The average loan size was _;3M. About 60
percent of the borrowers are located in Region IV and the National Capital
Region. Loan collection is estimated to run to _4M to _5M per month which
are re-lent to new clients. The estimated default rate is alarmingly high
at 18 percent.
The MSB assistance from the OECF has already been fully disbursed. At
present, TLRC is negotiating with O_IF for another ¥5B to augment its
resources.
(d) Export Development Assistance Project (EDAP)
EDAP is another project of TLRC. While EIMP provides long-term
capital to export-oriented enterprises, EDAP grants only short-term working
capital to help exporters fulfill their contracts and/or letters of credit.
it was set up in 1987 with a _20M fund contributed by the government. The
facility is open to serve both direct and indirect exporters who are
producing non-traditional export commodities.
The maximum loan amount per borrower is _2 M with a maturity period of
one year for term loans, or upon negotiation or expiry date of assigned
L/Cs whichever comes first in the case of credit line accommodation. The
interest rate is 12 percent per annum with a filing fee equivalent to one-
fourth of one percent of the 10an amount applied for to be paid upon filing
of application, a co_nitment fee of one-fourth of one percent on the
unavailed portion of the credit line, and a one time fee of five percent
per annum based on the availments/drawdown.
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To qualify for a loan, the project must have a loan to beneficiary
ratio of not more than _50,000 to one; the borrower must not have any
outstanding loan in any KKK lending program and must be credit worthy;
project's cash flow stat_nent must show positive cash balances after
payment of obligation due and must be satisfactorily profitable with a
minimum internal rate of return of 18 percent; and project must comply with
all existing government rules and regulations and must have a firm,
determined and reliable market.
(e) Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC)
Financing Facility for Small and Medium Scale Export Producers
Having been constantly in contact with direct and indirect exporters,
PITC took note of the difficulty encountered by small and medium-scale
export producers in fulfilling export contracts and orders. So, in April
1988, it set up a _IOM financing facility for small and medium export
producers. It is the latest non-financial government agency that joined
the bandwagon in providing short-term capital loan to small and medium
exporters. 'I_e _IOM was sourced entirely from PITC's resources. As of
December 1987, PITC's total assets stood at _375M.
The facility may be tapped to finance the acquisition of raw
materials, wor_ing capital and other costs of servicing export orders of
small and medium export producers whose assets do not exceed _20M. Unlike
the four financing schemes discussed above, t_is facility does not require
borrowers to put up hard collateral. The only security requirements are:
L/C proceeds being assigned to PITC wit/1 bank's conforme, and promissory
note of the borrower. Since only those who have valid and operative L/Cs
opened in favor of the export producer are being accommodated, indirect
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exporters who may have purchase order from final exporters but are not
beneficiaries of the L/C, do not have access to this facility.
Loan application s are processed by the PITC Special Credit Unit. It
normally takes three days to approve the loan application. However, prior
evaluation is done by BETP/CIT_M/GTEB/ROG/Industry Association who must
have closely monitored performance of the applicant concerned over a
minimum period of one year. The maximum loan amount is set at 70 percent
of the L/C value but not to exceed _200,000. A floating interest rate is
applied which is based on the prime rates charged by the Philippine
National Bank or Land Bank, whichever is lower during t3_e immediately
preceding weeK. The current prime rate of these banks is about 18 percent
per annum. Loans are supposed to be repaid either upon negotiation of
export L/C or upon maturity date of the promissory note, whichever comes
ear Iier.
In less than one year, PITC lent to 21 export producers some of whom
borrowed three times already from the same facility. The total amount of
loans granted already reached about _4M, while loans outstanding as of
December 1988 stood at around F2M. So far, PITC has a 100 percent
collection rate. The main reason for this is that the BETP/CIT_V_/GTEB/ROG/
industry Association who evaluates the loan application also closely
monitors productio n toensure that shipment schedules are met by the
borrower-exporter.
(f) Transactional Financing (formerly called Purchase Order
Financing)
Transactional Financing (TF) is a financingprogram of the Livelihood
Corporation (LIVECOR). Its main purpose is to provide short-term financing
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to accredited producers/suppliers of retail stores/traders/importers. It
is being managed by the Transactional Lending Center (TIE) composed of ii
full-time staff who are mostly loans specialists and loan collection
officers. As of December 1988, its total resources stood at _16.5M all of
which came from the government through budgetary appropriations.
TF started financing purchase orders (POs) held by producers/suppliers
in 1984. Then in 1986, it added the financing of irrevocable L/Cs. It is
available to both domestic- and export-oriented industries, whether direct
or indirect exporters, provided that they are a manufacturing enterprise
which has been operational for at least six months; have been a regular
supplier of any retail store/trader/importer for at least six months prior
to application; and have the capability to put up a collateral. All those
who apply for Transactional Financing have to be accredited first by the
LIVECOR-TLC.
TF grants financing up to 80 percent of the total value of POs or L/Cs
provided that it does not exceed )_750,000 per borrower. The loan should be
used solely for the purchase of raw materials, payment of labor and/or
other working capital purposes. The maximum loan maturity is six months
with fixed interest rate of 14 percent per annum. Also, TF charges a front
end fee of _1,0_0 or two percent of the amount of the loan applied for,
whichever is higher. Loans can be released within ten days after filing of
the application if all papers are in order.
TF requires collateral in the form of unencumbered real estate,
personal properties and chattel mortgage. Moreover, it asks borrowers to
surrender all pertinent loan documents, such as POs and deed of assignment
with bank certification in the case of L/Cs. For POs, TF directly collects
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repayment from PO issuers upon delivery of the goods; and for L/Cs, it
collects from the bank upon negotiation of the L/Cs. One special feature
of the TF facility is that it enters into a contract with a borro_r
w_erein the latter graduates to another facility which is called LIVE_X)R-
GFSME Guaranty Facility after three years, or if not to a regular facility
of banks.
The total value of loans granted from 1984 to 1988 was _75M. The
number of clients reached a peak of 90 in 1987. Accordingly, some of them
graduated already to another program, while others do not r__cd anymore
special assistance since they have already become bankable. At present,
TF'S outstanding •loans amount to _I5M. These come from 15 clients who
obtained multiple loans. Ninety (90) percent of the outstanding loans are
backed up by POs. So far, three borrowers with a total loan value of _2M
defaulted. Two of them defaulted because the i,aporters did not honor
anymore their irrevocable L/Cs. •Thus, the default rate of TF stands at
13.3 percent. In addition, four loans which are past due are being
considered for restructuring.
All of TF's borrowers have their offices in Metro Manila. The main
reason for limiting itself only to Metro Manila borrowers is that it
directly collects the loan from issuers of POs and banks who should be
located nearby. It hopes to expand its resources in the future so that it
can open up branches in Cebu City and Davao City which have a large number
of small and medium-size export-oriented enterprises, and include in its
operation discounting of post-dated checks similar to what PCIB is
17/
currently doing in the Marikina Shoe Industry.
17__/
See Lamberte and Jose (1988) for a detailed discussion of this
arrangement.
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(g) APEX Re-Financing Program
The APEX Financing PrDgram was established in 198_ to address the need
for long-term financing •of viaDle industries in the country. Managed by
the Central Bank Apex Development Finance Unit (CB-ADFU), the program
is open to medi_ and large-scale industrial enterprises preferably export
generating with assets ranging from [_4M to @100M. The proceeds of an APEx
loan can• be used to finance the acquisition of capital assets such as
factory buildings, machineries, and other equipment either for purlooses of
expansion or for start-up projects. APEX funds may also be used to finance
equity investments. This arrang_m_ent must be agreed upon between the
borrower and the participating financial institution (PFI). In some
meritorious cases, it may also be used for working capital purposes•.
The funds are intended mainly for private domestic industries although
to some extent it is also available for projects by the government assuming
these projects have extensive linkages with the private sector or if these
have substantial development impact. On the other hand, projects from the
private sector must show inherent comparative advantage in order tO compete
in foreign and domestic markets, and should make optimal use of local
resources as the primary criteria for its eligibility to the program.
APEX fundsmust be spent in the following manner: (a) 100 percent of
the cost if'the goods is directly imported; (b) 70 percent of the cost if
locally procured imported goods; (c) 50 percent of locally produced goods •
with direct or indirect foreign exchange component; and (d) 45 percent of
civil works with direct •or indirect foreign exchange component. The normal
disbursement period for an APEX loan ranges from one to two years.
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Just like the other refinancing facilities, APEX is a relep_ing
program intended to replenish funds by participating financial institutions
lent to eligible industrial projects. APEX funds are relent by the CB-ADFU
to participating financial institutions (PFIs) which in turn make
individual subloans to project proponents at a marKet-determined rate
inclusive •of the cost charged by the CB for the funds.
APEX is a foreign currency denominated loan • which underlines its
purpose mainly for the acquisition of imported machineries and other
equipment. Actual repayments are, however, generally made in the peso-
equivalent of the amountdue on the basis of the CB's existing peso-dollar
exchange rate. It is, •therefore, normally •the •borrower who will assume the
foreign exchange risk for the loan.
The first phase of the program was APF_I which was funded by a loan
from the World Bank (WB) and a consortium of foreign commercial banks led
by Lloyd's of London. APEX I started in 1981 with a WB fund of $150M and
the consortium's counterpart fund of $100M. Due to the nature of the
program's fund, APEX I was relent by the CB-ADFU to PFIs through a mixed-
lending system, under the system, the refinancing is done with a mix of 60
percent WB and 40 percent consortium funds. However, the PFI has the
option to relend these funds in any mix it wants.
The maximum loanable amount under the APEX I program is $6M for a
single borrower repayable for 15 to as long as 20 years or normally based
on the economic life of the assets to be financed. A grace period of four
years is given on the principal. However the consortium banks' portion of
the loan is good only for 12 and a half years. As a result of the
program's mixed lending system, a two-structured interest rate scheme was
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charged on an APEX loan to a participating financial institution - 9.6
percent on the WB component which reaains fixed up to maturity and a
floating LIBOR rate (average of 6 mos. + 0.125%) on the consortium funds
plus three-fourths of one percent as service charge by the CB. The cost of
the loan to the end-borrower, although market determined, essentially
includes the cost of the funds to the PFI - the interest coSt and the CB
service charge, plus a reasonable re-lending spread for the PFI. Overall,
the cost of the APEX loan to an end-user fluctuated largely to the extent
of the consortium's component of the loan.
APEX I had its last loan disbursement as of June 1988 :. Initially,
loan availments of APEX I was very slow that briefly in 1984, with enough
funds to spare, APEX was open for loans for working capital purposes.
Repayment of the APEX funds by PFIs to the CB is almost 100 percent with
the PFI's encountering very few cases of delays or defaults in their loan
recovery operations. These funds are in turn invested by the CB which will
eventually be merged with new funds for APEX II. In the interim, the
• -'
program is not operational with the negotiation of fresh funds for APEX II
underway. The additional $65M funding for APEX II from the WB together
with the original funds of APEX I will be managed by the Development Bank
of the Philippines. However, the collection of the remaining outstanding
loans under APEX I will be undertaken by the Central Bank. The
consorti_n's counterpart fund in APEX I, a part of the country's foreign
debt, has already been restructured for re-lending in the second phase of
the program.
4.0 Export Credit 6_arantee System
There are three guarantee schemes catering to export-oriented
industries, namely: (i) the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF); (2)
the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME); and (3) the
Philippine _port and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee).
As already mentioned _above, IGLF is more of a financing rather than a loan
guarantee facility. Hence, it will not be discussed here.
(a) The Guarantee Fund for Small and Mediu_n Enterprises (GFSME)
GFSME was established in April 1983 and began its actual operations in
February 1984. It is a special program attached to the Kilusan Kabuhayan
at Kaunlaran (KKK) - Processing Center Authority (KKK-PCA), now renamed
Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) which is a government-owned corporation.
A Management Board composed of three private sector and four government
sector representatives oversees its operations. All three private sector
representatives are professional bankers. A full-time Managing Director
manages the day-to-day affairs of GFSME (see Annex C for the Organizational
Chart). Currently, GFSME has 16 senior staff and 16 junior staff.
An initial _302M was allocated as seed fund of the GFSME, of which
_300M came from the proceeds of the Economic Support Fund and _2M from the
KKK-PC2%. At present, total resources of GFSME amount to about _500M.
GFSME has identified agriculture as its exclusive market area.
Specifically, it supportsprojects which are or will be engaged in the
direct production and/or processing of food intended for biological
consumption as well as those projects which are indirectly involved in food
production, up to one level of backward or forward integration or linkage,
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and other agri-projects majority of the produce of which is intended for
export. Thus, both export- and domestic-oriented industries can be
beneficiaries of the G_'SMEprogram. GFSME intends to give more emphasis on
food and non-food agricultural processing during the period 1989 - 92.
Export-oriented projects will be given high priority.
GFSME principally operates through a network of accredited financial
institutions composed of commercial, development, rural, and thrift banks.
To encourage banks to lend to small and medium enterprises, GFSME operates
the following regular subsystems:
(i) Guarantee Subsystem. This is designed to mitigate perceived
risks of agricultural sector lending by providing lending banks an 85
percent guarantee cover on all types of credit risks.
(2) Interest Rate Subsidy Subsys+tem. Under this subsystem, GFSME
absorbs the interest rate variabilities in the credit market and thereby
ensures viability of the loan portfolio carried by participating banks at
all times. This subsystem is now being phased odt in favor of market-
determined interest rate facility.
(3) Liquidity subsystem. This subsystem provides participating banks
with a rediscount facility for loan originations under the program on a
matched maturity basis. There is a plan to eliminate this subsystem so
that GFSME can concentrate more on its guarantee mechanim,.
(4) Recycling or Mortgage Subsystem. This is designed to provide a
secondary market for GFSME guaranteed loans and tap available liquidities
external to GFSME. This subsystemwill be further developed in the future.
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As already mentioned earlier, both export- and domestic-oriented
enterprises can qualify for the GFSME Program. However, the project must
qualify under the following minimu_ criteria:
(i) The project mustbe small-scale (i.e., those projects with assets
of not less than p82,500 but not more than p2.5M after financing)
or medium-scale (i.e., those projects with assets of more than
p2.5M but not exceeding _IOM after refinancing);
(ii) The project must have a projected rate of return on investment of
at least 20 percent per annum;
(iii) The project must have a firm, determined and reliable market; and
(iv) The proponent must have proven managerial capability.
The GFSME Program accommodates loans intended for the acquisition of
fixed assets with a maximum maturity period of 10 years inclusive of the
two-year grace period and for working capital with a maximum maturity
period of five years inclusive of the one-year grace period. The loan
ceiling is _2M for the small scale enterprise and p8M for the medium scale.
All loans should be collateralized. The Management Board determines and
reviews the interest rate every quarter. The prevailing interest rate on
loans under the GFSME Program is more or less the same as the market rate.
Aside from the interest rate, the borrower has to pay an origination
fee which is fixed at three percent of the principal loan amount payable
upon loan approval, a guarantee fee which is two percent per annum of the
guaranteed portion of outstanding loan amount, documentary stamps and other
registration fee, and other charges that may be charged by the originating
banks.
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A default occurs in case the borrower fails to pay three consecutive
monthly amortizations or one quarterly amortization, including all
applicable fees. The mortgages will be foreclosed if the borrower fails to
pay the unpaid balance and other applicable fees. The lending institution
may call on the guarantee 10 days after sending a letter of demand to the
defaultee. GFSME acts on the claim within 30 days after receiving the
bank's notice. Since GFSME possesses all the pertinent loan documents once
it pays bank's claims, it can run after the defaultees for collection.
Aside from the regular facilities above, three newly created
facilities are now being offered by GFSME. These are:
(i) CALF-GFSME Guarantee Facility. This is a _100M facility funded
by the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan fund (CALF) of the
Department of Agriculture. It is different from the regular
GFSME Program since it does not have an interest subsidy and
liquidity support and, the maximum loan amount is much higher,
(i.e., _20M for group borrowers and _2M for single borrowers).
(ii) Farm Machinery Dealer Discount Line Facility. This facility
provides guarantee cover to discount lines extended by accredited
financial institutions to farm machinery dealers.
(iii) LIVECOR-GFSME Guarantee Facility. This is an extension of
LIV_COR's Loan Program for non-agricultural livelihood projects.
With this program, it can be said that GFSME has also its foot on
non-agricultural economic activities.
As of February 1989, the n_ber of accredited financial institutions
stood at 23, down from a high of 39 in 1985. The number of accredited
commercial and private development banks substantially declined, but was
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partially offset by the rise in the number of accredited rural banks.
Total number of projects approved to date is 346 with an aggregate loan
value of )_620M (see Table V.10). The average loan size is _I.SM. About 42
percent of the projects approved are those of the small scale enterprises.
Loans are heavily concentrated in Regions III, IV, and VI•.
Table V.II shows the sectoral distribution of GFSME acti_ loan
accounts. About half of the total amount of active accounts went to the
fish and fish preparations sector. It is to•be noted that almost all of
these loans were used for prawn production which is a non-traditional
export-oriented industry. If we also consider other non-traditional export
crops, such as coffee and cacao, then it can be said that GFSME provides
substantial support• to the non-traditional export-oriented industries.
The number of past due accounts reached 40 as of February 28, 1989
with a total value of _38.7M (see Table V.12). So far, GFSME was able to
fully recover from five accounts its•exposure amounting •to _6.6M. Thus,
the net past due rate posted •at 10.25 percent, while the default rate
(i.e., accounts which are in default according to GFSME's definition) stood
at 9.9 percent of the total outstanding balance of all accounts as of that
date. All past due loans are fully• covered by collateral. So far, GFSME
has promptly paid banks in their claims within the stipulated time
mentioned earlier.
Table V.13 presents the income statement of GFSME from 1984 to 1987.
Note that income derived from the guarantee and origination fees has not
been enough to cover general and administrative expenses. GFSME has to
rely more on income from its investments in government securities and from
its liquidity subsystem. One large operating expense item is interest
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Table V.10
OPERATING HIGHLIGHTS, GFSME
(As of February, 1989)
Items Figures
Total loans approved
Number 346.0
Amount (_M) 619.7
Average Loan Size (_M) 1.8
z/
Inactive accounts
Number 99
Amount (%_M) 214.9
Active accounts
Number 247.0
Amount (_M) 404.7
Loans Released
Number 228
Amount (_M) 378.8
Outstanding Balance (_M) 316.7
Total Contingent Liability (_M) 191.1
Taken Out (Net of Repurchases)
Number 43
Amount (_M) 83.8
Purchased/Repurchased by Banks
Number 10
Amount (_M) 24.6
i/
Accounts means either of the following:
guarantee revoked, prepaid, fully paid,
withdrawn or acquired.
Source: GFSME Report (February 1989).
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Table V.II
GFSME LOAN AVAILMENTS BY INVESTMENT AREA
(As of February 1989)
GFSME
No. value
(_M)
A. Primary
Fuels - -
Non-Fuels
Live Animals 78 107.214
Meat, preparations 2 6.050
Dairy products, birds eggs 7 1.620
Fish, preparations 117 205.297
Cereals, preparations 5 5.725
Vegetables and Fruits 7 20.045
Sugar, preparations
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 8 15.710
Feeding staff for animals 7 14.800
Misc. Edible Products, Preparations ii 19.442
Beverages
Ferti Iizer s/Minera is 1 8,000
Animals, Vegetable Oils and Fats Processed
wood and Wood Products
Paper and Paper Products
B. Manufactured
Labor Intensive (LI)
Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Furniture and Parts
Footwear, Apparel, Garments
Misc. Manufactures
Moderately Capital and Skill Intensive (MCSI)
Leather and Leather Manufactures
Rubber and Rubber Manufactures
Iron and Steel
Electrical and Non-Electrical Machineries
Transport Equipment
Higly Capital and Skill Intensive (HCSI)
Chemical materials, products
Not Elsewhere Classified 4 8.035
(Ricemilling, Feedwilling, Marketing Facilities,
Transport, Printing/Publishing, Other Services)
Total 247 404. 718
Sources: Unpublished ALF and IGLFReports (February 1989)
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Table V.12
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS, GFSME
(As of February 28, L989)
Type Number Value
., (_0_)
i. Accounts with delayed 8 637.5
payment
2. Accounts wit_] unpaid 16 309.6
guarantee fee
3. Accouclts witil legal iI 31,095.8
a) Accounts wit_l on-going
negotiations 7 28,880.3
b) Accounts under
,,:.
foreclosure 4 10,215.5
4. Acquired assets (Recoveries) 5 ,. 6,650.0
Net Past Due 35 32,042.1
---_ jo:
Source: GFSME Unpublished Report
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Table V.13
INCOME STATEMENT, GFSME
(In Million Pesos)
0
1984 1985 1986 1987
REVENUES
Interest on:
Investment in government 6b.4 87.7 55.8 36.8
securities
Notes receivable - 6.2 5.0 10,2
purchased
Others 0.i _.9 i.i 0.7
Guarantee fee 0.1 0.6 3.0 4.4
Origination fee 0.1 1.4 2.0 2.6
TOTAL 66.7 96.8 66.9 54.7
EXPENSES
Operating:
Interest subsidy - 2.3 7.2 2.4
Provision for probable
losses - - 6.2 3.9
Others - 0.9 0.7 0.5
General & Administrative 4.1 6.7 8.4 9.6
TOTAL 4.1 9.9 22.5 16.4
NET INCOME 62.6 86.8 44.4 38.2
Sources: GFSME Annual Reports (various years).
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subsidy. It rose to _7.2M in 1986, representing about one-third of the
total expenses. GFSME's plan to phase out the interest subsidy subsystem
is therefore a step in the right direction to improve its operating
profits. Another large expense item is the provision for probable losses
which practically eats up the income from guarantee and origination fees.
Thus, without the large investible funds and prudent manag_nent of these
funds, the viability of GFSME as a guarantee institution will be in
danger, unless it substantially increases its guarantee fee, a move that
will likely raise the cost of funds to small and medium enterprises.
(b) The Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
(Philguarantee)
Philguarantee is a government-owned corporation created in 1977 by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1080 which essentially revised an earlier
decree creating the Philippine Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation. It has
an authorized capital stock of pIOB. The Paid-in capital stood at p3B as
of September 1988, It is functionally attached to the Department of
Finance. The Board of Directors is composed of seven members: two
representatives from the Department of Finance and one representative from
the Central Bank, Department of Trade and Industry, Development Bank of the
Philippines, Philippine Overseas Construction Board, and National Economic
and Development Authority. Presently, Philguarantee is headed by a part-
time president. It has full-time staff complement of 70 as of December
1988 (see Annex D for the Organizational Chart).
The primary functions of Philguarantee are as follows:
, (a) To promote and facilitate the entry of foreign loans into the
country for development purposes having special regard to the
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needs of export-oriented industries, industries registered with
the Board of Investments, public utilities, and industries t_e
promotion of which is encouraged by government policy;
(b) To guarantee loans granted by Philippine banking and financial
institutions to qualified exporters, producers of export
products, and contractors with approved service contracts _road;
(c) To facilitate and assist in the implementation of approved
service contracts abroad entered into by Philippine entities,
enterprises or corporations with foreign exchange earning
potentials, by providing counter-guarantees to Philippine banks
and financial institutions issuing standby letters of credit or
letters of guarantee for theperformance of said service
contracts;
(d) To meet requests from domestic entities, enterprises, and
corporations to assist them in the coordination of their
development and expansion plans with a view to achieving better
utilization of their resources; and
(e) To provide technical assistance in the preparation, financing and
execution of development or expansion programs, including the
formulation of specific project proposals.
In a nutshell, Philguarantee provides guarantee coverage to Filipino
exporters on their borrowings whether obtained from local or foreign
sources. Such coverage is designed to demonstrate the creditworthiness of
qualified exporters and, thus, enhance their ability_ko secure financing
for their various requirements. Its services are available to producers
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and traders of Philippine products for export as well as to service
exporters and contractors. Unlike GFSME which has a number of facilities
including a liquidity facility, Philgu_&ntee provides only a guarantee
facility.
At present, Philguarantee offers two major facilities namely, the
General Guarantee Facility and the Export Credit Guarantee Program for
Small and Medium Industries. These are discussed below.
(i) General Guarantee Facility. This is for guarantee of more than
_5M per beneficiary that requires the approval of the Board of Directors.
However, guarantees of _*50M or more per beneficiary need approval from the
President of the Philippines. These can either be peso or foreign currency
denominated guarantees.
For export producer and or trader to qualify under this program,
he/she must be a producer or a trader of non-traditional export products
and registered with the Board of Investment or the Central Bank as export-
oriented. Thus, indirect exporters can have access to Philguarantee' s
assistance. On the other hand, for a service exporter and/or contractor to
qualify, he/she must be involved in construction projects or other services
provided to overseas customers; or, if involved in domestic infrastructure
projects, such pro3ects must have foreign-funding _equirement and be open
to international bidding; and that he/she must be registered with the
Central Bank or to Board of Invesb_ent if a service exporter, or with the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board if a contractor. The foreign
currency and peso loan Obtained by borrowers may be used for working
capital and acquis_iDn, construction and improvement of fixed assets for
expansion.
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Philguarantee provides 70 percent of the loan accommodation value in
the case of export producer and trader and 80 percent of the loan
accommodation value in the case of service •exporter and contractor.
Philguarantee charges a guarantee fee of 1.5•percent per annum of the
amount •guaranteed.
(2) Export Credit O_/arantee Program for Small and Medium
Industries (ECGP-SMI)
This is for guarantees of _5M or less that do not n_ approval from
the Board. The •Chairman of the Board, President •and Executive Vice-
President of Philguarantee are authorized by the Board of Directors to
approve loans under this facility.
This facility was• designed in collaboration with the Bankers
Association of the Philippines. It would enable an eligible small- and
medium-size exporter lacking sufficient collateral to obtain _)re-shii_ment
and post-shipment revolving •credit facilities from any participating bank.
The maximum guarantee coverage provided by Philguarantee is 70 percent of
the approved credit facility. Small-size exporters are those which have
assets of at least _50_,000 but less than _5M, while medium-size exporters
are those who have assets of at least _5M but less than _20M.
%
To qualify for the •ECGP-SMI facility, borrowers •must be engaged in the
processing, production or trading of _riority non-traditional export
products; must have a •t/_ree-year track record; and must have an average
profit margin of 10 percent, average return on equity of 15 percent,
average current ratio of 1.5:1, and an average debt to equity ratio (net of
valuation incr_nent) of 75:5. Both direct and indirect exporters can avail
themselves of such facility.
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Under the BZGP-SMI facility, Philguarantee charges a minimum guarantee
fee of 1.5 percent per annum of the guarantee accommodation payable prior
to the issuance of the guarantee and a filing fee of one-fifth of one
percent of the granted accommodation with a minimum of _1,_0 payable upon
filing of the credit and guarantee application, to be shared equally
between Philguarantee and the lending bank.
All applications for a credit and guarantee facility are to be
submitted to participating banks. Although participating banks already do
the normal loan processing proc_ure before endorsing the application for
guarantee, Philguarantee still reviews the application on a case-by-case
basis, and in some cases conducts its own credit assessment and
investigation. Thus, all applications for guarantee submitted by
participating banks are not automatically approved by Philguarantee.
Philguarantee does not require separate collaterals from the exporter-
borrower. However, it has a proportionate share on all collaterals,
rights, interests and claims held by the participating banks against the
borrower for the credit accommodation under guarantee. The exporter-
borrower is required to execute in favor of Philguarantee an Indemnity
Agreement with Negative Pledge.
Under the BCGP-SMI program, claims for guarantees may be submitted by
banks at the time of default. No claims will be honored if submitted 15
days later than the expiry date of the guarantee. All claims will be paid
within 30 days.
Philguarantee has had a poor performance record mainly due to failures
in Middle East construction contracts which it guaranteed in foreign
currency. About _5.5B non-performing assets of Philguarantee are supposed
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to be transferred to the national government by virtue of Executive Order
No. 64, but as of September 1988, this has not yet been done. AS a result,
Philguarantee continues to suffer huge losses. For the period January to
September 1988 alone, it lost _165M (see Annex E). This is mainly due to
the interest and financial charges on the non-performing assets amounting
to _174M. The government has been providing advances to Philguarantee to
sustain its operation. As of September 1988, advances from the National
Treasury related to the non-performing assets for transfer to National
Government already totalled _489M.
In view of its heavy losses, Philguarantee's General Guarantee
Facility has been essentially inactive today. One highly exceptional case
was the $40M guarantee it provided to PLDT in 1987 because the company is
exceptionally creditworthy and that it serves a vital role in the
_unication system in the Philippines. Hoover, the ECGP-SMI r_mlains
active. Thus, the discussion that follows will focus on the performance of
this program.
Between 1980 and 1988, guarantee issuances under the II:GP-SMI
amounted to _335.8M (see Table V.14). It reached a peak in 1982, but
declined thereafter as the economy went through a balance-of-payments
crisis. As of December 1988, outstanding guarantees net of re-availments,
cancelled guarantees and guarantees in default were only _38.4M down from a
high of _80.4 in 1982. The number of accounts outstanding also declined
substantially from 83 in 1982 to 17 in 1988. The effort to revitalize the
_GP-SMI in 1987 resulted only in a small improvement in the guarantee
issuances in 1987 and 1988 even as the economy, particularly the export
sector, started to recover. One of the reasons is that the number of
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active banks considerably declined during the last few years (see Table
V.15), not to mention the fact that all of them need time to adjust to the
new progrma. The other reason is that the eligibility criteria of the new
_CGP-SMI as earlier discussed are _ch more rigorous than the previous one.
Banks indicated that firms that satisfy the newly revised requirements are
those that do not need anymore assistance from Philguarantee. It seems
that Philguarantee went so far in an effort to reduce calls on its
guarantees.
Classified according to type of credits, a greater proportion of the
guarantee issuances was for pre-shipment export credit (see Table V.16).
This reflects the banks' preference for short-term financing. However, the
share of comprehensive export credit in total guarantee issuances is
catching up fast especialiy in the last two years. Post-shipment export
credit is still not popular among banks, as shown in the share of guarantee
accommodation going to it.
Before 1984, guarantee issuances went to quite a number of industries
(see TaDle V.17). From 1985 onwards, however, the guarantee issuances
beca,ne more concentrated in only three industries, namely garments,
handicrafts and furniture.
During the period 1980 to 1988, _30.9M in guarantees defaulted. This
is about 9.2 percent of the total guarantees issued. The highest default
rates occurred in 1982 and 1985. However, a closer look at the
distribution of default by year would show that the highest default rates
were incurred by guarantees issued in earlier years (see Table V.18).
Accordingly, banks' misconception of the program largely contributed to the
high default rates. More specifically, only riskier loans were endorsed by
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Table V.15
ACTUAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING BANKS
Year Active Participating Ratio
Banks BanKs
198H 12 27 44
19dl 16 28 57
1982 23 31 74
1983 20 31 64
1984 16 31 52
1985 10 31 32
1986 8 31 26
1987 5* 31" 16
1988 3* 5** 60
* Participating banks in the Old ECGP
** Selected banks in the New ECGP-SMI
Source: Philguarantee Unpublished Report (March 1989).
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banks to the ECGP-SMI, while the relatively good accounts were kept by
them. This practically negates the risk-pooling feature of the _CGP-SMI.
Philguarantee responded by tightening their screening process on guarantee
reco_nendation by banks to the point of duplicating the credit evaluation
and monitoring normally done by banks. The tighter screening process and
!
constant credit monitoring coupled with a much stricter eligibility
criteria all helped in attaining a zero default rate in 1987 and 1988. But
this has resulted in a smaller number of accounts outstanding and a much
leaner guarantees outstanding net of reavailments, thus, almost completely
losing the effectiveness of the ECGP-SMI.
So far, recoveries amounted to _5.4M which is equivalent to 17.5
percent of total guarantee defaults. Improvement in recoveries was made in
the last two years when Philguarantee started to directly take the
responsibility of running after defaultees.
The profit and loss statement of the HCGP-SMI program is shown in
Table V.19. For the period 1980 to 1987, total revenues derived from
filing and guarantee fees amounted to _5.1M, while expenses totalled only
_2.6. Except for one year during that period, a positive profit was
realized by the program in all the years of its operation. However, the
net income of _6.8M realized in its eight years of operation cannot cover
total advances made by the program for the same period. Clearly, a
sufficiently huge investible fund is required for the ECGP-SMI to be self-
liquidating.
To improve the effectiveness of ECGP-SMI, Philguarantee is planning to
introduce the so-called "Bank Guarantee Line" program (see Annex F). It is
designed to simplify and facilitate the delivery of financial assistance
•
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and guarantee support to deserving exporters by providing a guarantee line
of _25M per participating bank. Only pre-shipment export credits granted
against irrevocable L/Cs or acceptable POs are eligible under this program.
The eligibility criteria for borrowers are muc_ more liberal than the
existing one. Philguarantee hopes to issue _IB in guarantees for pre-
export financing or five _times the _200M liquid assets now readily
available for i_s use.
Philguarantee is als0planning to re-introduce its guarantee
assistance program for overseas Contractors, although in lsomewhat limited
amount and in selected types of contracts (see Annex G). Under this
proposed program, Philguaran_ee will Prbvide guarantee on performance bond,
advance payment or peso working capital for mobilization expenses. It
proposes a guarantee sharingCwi%h a Dank and the contractor concerned.
Recently, Philguarantee obtained a technical assistance from the World
Bank to improve its operations_ _ Ir_de_ it is gearing itself to become a
truly export credit guarantee institution.
B. Experience with Export Financing
This section is divided into two parts. The first discusses export
finance experience of banks, and the second, the exporters' experience with
export financing.
i.0 " Banks
Export transactions normally pass through the commercial banking
system. This is the most convenient way for both exporters and importers
to transact their business. There is a regulation that requires all
exporters to report to the Central Bank both the volume and value of
187
exports. In addition, exporters are required to immediately surrender to
their banks all export proceeds denominated in foreign currency. This is
closely monitored by the Export Department of the Central Bank.
In 1988, the seven sample•banks had a total of 2,392 export customers
(see Table V.20). This is roughly 45 percent of the total number of active
18/
exporters in 1987. Except for one bank, only a small proportion of
19__/
their export customers in 1988 were new ones. The size of individual
export transactions in 1988 greatly varies within and among banks (see
Table V.21). The lowest average transaction was _25,700, while the highest
average transaction was _5M.
The typical terms of export transactions are cash, sight draft,
documentary credit and L/Cs. One of the seven sample banks mentioned L/Cs
only (see Table,V.22). As regards L/Cs, three banks a_e advising only
while the rest are both advising and confirming. The ratio of usance to
L/Cs is relatively small for most banks, and the typical term of usance
L/Cs for most banks is 60 days (see Table V.23).
The total amount of export loans granted in 1988 by the seven sample
banks amounted to _5B, which is 0nly about three percent of the total value
of merchandise exports in that same year. All, except one bank, did not
fully refinance their export loans with the Central Bank (see Table V.24).
It se_s that banks rely on their own funds to a certain degree. When
asked how liquid the banking system at present, all respondent banks said
18/
We are using 1987 figure since the 1988 figure is not yet
available.
19__/
New customers may include old exporters who may have just newly
bank with the respondent.
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Table V.20
NUMBER OF EXPORT CUSTOMERS, 1988
No. of Export % New Export
BanKs Customers Customers
1 88 78
2 I_73 34
3 2_ 15
4 I19 5
5 154 3_
6 188 15
7 666 7
Table V.21
SIZE OE INDIVIDUAL TRANSACTIONS,
1988: BANKS' RESPONSES
(In Pesos)
Banks Average Minimum Maximum
1 5,0%9,000 28,888 50,_S
2 25,7_ 21,_9_ 63,27_,_00
3 200,00_ i_,00_ I_,_00
4 1,894,43% 12,584 II_,00%,_0_
5 423,50@ 8,278 886,696,168
6 1,2_0,000 10,_M0 220,%0_,000
7 39,500 4,278 64,0_,0%_
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Taole V.22
TERMS OF EXPORT TRAHSACTIONS
Banks Terms
1 1245
2 12345
3 24
4 •234
5 1234
6 4
7 2345
Note: Terms - 1 - Cash
2 - Sight Draft
3 - Documentary Credit
4 -•Letter of Credit (L/C)
5 - Others
Others: for Bank 1 - Cash against Documents
Documents Against Acceptance.
for •Bank • 2 - Open Account DP, DA
for Bank 7 - Prepaid Exports
Documents against Payments
TaDle V.23
LETTERS OF CREDIT
Letters of Credit
Banks ...._ ______ ___ _. a.. -...... ......_ _ _.-_..- .......... .
Terms of Usance Ratio of Usance
(Days) to L/Cs (%)
1 Advising 6_ 0.05
2 Advlsing & confirming 60 15._0
3 Advising 60 10._0
4 Advlsing & confirming 3_ 2_.00
5 Advising & confirming 6_ i_._
6 Advlsing 45 3g.0%
7 Advlsing & confirming 60 3.00
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if%at it is liquid. This seems to be the prevailing situation despite the
fact that the economy has picked up quite fast in the last two years. This
could pernaps be one of the reasons why rediscounting availments with the
Central Bank are at a lower rate.
Pre-shipment loans were the typical export loans provided Dy banks.
_hus, the usual credit term was less than 180 days (see Table V.25). The
current rate for export loans is between 14 to 18 percent which is close to
the rate given by banks to their prime custaners. Note that not all
exporters have access to bank loans. Hence, the rate on export loans
reported by the sc3mpie banks most probably applies t_)exporters whom they
cons ider cred itwor thy.
Banks in the Philippines are extre_ely c(_nservative. Usually, they
lend to exporters up to 70 percent Of the L/C. But they do not lend to
exporters on the strength of an L/C even if it is irrevocable. Aside fr_
the assigned L/C, the most common type of collateral asked by banks for
pre- and post-shipment loans are real estate and deposit/placements of
exPorter-borrowers with the bank (see Table V.26). The value of the
collateral ranges between i_0 percent to 125 percent of tt]e loan value.
Banks have been encountering some difficulties in extending financing
9, "
to local exporters. The mos_ comaon of these is that the buyers of
exporters' products do not appear to be creditworthy (s_e Table V.27).
This partly stuns fr(_n the fact that banks have very little information
about the creditworthiness of importers of Philippine products, except the
very big ones. There is no mechanism by which local banks can obtain at a
lower cost information about the credit track record of numerous importers.
The second most common difficulty in extending financing to exporters is
191
Table V.24
AMOUNT OF EXPORT LOANS GRANTED IN 1988
Sourced From
Amount of Refinanced through
Banks Export Loans CB Rediscounting Special Lending Programs Own Funds
(in Pesos) % (e.g. ALF, IGLF, etc.) %
1 1,544,993,455.94 83.0 0 17.0
2 450,000,000.00 47.0 0 53.0
3 530,518,997.00 90.0 0 n.a.
4 314,607,600.00 80.0 0 n.a.
5 139,889,100.00 36.0 0 n.a.
6 80,000,000.00 "100.0. I 0 0
7 2,053,000,000.@0 79.8 1.9 18.3
Table V.25
EXPOrt LOANS
.... Distribution of Export Current Current Rate
Loans by Credit Term (%) Rate on to Prime
Banks Export Loans Customers
< 180 days 180 days
to 1 year (% p.a.) (% p.a.)
1 i_0.0 0.0 18.5 17
2 90.0 10._ 14 to 18 17
3 90.0 10.0 15 to 18 20
4 n.a. n.a. n.a. . n.a.
5 100. _ 0.0 16 16
6 100.0 0.0 17 to 19 a 17 a/
14 to 16 bE 14 b/
7 96.6 3.4 18 16
Note:
n.a. - No Answer
a/ ~ Prior to CB Rediscounting
b/ -Upon CB Rediscounting
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Table V o26
TYPES OF COLLATERAL FOR LOANS
Post-Shi[_uent Pre-Shigoent/Working
Banks Loan Capital Loan
1 123 123
2 45 125
3 nap 15
4 • • nap 234
5 235 235
6 4 4
7 15 14
NOTE:
Collateral - I - L/C
2 - Real Estate Mortgage
3 - Deposits/Placements
4 - Guarantee (Letter ,Corporate,JSS, etc. )
5 - Others
nap - bank did not imve any post-shipment loan
Table V. 27
DIFFICULTIES IN EXTENDING FINANCING TO LOCAL EXPORTERS
(By Rank: i = Most important; 7 = Least important)
Banks
Difficulties ...........
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Export Loan is not
profitable to the bank 3 6 n.a. 6 n.a. 2 3 6
Size of transaction does not
meet with bank policy _ 5 2 n.a. 5 1 5 6 3
Country of buyer is not
believed to be creditworttly 6 5 n.a. 4 4 6 2 2
Required luaturity of credit is
believed to be unreasonable 4 4 n.a. 2 2 4 5 5
Buyer does not appear
creditwor thy 1 i n.a. 1 3 1 1 1
Required interest rate is _
believed to De low 2 3 n.a. 3 n.a. 3 4 4
Note: n.a. - no answer
that the required maturity of credit is believed to be unreasonable. Banks
have strong preference for short-term loans. As pointed out above, the
typical maturity of export loans extended by banks is less than 18_ days,
and most of these are pre-shipment loans. Very rarely do they give long-
term loans which exporters want to obtain. The other most common
difficulty is that tile interest rate exporters are willing to pay is low
co_ared to what bank_ want to charge them. It is not uncommon among
exporters to turn away from banks because of their inability or
unwillingness to pay a high interest rate.
As regarus pre-snlpment export loan requests, _ mOSt common problems
encountered by the sample banks are discrepancies in the documents
submitted and insufficient collateral. Similar problems are encountered by
... • , . . ,
the sample _enks as regards post,shipment export loan requests. In
additiont all, exc?pt one bank, admitted that they do not have sufficient
.. ..- ,, . • ,.. _ .
information to evaluate foreign buyers. • This is one of the major reasons
why post-shipment loans are least Preferred by banks.
Only One of•the seven •sample banks claimed that current Central Bank
regulations have imposed restrictions in its lending that affect • its
ability to lend to exporters..• And these pertain to the low loan value and
shorter maturity period of rediscounts.
Five of the sample banks indicated that they offer domestic letters of
credit to support indirect exporters. But of these five banks, only two
admitted to have lent to indirect ••exporters. The aggregate loans granted to
indirect exporters by these two banks were estimated to be between one to
five percent of the total loans granted in 1988. Most of the sa,ple banks
suggest that indirect exporters, who are mostly small producers, be given
194
preferential rate for their export loans under a special government lending
program.
As mentioned in the earlier section, there are three existing
guarantee facilities in the Philippines, namely: Philguarantee, GFSME, and
IGLF. Five of the seven sample banks have themselves availed of the
guarantee facilities at one time or another (see Table V.28). But in 1988,
only three of the sample banks utilized the guaran%ee facili{ies. As _hown
in Table V.29, the guarante6_ loans were o_iy a small proportion to their
total export loans.
Banks evaluate loan applica£ion of exporters •that are submitted for
guarantee using their standard evaluation system, such as financial and
market viability of the pr0je_%, debt-servic_;capacitys quality of
management, export _record and•icredit experience, • and resources of
stockholders. Five of the seven sample banks •have ta_ed the services _ of
the Credit Investigation Bureau (CIB) in evaluatfng _export loan
applications being submitted for guarantee. More specifically, they want
to find out through CIB the loan applicants' repayment record, court cases
and current loans with other banks.
Of the •seven sa_ple banks, only two had experienced calling on the
!
guarantee on some of the loans they granted to exporters •(see Table V.30).
Both of them said that their claims were paid.
Numerous docunentation requirements, long evaluation process and
stringent evaluation criteria were mentioned by three banks as their
problem with the Philguarantee facility (see Table V.31). Three of the
seven sample banks suggested that the existing guarantee •programs _should be
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Table V. 28
BANKS' AVAILMENT OF
GUARANTEE FACILITIES
Banks Guarantee Facilities
1 2
2 23
3 none
4 none
5 1
6 3
7 123
Note: Guarantee Facilites:
1 - Philguarantee
2 - GFSME
_,3 - IGLF
TaDle V.29
RATIO OF GUARANTEED LOANS TO
EXPORT LOANS GRANTEU IN 1988
Banks Ratio (in %)
1
2 2
3 nap
4 nap
5 1
6 0
7 < i
Note: nap - not applicaDle
Table V. 30
CLAIMS MADE UNDER THE GUARANTEE PROGRAMS
: Claims Made : Claims Paid
Banks: Philguarantee GFSME IGLF:Philguarantee GFSME IGLF
1 : 2 2 2 : nap nap nap
2 : 2 2 1 : nap nap 1
3 : 2 2 2 : nap nap nap
4 : 2 2 2 : nap nap nap
5 : 1 2 2 : nap nap nap
6 : 2 2 2 : nap nap nap
7 : 2 2 2 : nap nap nap
Note: nap - not applicable
Claims Made : 1 - Yes; 2 - No
Claims Paid: 1 - Yes; 2 - No
Table V.31
PROBLEMS WITH EXPORT GUARANTEE FACILITIES
BanKs Philguarantee GFSME IGLF
1 15 6 6
2 6 6 6
3 6 6 6
4 6 6 6
5 2 6 6
6 6 6 6
7 23 1 45
Note: Problems:
1 - numerous documentation requirements
2 - long, evaluation, process
3 - stringent,evaluation criteria
,4 - limited coverage of collateral
5 - snorter maturity of the scheme
6 - none
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modified. Their specific recommendations are as follows: simplifying
procedures, reducing fees and interest rate, clearer requira_ents for
claims, higher guarantee cover up to 85 percent, and shortening the period
for processing claims.
The Philippines does not have an export credit insurance scheme. This
facility is, however, most welcomedby banks. Five Of the sample banks
indicated that they will seriously consider the loan application by an
exporter who has secured an export credit insurance policy. However,
almost all of them said that they will not automatically accept the export
credit insurance policy as a collateral for loan application by exporters.
2.@ Exporters
The major product lines of the 23 sample exporters are varied (see
Table V.32). They range from agricultural products, such as prawns, to
gifts and housewares, such as toys and toy accessories, to electronic
products, such as integrated circuits. All, except two firms which are
engaged in garments and electronic products, are producing products for
exports which have high value-added. A great majority of the sample
•exporters •exported/sold their products in finished form (see Table V.33).
As regards foreign markets, •only two firms •have• concentrated in
marketing their products in one Country. The rest have fairly diversified
markets (see Table V.34).
Table •V.35 shows the total amount of sales and export sales of the
sample firms. For the five indirect exporters, the export sales reported
refer to the value of commoditiessold to final exporters. Only five of
the sample exporters have export sales below 58 percent of their total
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Table V. 32
MAJOR PRODUCT LINES
Assets Export No. Products
A. Small-Scale
1 i baskets (made from buri and coconut)
l 6 abaca fabric bags, fashion accessories, home decors
1 7 garments, worked horn
1 8 fashion accessories
1 9 baskets, trays
1 10 fashion accessories, office decor, cermnics
1 11 cocowood ashtrays and jars
1 12 home and office accessories (wood)
1 14 native handicrafts
1 17 marble slabs and tiles
1 28 blankets, clothing, decors, ethnic items
1 21 toys and toltaccessories (buri)
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 fashion accessories
2 3 rattan products
2 4 rattan products
1 13 banana chips
2 15 prawns
1 22 painted woodcarvings and shell
C. Large-Scale
2 5 stone in-laid furniture, bamboo, wicker, leather
2 16 natural rubber
2 18 furniture and handicrafts
1 19 processed foodstuffs
3 23 integrated circuits, LED display, disk drives, photo detector
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 -more than P28 million
Table V.33
FORM OF PRODUCTS/SERVICES EXPORTk39/SOLD IN 1988
(In Percent)
Products/Services
Assets Exporter
No. Raw Materials Semi-Finished Capital Goods Consumer Goods Services
A. F_all-Scale ......
1 1 0 _ 0 10_ 0
1 6 0 60 0 40 0
1 7 0 0 0 100 0
1 8 0 0 0 100 0
1 9 0 0 0 100 0
1 10 0 0 0 100 0
1 ii 0 0 0 100 0
1 12 0 0 0 100 0
1 14 0 30 0 100 0
1 17 0 0 0 100 0
1 2_ 0 _ 0 100 0
1 21 0 0 0 100 0
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 0 0 0 100 0
2 •3 0. 100 0 0 0
2 4 0 0 0 100 0
1 13 0 0 0 100 0
2 15 0 100 0 0 0
1 22 0 0 0 100 0
C. Large-Scale
2 5 0 0 0 100 0
2 16 0 100 0 0 0
2 18 0 _ 0 100 0
1 19 0 0 0 100 0
3 23 0 100 0 0 0
NOTE: Assets - 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 -more than P20 million
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T_l e V.34
COUNTRIESMHEREFIRflEXPOR?EDTOIN I988
(In Percent to Total Exports)
Assets Exporter
• No. USA Japan _ermanynecnerlanos .ong_ong_stralIa S. Korea France:Others
A. Small-Scale
1 1 6 g 8 0 6 88 I 21 I
I 6 0 0 50 0 0 B 50 O. 6
1 7 39 2 _ 9 2 6 6 9 69
I 8 9m 0 B 0 0 0 i I II
1 9 89 6 8 _ 26 6 6 8 9
l II lO_ 6 9 0 9 g 6 6 i
1 II nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
1 12 96 5 2 B 5 6 @ 0 2
1 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n,a. n.a.
1 17 nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
l 20 79 9 6 9 $6 6 6 6 g
1 21 15 1D 36 15 6 6 6 _0 _.6
D. Hediue-Scale
2 2 49 29 15 9 15 9 9 16 9
2 3 nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
2 4 75 29 5 9 9 9 9 ! 6
i 13 nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
2 15 nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
I 22 34 33 9 9 33 I 9 I " 0
C. Large-ficale
2 5 85 3.75 3,75 _,75 3.75 9 6 9 9
2 16 6 9 9 19 9 9 199 9 9
2 1B 0 9 9 9 0 9 9 6 99
1 19 1.5 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 99.5
3 23 44 19 2 B 9 9 9 9 l_4
NOTE:Assets - 1 - less than P5million
2 - P5 million to P29million
3 - morethanP29million
n.a.- noanswer
Table V.35
ANNUAL SALES AND EXPORT SALES
(In Pesos)
Assets IExporterl Total Annual Sales I Total Export Sales
• I 1987 1988 1987 1988
A. Small-Scale
1 1 nap 423,475.00 nap 320,000.00
1 6 380,000.00 420,800.00 380,000.00 420,000.0_
1 7 4_0,000.00 450,000.00 300,000.00 350,000.00
1 8 270,000.00 140,000.00 91,000.00 21,000.00
1 9 123,000.00 165,000.00 50,000.00 35,000.00
1 10 566,020.04 1,698,060.12 452,816.03 1,358,448.10
1 ii 32,000.00 48,000.00 8,000.00 10,0_0.00
1 12 nap 200,000.00 nap 150,000.00
1 14 400,00.0.00 200,000.00 400,0_0.00 200,_00.00
1 17 2,180,000.00 2,000,000.00 625,000.00 910,_00.00
1 20 980,000.00 2,000,000.00 120,000.00 400,000.0_
1 21 1,900,000.00 2,400,000.00 1,900,000.00 2,400,000.00
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 9,600,000.00 10,30_,000.00 8,500,000.00 9,708,000.00
2 3 3,800,000.00 4,600,000.00 3,.800,000.00 4,600,000.00
2 4 430,499.70 9,944,874.38 353,175.70 4,326,981.27
1 13 6,500,000._0 8,000,000.00 6,500,000.00 8,000,000.00
2 15 1,800,000.00 2,850,000._0 350,000.00 1,300,0_0.00
1 22 8.,991,699.77 9,541,627.32 5,313,638.86 8,122,402.55
C. Large-Scale
2 5 21,446,000.00 36,091,000.00 21,446,000.00 36,091,000.00
2 16 30,900,000.00 48,600,000.00 11,080,000.00 34,700_000.00
2 18 60,874,865.30 58,091,616.10 60,266,116.00 57,510,699.00
1 19 34,854,000.00 31,798,000.00 34,363,000.00 31,665,000.00
3 23 42,400,000._0 49,300,000.00 42,400,000.00 49,300,000.00
NOTE: Assets - 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 -more than P20 million
nap - not applicable
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annual sales in 1988. The export sales considerably vary among the sample
exporters. The lowest export sale in 1988 was _21,000 or $1,000 while the
highest export sale was _57M or close to $3M. The size of individual
export transactions by an individual firm widely varies (see Table V.36).
Among firms, the size of individual transactions also greatly varies. The
lowest average size of individual transactions was _ii,000, while the
highest was _40M.
Exporters typically use containerized van to deliver their goods to
importers. In the case of saall exporters, export goods are consolidated
into one van and sent together to importers located in the same country.
In almost all export transactions, importers take care of the insurance and
freight cost.
Only five firms suffered a decline in their export sales over the last
three years, while the rest achieved a quite impressive growth in export
sale in the same period (see Table V.37). It is noteworthy that three
small firms realized a growth rate in sales over the last three years in
excess of 100 percent.
Almost all sample firms usually export in cash or L/C upon shipment
in 1988 (see Table V.38). This corroborates the information provided
earlier by banks. Exporters prefer this arrangement for at least two
reasons. One is that it reduces the uncertainty regarding palAnents of
goods sold especially that exporters do not nave adequate information about
the track record of importers. The other is that ti_ey need high sales
turnover because most of t_em are self-financing tl]eir export production/
trading activities. As shown in Table V.39, 15 out of 23 respondent firms
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Table V. 36
AVERAGE SIZE OF TRANSACTIONS IN 1988
(In Pesos)
Assets Export No. Average Size Lower Range Upper Range
A. Small-Scale
1 1 120,000 95,000 140,000
1 6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 7 175,000 100,_00 250,00_
1 8 52,500 20,000 85,000
1 9 67,000 60,000 75,000
1 10 300,000 50,000 350,000
1 ii 11,000 2,0_0 20,000
1 12 20,000 10,000 60,000
1 14 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 17 150,000 n.a. n.a.
1 20 60,000 50,000 80,000
1 21 110,006 100,000 120,000
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 800,000 500,000 2,000,0_0
2 3 340,000 100,000 700,000
2 4 250,000 70,000 400,0H0
1 13 1,200,000 200,000 2,400,000
2 15 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 22 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C. Large-Scale
2 5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 16 2,000,000 1,500,000 2,500,000
2 18 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 19 460,000 100,000 950,000
3 23 40,000,000 35,000,000 45,000,000
NOq'E: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 -more than P20 million
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•Table V.37
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF EXPORT SALES
IN THE LAST 3 YEA_S
Assets Exporter Increase, Decrease
No. (%) (%)
A. Small-Scale
1 1 nap nap
1 6 10 nap
1 7 3_ nap
1 • 8 nap 76
1 9 nap 15
1 10 150 nap
1 ii 25 nap
1 12 nap• nap
1 14 nap 50
1 17 46 nap
1 2_ 120 nap
1 21 150 nap
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 60 nap
2 3 20 nap
2 4 1225 nap
1 13 15 nap
2 15 4_ nap
1 22 53 nap
C. Large-Scale
2 5 68 nap
2 16 237 nap
2 18 20 nap
1 19 nap 8
3 23 nap 10
NOTE: Assets - 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
nap - not applicable
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Table V. 38
RATIO OF CREDIT JTERMS•TO TOTAL• EXPOR%'_
(In Percent)
Export I cash or L/C Less Than 180 days Over 1 Year
Assets No. IUpon Shipment 180 Days to l Year•
A. Small-Scale •
1 1 100 0 0 0
1 6 100 0 0 0
• 1 ••7 100 0 0 0
1 8 100 0 0 0
1 9 100 0 _ 0 0
1 10 100 0 0 0
1 ii nap nap nap nap
1 12 100 0 0 0
1 14 0 100 0 0
1 17 nap nap nap nap
1 20 100 0 0 0
1 21 100 0 0 0
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 100 0 0 0
•2 3 nap nap nap nap
2 4 100 0 0 0
1 13 nap nap nap nap
2 15 nap nap nap nap
i 22 100 0 0 0
C. Large-Scale
2 5 100 0 0 0
2 16 100 0 0 0
2 18 25 25 50 0
1 19 10_ 0. 0 0.
3 23 34 64 0
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less t/_an-P5 million •
2 - P5 million to P20 million
" 3 - more than P20 million
nap - not applicable
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Table V.39
SOURCES OF FINANCING EXPORT PRODUCTION, 1988
(In Percent)
Assets Export Firm Factoring Local Foreign Foreign Buyers/ Others
No. House Bank Bank Customers
A. Small-Scale
1 1 100 0 _ 0 0 0
1 6 i_ 0 0 0 0 0
1 7 100 0 0 0 0 0
1 8 i_0 0 0 0 0 0
1 9 10_ 0 0 0 0 0
1 10 0 0 0 _ 0 100
1 Ii 100 0 0 0 0 0
1 12 20 0 30 0 50 0
1 14 100 _ 0 0 0 0
1 17 100 0 0 0 0 0
1 2_ 100 0 0 _ 0 0
1 21 40 0 30 0 0 30
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 100 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 100 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 100 x 0 0 0 0
1 13 0 0 100 0 0 0
2 15 100 0 0 0 0 0
1 22 100 0 0 0 0 0
C. Large-Scale
2 5 100 0 0 0 0 0
2 16 0 0 60 0 0 0
2 18 80 0 0 20 0 0
1 19 i_ 0 50 0 0 40
3 23 65 0 35 0 0 0
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P2_ million
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are completely financing their export production/trading activities most of
the time.
About half of the respondents claimed that the payment arrangement
they have now with their buyers is about the same as their foreign
competitors. However, a great ma3ority said they could have increased
their export sales between 30 and 50 percent had they offered better credit
terms to their present customers. Many of the firms interviewL_d admitted
that definitely they cannot go on for long demanding cash or sight L/C
especially since orders of their buyers who have shown good payment record
are becoming larger. Accordingly, some of their buyers have already
started asking for term L/Cs for about 180 days. A great majority of the
respondents said that they are not worried about price competition since
they are confident that the prices of their -export commodities are
competitive at present, and will remain competitive in the future. It is
the credit term that they offer to their buyers that they are worried
about. They noted that some foreign competitors are now offering better
credit terms to their buyers.
In 1988, only three out of the 23 sample firms obtained pre-shipment
financing from a local bank (see Table V.40). For the two exporters,
however, the level of pre-shipment financing was low. The lack of access
to pre-shipment financing has led almost all exporters interviewed to turn
down large orders, picking up the smaller ones only. Thus, the amount of
export sales/ production was severely constrained by lack/absence of pre-
shipment financing. The same can be said of post-shipment financing. Only
four out of 18 final exports interviewed obtained post-shi_nent financing
in 1988 (see Table V.40). The level of financing was low for two of t21ese
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Table V.40
PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS IN 1988
WHICH WERE PRE-FINANCED AND
RECEIVED POST-SHIPMENT FINANCING
Assets Export No. Pre-Shipment Post-Shipment
A. Small-Scale
1 1 0 0
1 6 0 80
1 7 0 0
1 8 0 0
1 9 0 0
1 10 0 0
1 ii 0 nap
1 12 0 0
1 14 0 0
1 17 0 nap
1 20 0 0
1 21 30 0
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 0 0
2 3 0 nap
2 4 0 0
1 13 0 nap
2 15 _ nap
1 22 0 0
C. Large-Scale
2 5 0 0
2 16 0 60
2 18 8_ i_
1 19 0 0
3 23 20 35
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
nap - not applicaDle
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firms. The lack of financing to finance a higher level of receivables has
severely constrained the amount of export sales made by exporters.
Respondent firms were asked whether they ever obtained export
financing from a local bank (see Table V.41). Twelve of the 23 sample
firms gave a positive answer. This means that many of them did not borrow
from banks in 1988. High interest rate was the most coa_on reason cited
for not borrowing from banks in 1988. Of the total number of respondents,
only one was fully satisfied with the export finance services of his bank;
four said that the export finance services of their hank were just
adequate; ten said that they were inadequate; and the rest said that they
do not have any knowledge at all regarding the adequacy of local banks'
export finance services. It is interesting to note that half of those who
ever obtained an export financing from local banks claimed that export
finance services of banks were inadequate. The major reasons they cited
are the following: collateral asked by banks was too high compared to what
they can offer; .interest rate was high; and loan maturity being offered by
banks was too short.
Of the 23 respondents, only one was able to borrow from one of the
special lending programs of the government (i.e., EIMP). It was a long-
term loan which was used for the acquisition of fixed assets.
Six of the 18 final exporters encountered problems with regard to
payment of t/%e goods already delivered to i,_orters. The specific problems
mentioned were: non-payment; issuance of post-dated check for 30 days
instead of cash payment; alleged short shipment; non-acceptance of
documents and delayed payments.
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Table V. 41
EXPORT FINANCING FROM LOCAL BANKS
Export Bank Gov't Processing Time Local Banks Export
Assets No. office ownership Prograa for Loans (days) Finance Services
A. Small-Scale
1 1 branch gov't n.a. 7 3
1 6 branch private nap nap 4
1 7 nap nap nap nap 4
1 8 nap nap nap nap 3
1 9 nap nap nap nap 3
1 IM nap nap nap nap 4
1 ii nap nap nap nap 4
1 12 branch private nap 5 2
1 14 nap nap nap nap 4
1 17 nap nap nap nap 3
1 20 nap nap nap nap 4
1 21 branch private nap 3 3
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 branch private nap 3 2
2 3 nap nap nap nap 3
2 4 branch private nap 7 3
1 13 branch private nap 2 1
2 15 nap nap nap nap 4
1 22 nap nap nap nap 4
C. Large-Scale
2 5 head gov't TLRC 365 3
2 16 branch private nap 3 2
2 18 r_ead pr ivate nap 5 3
1 19 head/branch private nap 2 2
3 23 branch private nap 7 3
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
Service : 1 - Fully Satisfactory
2 - Adequate
3 - Inadequate
4 - No Knowledge
nap - not applicable
n.a. - no answer
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Five of the 18 final exporters experienced cases wherein buyers
suddenly cancelled their orders (Table V.42). Four of them had already
L/Cs opened by importers for their orders. The value involved ranged from
_100,000 to _400,000. Two firms did not know the reason why export orders
were cancelled, while the three firms cited tithe el_ment, financial
problems of the importer and labor problems of the exporter as the reasons
for the cancellation of export orders.
Eight of the 23 respondents indicated that there is a high level of
bankruptcies and insolvencies in their industry. Six of these respondents
said that exporting has contributed to these problems.
Despite the various problems now facing exporters, they are very
optimistic as regards export prospects for the next three years. The
expected increase in exports by individual firms ranges between 60 and 300
percen t over a three-year period (see Table V.43). A great majority of
them are now actively pursuing new export markets for their products. Some
of them plan to introduce new products to be marketed in specific countries
(see Table V.44). But 'limited or lack of financing could douse the
enthusiasm of exporters.
The Inter-Agency Study Group on External Trade Statistics and
Projections Foreign Operations Committee which is chaired by the Central
Bank has been making dialogues with exporters twice a year for the last two
years. Table V.45 presents a c_nprehensive summary of the problems/
bottlenecks related to financial matters encountered by exporters and some
recommendations to ease/eliminate the bottlenecks.
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Table V. 42
CANCELLATION OF ORDERS BY BUYERS
Export Value Payment
Assets No. ReasOns (In Pesos) Terms
A. Small-Scale
1 1 nap nap nap
1 6 time element 400,000 1
1 7 nap nap nap
1 8 financial problems of importer n.a. 1
i 9 nap nap nap
1 10 nap nap nap
1 ii nap nap nap
1 12 nap nap nap
i 14 none 100,000 5
1 17 nap nap nap
1 20 labor problems of the exporter 250,0_0 1
1 21 nap nap nap
B. Media-Scale
2 _ nap nap nap
2 3 nap nap nap
2 4 nap nap nap
1 13 nap nap nap
2 15 nap nap nap
1 22 none n.a. 145
C. Large-Scale
2 5 nap nap nap
2 16 nap nap nap
2 18 nap nap nap
1 19 nap nap nap
3 23 nap nap nap
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
nap- not applicable
n.a. - no answer
Payment Terms: 1 - L/C
2 - Document against payment
3 - Docuaent against acceptance
4 - Sight draft
5 - others
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Table V.43
EXPORT PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS
AND PROSPECTIVE MARKETS
Assets Export No. % Increase Countries
A. Small-Scale
1 1 120 12
1 6 60 1234
1 7 80 1235
1 8 100 5
1 9 10_ nap
1 10 100 n.a.
1 Ii 100 nap
1 12 200-300 1234
1 14 60-70 7
1 17 nap nap
1 20 100 123
1 21 280 3
B. Medium-Scale
2 2 150 3
2 3 nap 123
2 4 300 123
1 13 nap nap
2 15 nap nap
1 22 100 123
C. Large-Scale
2 5 n .a. n .a.
2 16 200 56
2 18 60 3
1 19 90 16
•3 23 60 126
NOTE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million tu P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
Countries: 1 - USA
2 - Japan
3 - Europe
4 - Australia
5 - Hongkong
6 - others (Korea, Taiwan,
Papua New Guinea,
Middle East)
7 - no country in mind
nap - not pursuing new export markets
n.a. - no answer
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Table V.44
NEW EXPORT PRODUCTS
Assets Export No. Products Countries
A. Small-Scale
1 1 charcoal briquets & coconut husk 2
1 6 n.a. n.a.
1 7 carabao horn & bone accessories 1235
handscreened dresses & beach wear
1 8 n.a. nap
1 9 baskets 56
1 I_ ceramics 1
i ii nap nap
1 12 handpainted wooden jars 134
1 14 a/ n.a.
1 17 nap nap
1 20 ladies & children wear (with 12
ethnic design), bags
1 21 furnitures (buri) 3
B. Med ium-Sca le
2 2 stonecraft fashion accessories 3
2 3 nap nap
2 4 nap nap
1 13 nap nap
2 15 nap nap
1 22 nap nap
C. Large-Scale
2 5 n.a. n.a.
2 16 latex, steel 56
2 18 b/ 3
1 19 sacks for sugar and coffee, 6
work clothes
3 23 FAX, numeric 26
N_gE: Assets: 1 - less than P5 million
2 - P5 million to P20 million
3 - more than P20 million
nap - not considering new products
n.a. - no answer
a/ - same handicrafts but with different design
and made from different ,materials
b/ - would like to know
Countries: 1 - USA
2 - Japan
3 - Europe
4 - Australia
5 - Hongkong
6 - others (Korea, Taiwan, Papua New Guinea, Middle East)
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SUI_ARYOFSELECTEDFINANCE-RELATEDPROBLEMS,RECO_ENDATIONSNDP_PECTS,
DECEIVERINDUSTRYDIALOGUESCONDUCTEDBYTHEIASG
INDUSTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECONNENDATIONS ABENGYINVOLVED
A, Proble_/RecomndetioneCommontoAllIndustrySectors
Highfinancingcost. Providen cessaryfinancinga dcredit CB
facilitiesatrelativelyeasyterr_to
Cautiousmoodinthefinancialm rket beusedintheprocurementof eeded
ingivingcreditaccesstosmall-and rawmaterialsintheshortterm,and
medium-scaleindustrieswhichresultsin additionalpurchaseofcapita]equipment
inadequatefinancialassistancefor andexpansionprojectsinthe]ongterm.
theiroperationsandexpansion,
ReviewofCBrediscountingpolicywith CB
Collatera}requirementisoveremphasizedth endinviewofloweringrediscount
ratherthangivingmoreweighttopast ratetostimulateborrowingsand
performancedeconomicviabilityof includings_llandmedium-scalefirs
theproject, inexportpackingcredits.
•Worktowardsthereductionofthe{B- CB
imposedreserver quirementsoncommercial
banks'liquidportfolio,particularlyif
acertainpercentageofthesefundsis
forexport,Theinterestspreadslapped
bycommercialbanksonrediscountloans
borrowedfromCBshouldbe.examined.
Easeupthestrin_bntrequirementon
collaterals,particularlyforsmall-and
medium-scaleent rprisesto nable_hem
tnavailthemselvesofthenecessary
financinga dgivethemopportunityto
growanddevelop.
Sizexportersp eferentialratesof
interestandcollateral-freeloans.
Problems/Reco_ndationofSpecificIndustries
(I)SugarandMolasses
Inadequatefinancialassistanceto GivedeservingplanterspreferentialCB/SRA
planters, ratesofinterestandco}]atera)-firm
]oans,
(2} Coffee
Highfinancingcostimpedesthegrowth Facilitatecreditandfinancingrequire-CB/DTI
ofinvestmentintheindustry, meritsofgrowersinordertoimprove
•production.
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INDUSTRYSECTOR BOTTLENECKS RECOM_)ATIONS ABENCYINVOLVED
(3}Tobacco
Inadequatefundingwhichaffectshe Provideeasycreditandfinancing CB/DF
•operationsoftheNationalTobacco packagestogrowers,specificallythose
Administration. gearedtowardsthe xportmarket.
(4)FishandFishProducts
Limitedandhighcostoffinancing Providepreferentialinterestra esand CB/DF
hindersefficiencyinoperation, financialp ck_lestoboostproduction.
(5)FurnitureandFixtures
Limitedfinancialsupport,especiallyGivepreferentialinterestra esandlow-CB/DOF
tosmall-andme ium-sizedpro ucers costfinancialp ckagestoexportersto
inhibitsthegrowthoftheindustry, boostoperations.
(B)Handicrafts
Inadequatefinancinga dcreditfacili-Givepreferentialinterestra esandeasyCB/DF
tiescoupledwithighinterestchargesfinancialtermstoenhanceproductien
forinvestmentandoperationalpurposes,andexportation
(7) G_rmentslTextiles
Cautiousattitudeinthefinancial Developsmall-andn_ ium-scaleg rment CB
marketingivingcreditaccesstosmall firesbygivingthemaccesstopacking
andmediumscaleindustriesfortheir creditsandotherfinancialp ckagesat
operationsandexpansion, lowerinterestra esandeasycollateral
requirements.
Highfinancingcost,
(8)ProcessedFoodandBeverages.
Highlendingrateschargedbylocal livepreferentialsupporttoexportersOB
bankswhichmakexportersuncompetitivewithregardtotheirfinancial
intheworldmarketrelativetoother requirements.
Asianexporters,
Discriminationinthe xtensionofbank
creditagainssmall-andmedium-scale
enterprisesforinvestmenta d
operationalpurposes.
Source:Inter-AgencyGrouponExternalTradeStatisticsandProjectionsF reignOperationsCommittee,CentralBankofthe
Philippines,AnnualReport1987.
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VI. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE EXPORT FINANCING SYST_ IN THE PHILIPPINES
This chapter provides a general evaluation of the export financing
system in the Philippines. To facilitate the evaluation, a theoretical
export finance system is first presented.
A. Theoretical Export Financing System
It is important to point out at the outset that the theoretical export
financing syst_n presented below is not necessarily the best one among
export financing systems that we could think of for the Philippines. It is
devised for the purpose of helping us analyze the existing export financing
schemes in the Philippines.
To simplify the presentation, we will limit ourselves only to the pre-
shipment working capital requirement of exporters. We assume the
following:
(i) the economy has an active c_amercial banking system;
(2) the economy has both export and d_estic L/Cs;
(3) the economy has a well-functioning Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation;
(4) the Central Bank refinances export loans of commercial banks;
(5) the Central Bank considers loans of indirect exporters eligible
for rediscounting; and
(6) all raw materials are available locally.
From the demand side, the key players are: the direct exporters (or
purely traders) who do not manufacture exportable goods but buy them
instead from local manufacturers, and the local manufacturers who are in
this case the indirect exporters since they do not sell directly to foreign
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buyers. From the supply side, the key players are: the commercial banks,
the Central Bank, and the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation.
Thetransaction process proceeds as follows (see Figure If):
Step 1 - Exporter receives in his favor an immediate Letter of Credit
(L/C) at sight in dollars under pre-determined terms to include
expiry date sufficient to provide an adequate period for
•preparation and shipment.
Step 2 - Exporter assigns L/C to local Bank I as support for his request
to establish a Back-to-Back Inland Letter of Credit (BB L/C) in
favor of the manufacturer, or Indirect Exporter (IE).
Step 3"- Bank I obtains a pre-shipment guarantee from Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation (ECGC) i ar_
Step 4 - Against the assigned export L/C opens through Bank II a BB L/C in
favor of the IE in local currency up to a certain percent of the
value of the underlying export L/C, available for a shorter
period than the export L/C to allow receipt of product, packing,
and shipment by exporter.
Step 5 - IE• assigns the BB L/C to Bank II and requests a local currency
loan equal up to a certain percent of BB L/C to be used for
purchase of raw material and working capital.
Step 6 - Bank II obtains pre-shipment guarantee from •BCGC;
Step 7 -• Grants loan to IE; and
Step 8 - Refinances loan with the Central Bank;
2H/T_s-- is drawn frcm the hand-out provided by Mr. Bruce Nicholson
during the Commencement Workshop for the study of Export Financing in
Selected DMCs, Manila, 22 - 23 September 1988. •
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Step 9 - IE uses cash to purchase raw material from local suppliers and
begins the manufacturing process.
It is important to point out that under this system, indirect
exporters WhO may be small producers have ready access to the rediscounting
window of the Central Bank. Moreover, the existence of a well-functioning
guarantee scheme encourages banks to provide loans to small and medium
exporters.
B. EValuation of the Export Financin9 System
AS may be gathered from Chapter V, the export financing system in the
Philippines consists of three major components, namely: refinancing
scheme, financing scheme, and the guarantee scheme. Each of these
components will be evaluated below.
1.0 Befinancing Scheme of the Central Bank
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the Central Bank has been
pursuing an export-oriented rediscounting policy. In particular, non-
traditional exports are preferred over traditional exports. Like other
eligible papers, export loans (whether pre-shipment or post-shipment) can
be rediscounted at 8[_percen.tof the loan value with a rediscount rate that
varies with the market rate. The maturity period is 90 days and renewable
for another 90 days. Rediscounting can be processed within one day if all
papers are in order and are submitted before noon to the main office or
branch office of the Central Bank. With the open market operation of the
Central Bank, rediscounts on export loans will not be severely affected by
any change in monetary policy. All these ensure quick and automatic access
of exports to the rediscounting facility of the Central Bank.
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However, the facility is limited only to direct exporters. THUS, in
the context of the framework laid out earlier, domestic L/Cs will remain
underdeveloped under the present rediscounting policy. As of this moment,
loans of indirect exporters are given less preference by banks because they
cannot he rediscounted with the Central Bank.
At present, the rediscounting availment rate is relatively low. This
is because the banking system is generally liquid. The availability of
alternative sources of loans with terms better than those of the
rediscounting facility to a certain degree has contributed to the low
rediscounting availment rate. But it is believed that the generally liquid
situation of the banking system is only temporary. The economy has already
started to pick up. In fact, actual merchandise exports in 1988 exceeded
the targeted level. Our forecasts presented in Chapter III suggest that
the pre-shipment and post,shipment financing requirements on an outstanding
basis in 1990, 1995 and 2000 will be _29.4B, _72.8B and _167.2B, assuming a
peso depreciation rate of four percent a year. This can very well be
accommodated by the Central Bank rediscounting facility without serious
implications on reserve money. For instance, the reserve money target for
1990 is I_86'4B, whereas the forecasted pre- and post-shipment financing for
the same year is only _26.4B. In 1992, the reserve money target is _IIOB,
while the forecasted pre- and post-shipment financing is only _41B. In the
1980s, the highest ratio of total rediscount to co_%_ercial banks to reserve
money was achieved in 1982 at 68 percent. Since then it_went down to only
about seven percent in 1987.
The effectiveness of the rediscounting facility of the Central Bank in
reaching a wide range of exporters is weakened by its policy to accommodate
only direct exporters. But even its effectiveness in supporting direct
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exporters is undermined by banks _ attitude towards extending credit to
exporters. This will be discussed below.
2.0 Financing Scheme
The commercial banking syst_ is the most important potential source
of funds for the export sector. All ccmaercial banks are engaged in
international banking at varying degree. Commercial banks in the
Philippines are basically conservative. Table VI.I outlines the loan
processing procedure commonly followed by banks and the approval rates.
The information contained in this table is based on an empirical study by
Lapar and Graham (1988). Note that not all those who approached the bank
are given a loan application form. The branch manager who interviews
prospective borrowers determines who should be given an application form.
On the average, 58 out of 100 loan applicants who approached the bank are
given loan applications. Some of these loan applications are processed and
approved by the branch manager while others are sent to the main office for
approval. The overall approval rate is 53 percent.
Banks have strong preference for short-term loans and are basically
collateral-oriented. As reported by sample banks, commonly-accepted
collateral are real estate mortgage and deposits/placements of exporters
with the bank. Some of the exporters did borrow from banks but are
collateral-short. So, they selected only _nall export orders since loans
they obtained were relatively small. Having a good credit track record
wit_ banks simply means that the borrowers can easily obtain a loan,• but
yet they are still required to present a collateral. When new orders come,
exporters either ask their customers to wait until such time they comply
with the prior order and pay the bank so that they can use again the same
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Table VI.I
COMMERCIAL BANKS' APPROVAL RATES FOR EVERY
10Z LOAN APPLICAITONS RECEIVED IN 1986
Screening
i. No. of loan applicants who approached the bank for a loan 108
2. No. of loan applicants given and submitted loan applications
(total no. of loan applications received). 58
Processing
3a. No. of loan applications approved by the manager out of
total loan applications received from loan applicants. 35
Approval rate at•the manager's level, in % (3.a/2). 60
No. of loan applications recommended by the manager for
approval Dy the Board of Directors (for RBs) or the area or
head office (for PDBs and KBs) out of total loan applications •
received•from loanapplicants. 18
No. of loan applications approved by the BOD or at the area
or head office out of total loan applications recommended by
the manager. 18
Approval rate by BOD•or at the area or head office _ with
respect to the manager's •recommendation, in (4b/4a) 100
Approval rate in processing stage (3a + 4b/2) 91
6. Overall approval rate, in % = total no. o£ loan applications
approved *3a + 4b)/no. of loan applications who approached
the bank for a loan. 53
Source: Lapar and Graham (19_8).
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collateral for borrowing, or simply turn down the order. Not few of the
exporters we intervie_t_d admitted that hanks turned down their additional
loan requests because they cannot present additional collateral inspite of
the fact that they had valid L/Cs or l_)s. Indeed, the lack of or limited
collateral has constrained exporters to raise funds to finance production
for exports.
Other exporters did not borrow from banks because they could not
present an acceptable collateral. Still others find the prevailing lending
rate very high that would have an impact on the competitiveness of their
products. This is over and above what banks normally charge for every
export transaction. Accordingly, banks charge _500 for advising exporters
of their L/Cs. Other charges including telex, mail, etc., could go up to
_2,000 per transaction. Since exporters are usually paid between _0.50 -
_0.80 lower than the B&P reference rate for every dollar they earn,
therefore a transaction worth $5,000 implies a total cost of _5,000 to an
exporter.
There is a general perception among exporters that Central Bank
regulations tend to reward banks and penalize exporters. Below is an
example of this which is taken from PHILFOODEX NEWS (January 1989).
"Do you know how much you are losing because of the Central
Bank ruling that requires us to pay our freight in pesos instead
of dollars?
Take a very recent example. Two Philfoodex members recently
shipped their products abroad, incurring a freight cost of
$1,350. But instead of allowing the exporters to just deduct the
freight cost from the dollar proceeds of the sale, which could
have been simpler, the rules required them instead to first get
the peso proceeds of their dollar earnings at _21.25.
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And then, they were made to turn around and, using the pesos
that they got, to buy dollars to be used to pay for the freight.
There, s nothing wrong about that, except•that when they bought
the dollars these •cost _21.94.
So from this transaction alone, the two exporters• lost
_931.50. And this happened without even leaving the same bank
from which they collected the dollar payments of their foreign
buyers.
Apparently, the CB wants the banks to earn extra from • this.
But at what cost?"
This is one of the reasons why exporters prefer that importers
directly pay the freight cost.
Thus, in the context of our framework above, one of the greatest
bottlenecks seems to lie on the attitude of banks towards lending as a
whole. Even if tl_eCentral Bank is ready to •refinance export loans, but if
such loans are not forthcoming then its rediscounting facility is rendered
ineffective.
The special lending programs have been introduced to ease up this
bottleneck. More specifically, they have been addressed to those who have
been left out by the banking system, such as the small and medium
enterprises. That most of them are managed by non-financial institutions
merely underscores the point that they were designed to •partly do what
banks failed to do. However, the resources of these programs are small
relative to the financing requirements of the export sector. Admittedly,
two programs (i.e., ALF and IGLF} are well-endowed, however, they cater to
both the d_aestic-oriented and export-oriented enterprises. It is also
noteworthy that almost •all •of these programs require hard collateral. In
the case of IGLF and ALF, a project study is required which unnecessarily
adds to the cost of borrowing from these programs.
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In the preceding chapter, the impressively high availment rates of
these programs have been noted. Whether they _ave reached a wider
clientele is indeed questionable. It could be that these programs have
been serving the same set of borrowers who probably have already exceeded
the individual loan limit from a particular program. Officers of some of
these programs whom we interviewed said that they do not bother at all to
check whether their borrowers borrowed from other credit programs since it
is not part of their criteria for approving loan applications. So long aS
they can present unincumbered assets as collateral and can assign a certain
portion of the L/Cs, exporters can borrow from these programs. Thus, these
special credit programs could have limited impact insofar as the financing
requirements of a wider range of exporters are concerned.
While it has been pointed out that these special credit programs,
however small and fragmented, could have catered to the same set of
borrowers, it is also worthwhile to note that obtaining small loans from
different lending institutions could unnecessarily raise the cost of
borrowing.
Recently, Magno and Meyer (1988) evaluated the effectiveness of the
guarantee programs, namely GFSME, IGLF, and Quedan Guarantee Fund Board
(QGFB). All three programs have liquidity window. Table VI.2 shows that
while the ratio of agricultural loans to total loans of commercial banks
declined during the period 1981 to 1986, the ratio of agricultural loans
guaranteed to total agricultural loans granted increased during the same
period. This suggests that the additional funds from the guarantee
programs did not result in net additions to loans granted to the
agricultural sector. Participating and non-participating _ercial banks
showed negligible difference in the ratio of their agricultural loans to
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Table VI.2
RATIO OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS TO TOTAL LOANS AND RATIO OF
AGRICULTURAL LOANS GUARANTEED TO TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LOANS
GRANTED, COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1981-1986
Average Annual
Ave rage Ratio Growth Rate
(%7 (%)
i. Ratio of agricultural loans to
•total loans 7.3 -3.0
i. Ratio of agricultural loans to
guaranteed to total
agricultural loans granted 2.9 29.8
Source: Magno and Meyer (1988)
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total loan portfolio, again suggesting the ineffectiveness of the guarantee
programs.
The gearing ratio of GFSME has been substantially below one (i.e.,
0._8 in 1984, 0.30 in 1985 and 0.34 in 1986). it implies that the
guarantee fund had not been fully utilized.
In our survey, only three out of seven sanple banks availed of the
guarantee facilities in 1988. Moreover, the ratio of guarantee_ loans to
total export loans had not been more than two percent for these banks.
This suggests that the guarantee facilities have been considered less
useful to banks.
Philguarantee' s effectiveness in providing guarantee facilities to
small and medium scale enterprises has been weakened by lack of funds.
Although it is highly capitalized, losses incurred in the guarantee it
provided tb overseas contractors have practically dissipated its capital.
This is compounded by its stringent qualification requirements. Thus, in
1988, Philguarantee was servicing only 15 exporters which accounts for only
0.3 percent of the total number of exporters. Meanwhile, guarantees
outstanding as of 1988 amounted to _38.4M which, is only two percent of the
total outstanding export rediscounts of the Central Bank. Thus,
Philguarantee's desire to attain a zero default rate has rendered the EGCP-
SMI program virtually useless.
The gearing ratio of Philguarantee's EGCP-SMI program could not be
determined because it does not have a separate fund. But if we were to
base it on its readily available liquid resources of about _2_0M, t_en we
will arrive at a gearing ratio of less than one.
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In general, servicing a guaranteed loan is time consuming. For
example, it takes an average• of 308 percent more man-hours to service a
loan under the GFSME program than an ordinary loan (see Magno and Meyer
1988). This is due to the •following reasons: First, guarantee programs
have numerous and cumbersome requirements and involve more paperwork.
Second, banks are •mandated by the guaranteeing institution to monitor
solely guaranteed loans to reduce the possibility of credit being diverted
.. . . ,...
to other uses. And lastly,••banks spend so much time in seeing to it that
.. _..
borrowers would not •default for fear of being blacklisted by the agency
. , .,..
concerned. As noted by Magno and Meyer, being accredited to a guarantee
program brings extra value to the banks even if they do not actually
• . ..
participate in the program.
While there is a consensus regarding ithe importance of having a strong•
guarantee program, however, one must not lose sight of the fact othat any
guarantee program needs the support of banks. In the Philippines, banks do
not consider guarantee as a substitute to collateral. Thus, so long as
exporters lack or have limited collateral •to offer, the effectiveness of a
guarantee program, no matter how well funded, will be severely limited.
This somehow suggests that an export financing system should directly
address the lack of or limited collateral on the part of exporters.
The inescapable conclusion that can be drawn frc_ our evaluation •is
that exports do not have automatic access to finance. While the Central
Bank stands ready to provide autcmatic and quick refinancing of export
loans, the collateral-orientedness of• commercial banks and relative
ineffectiveness of the special lending programs and guarantee schemes serve
as a major bottleneck. Indirect exporters suffer most from the weaknesses
of the existing export financing system.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA FOR POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL RE_)I_MS
After a two-year recession (i.e., 1984-85) the Philippine economy has
resumed its growth path. It achieved a solid growth of 6.7 percent in
1988. More importantly, the level of exports increased to $7.1B in 1988,
slightly exceeding the targeted level for that year. Despite this
remarkable performance, the Philippines has been lagging way behind other
Asian countries. For instance, in 1970, the value of Philippine
merchandise exports was $1.1B, much higher than Korea's $835M exports and
Thailand's $?10M exports. In 1988, however, merchandise exports of Korea
and Thailand reached $59.5B and $16B, respectively. Past policies that
were biased against exports had largely contributed to the lackluster
performance of Philippine exports. Definitely, the Philippines has a lot
of catching up to do in the next few years.
The new government has increased its intensity in pushing further the
development of the export sector. The export drive se_ms to be well-
coordinated by the International _Yade Group of the Department of Trade and
Industry. Gains realized in the past, such as the increasing share of the
non-traditional exports to • total exports and greater market
diversification, have been maintained and improved as demonstrated in
various government programs designed to promote non-traditional exports.
Significant policy changes, like trade liberalization and the new fiscal
incentives included in the Omnibus Investment Code, and ingtitutional
reforms, like licensing more common bonded warehouses and the one-stop
processing center for exports, have been introduced. Notwithstanding these
new developments, serious obstacles to the rapid develolm_nt of the export
sector still remain.
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First of all, the exchange rate policy r_--cdsto be reconsidered. The
Philippine exports are losing their competitiveness vis-a-vis their
competitors, specifically Thailand.
Second, exports seem to be not accorded a free trade status as regards
imported raw materials. For instance, all exporters except those located
in the EPZ are asked to get a BOI certification of non-availability of
domestic substitute for the imported raw material. This condition is over
and above the more general restrictions on imports pending complete .import
liberalization. Another example relates to the administration of _;s. In
the Philippines, the procedural requirements for HMWs are simpler relative
to other schemes. However, these are more stringent than those in other
countries where exporters using H_4_s are not required to submit a "formula
of manufacture" and to post a re-export bond. In general, the combination
of the exemption drawback syst_ for intermediate inputs and BOI/EPZA
incentives is not enough to compensate for the anti-export bias of the
protection system.
And lastly, the export financing system seems to be weak and
ineffective. In particular, the refinancing facility of the Central Bank
does not provide an equal status to indirect exporters. The commercial
banking system is generally conservative and is collateral-oriented. The
special credit programs are fra%_nented and small. And the credit guarantee
system has been generally ineffective.
Thus, some policy and institutional reforms should be introduced to
support the export sector.
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A. Reforms for Achie,vin9 a Free Trade Status on the Ex_ort Sector
Many of the recommendations advanced here to achieve a free trade
status for the export sector have been already discussed in detail in All
(1988) and Rhee (1984). In particular, the policy recommendations are:
(i) abolish import licenses for exporters; (2) abolish non-availability
test for gaining access to duty free imports; (3) replace tax certificates
with cash rebates; and (4) limit duty exemption to exporters, otherwise the
duty should be reduced to zero. These privileges should be provided to all
firms that generate export value added. Hence, indirect exporters should
be allowed to enjoy such privileges.
The demand for BMWs facilities is expected to increase in the future.
The procedure for accessing such facilities is a lot simpler than other
mechanisms currently available to exporters. However, the requirement to
submit the "formula of manufacture" remains a thorny issue. In
commodities where input coefficients can be easily obtained, such as
garments, electronics, rattan furniture, the requirement may be maintained.
NIST shall regularly update and widely disseminate the input coefficients.
But in commodities where it is extremely difficult to arrive at input
coefficients unless all exporters have to divulge their trade secrets, such
requirement should be dispensed with. This is most apparent in the food
export sector wherein almost every "item has different input mix, some of
which are imported. Perhaps, it is even better not to require at all
exporters using B_s to submit a "formula of manufacture" as what other
countries are doing.
Finally, it is imperative that incentives/privileges given to
exporters be widely disseminated. In our survey, results show that several
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exporters were not a_re at all about incentives given to exports. In this
regard, •s_inars/workshops should be regularly conducted by the regional
offices of the Department of Trade and Industry in collaboration with
exporters' associations. Measures should, however, be taken to include
indirect exporters in the dissemination program.
B. Reforms. for Assuring Automatic Access to Export Financing
There is a need to focus on pre-shipment financing. At the moment,
post-shipment financing requir_nent comprises only about five percent of
the total export financing requirements. In our forecast given in Chapter
III, the share of post-shipment financing requirement to total export
financing requirements will not exceed 10 percent up to the year 2000.
• The policy •and institutional reforms should address the issue of
exports' access to financing. While a preferential rate for export loans
is not prescribed, a generally lower interest is certainly desirable for
the entire economy. As of this moment, the Central Bank is using the
interest rate policy to defend the domestic currency. In view of the
external debt overhang and !owgross 'international reserves, the pressure
on the domestic currency remains strong. While this pressure exists,
domestic interest rates are likely to remain high. This adversely affects
exports on two counts. First, a high domestic interest rates vis-a-vis the
interest rates of competitors lessens the c_titiveness of Philippine
exports. As shown in our survey results, many exporters did not borrow
because of the prevailing high interest rate. Second, an overvalued
dc_stic currency makes Philippine exports relatively more expensive
compared with those of competitors and also reduces export earnings which
exporters could have plowed back to finance higher volume of production.
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There is therefore a need to reconsider the interest rate and exchange rate
policies. It should be noted that the Philippine peso has lost its
competitiveness •against the Thai baht since 1984.
At present, the Central Bank refinancing facility provides access only
to direct exporters. It is desirable that indirect exporters be given
equal access to such facility. With this policy, it is expected that banks
would also provide both direct and indirect exporters equal access to
financing. For this policy to be effective, it is however necessary to
modernize the export financing system in the Philippines. One of t_e key
elements to modernizing pre-shipment export financing is disaggregating
export loans into those which (i) generate value added (VAL), (ii)
purchase domestically produced intermediate inputs (DIL), (iii) purchase
imported intermediate inputs (FIL), and (iv) purchase domestically produced
2_V
finished goods (DOL). The separation of DIL from FIL and DOL from
production financing makes it possible to i_{olement a domestic L/C system
for domestic purchase and import L/C system for imported inputs. As noted
in the preceding two chapters, the Philippines virtually does not have a
domestic L/C system. The development of the domestic L/C system assures
automatic availability of short-term export loans and free trade status to
all indirect exporters. Moreover, the separation of FIL, DIL and DOL from
VAL makes it possible to make a quasi-physical collateral, with inputs or
outputs financed by export loans through the automatic loan disbursement
mechanisms. It should be noted that one of the main bottlenecks in the
export financing system in the Philippines is the fact that commercial
banks are overly collateral-oriented. With the creation of a quasi-
21__/
See Rhee (1984).
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physical collateral, it is hoped that cona_rcial banks respond to the
credit needs of all qualified exporters, whether they are direct or
indirect exporters.
The modernization of pre-shipment export financing system could also
allay fears of the Central Bank that providing indirect exporters access to
its rediscounting window could result in losing control of the monetary
base. As pointed out by All (1988), the basis of export loans would he an
actual export order (backed by an L/C) or an expected order based on past
performance. The sum of export product loans, VAL + DIL + FIL, cannot
exceed the value of the associated export order. A loan given for purchase
of domestic DOL cannot exceed the value of the associated export order.
Since the Philippines has already gone into value-added taxation, it would
be relatively easy to implenent this scheme.
The Central Bank should relinquish its responsibility of managing
special credit programs. Such should be transferred to government
financial institutions. Specifically, IGLF should he transferred to the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Agricultural Loan Fund to the
Land Bank of the Philippines. IGLF should do away with its guarantee
function, which is not utilized anyway, and instead concentrate on its
refinancing function. DBP is in a better position to implement the export
packing and production credits facility for exporters. Its regional
branches can either directly on-lend to exporters or quickly refinance
export loans made by banks falling in any of the four export loan
categories mentioned above.
The small and fragmented export credit programs managed by non-
financial government agencies should not be continued. For efficiency,
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they should be consolidated and transferred to a regular financial
institution which has the comparative advantage in managing a credit
program.
One of the key elements of an effective pre-shipment export finance
system is a strong pre-shipment export finance guarantee schemes. As noted
in the preceding chapter, the existing guarantee programs se_n to be weak
and ineffective. There is therefore a need to strengthen it. First of
all, there should be a policy statement making GFSME and Philguarantee as
the main guarantee institutions. However, both should sit down together to
define their own areas of coverage to prevent any overlapping. It was
noted in Chapter V that GFSME has been providing guarantee to export-
oriented agro-processing industries and has plans to expand its exposure to
this sector. This plan should be supported. ••
•GFSME's plan to abandon its liquidity and interest rate subsidy should
be impl_nented right away so that it •can direct all its resources to the
provision of guarantee. Since it has been proposed earlier that IGLF
withdraw its guarantee function, GFSME should be ready to pick up the
slack. Thus, its guarantee should be extended to both agricultural and
non-agricultural loans.
At present, GFSME is only a program of LIVHCOR, •the mother
corporation. In view• of its huge responsibilities, GFSME should be
converted into a regular government corporation attached to the Office of
the President for greater autonomy and flexibility. This is going to be
relatively difficul_t though since it needs a congressional action. If ever
this pushes through, it is desirable that the ratio of government to
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private sector representatives in the Board of Directors of the
incorporated GFSME be the same as the present Management Board.
GFSME should maintain its guarantee coverage of 85 percent on all
types of credit risks. As regards its definition of small and large
enterprises, GFSME should adopt Philguarantee 's definition (i.e., small
firms are those with assets of less than _5M and medium size firms are
those with assets of _5M but less than _20M).
For the export-or.iented agro-processing industries, GFSME should
implement a bank guarantee line of _25M per participating bank similar to
Philguarantee's proposed bank guarantee line with a maximum guarantee
coverage of 85 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest.
In terms of flexibility, Philguarantee is in a better position than
GFSME because it is already incorporated. However, it is financially
weaker than GFSME. The first task in rehabilitating Philguarantee
therefore is to finally transfer its non-performing assets to the National
Government which in effect is a mere implementation of E.O. No. 64.
Second, its resources should be increased. The study of First Washington
Associates (1988) has recommended an additional capital of _400M which is
deemed sufficient to support a _ealthy growth of guaranteed and insured
finance for exporters from 1989 to 1993. It is recommended that resources
of export credit programs of non-financial government agencies which we
suggested earlier to be phased out be transferred to Philguarantee. This
includes the _165.5M from EIMP, _20M from EI)AP and _16.5M from TF. The ¥5B
being negotiated now by the government in behalf of EIMP should instead be
used to increase Philguarantee's capital.
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The maximum guarantee coverage of Philguarantee should be increased
from 70 percent of outstanding credit to 85 percent to align it with that
of GFSME's.
Recently, Philguarantee was given the authority to grant guarantees of
less than _50M per beneficiary without seeking the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Ithas lined up new initiatives as shown in
Annexes D and E. As it prepares itself towards becoming a truly export
credit guarantee institution, Philguarantee's organizational structure has
to be overhauled. The number of the Board of Directors should be reduced
from seven to five, with two private sector representatives, preferably one
from the commercial banking system and one from the association of
exporters. A full-time president is definitely desirable.
It has been shown in the case of Philguarantee that loan recoveries
have improved tremendously when it started to directly take the
responsibility of recovering loans. This should be continued and
strengthened further by having a separate division to manage claims and
collections. GFSME should likewise maintain such division.
It would be worthwhile to do away with accredftation of banks.
Whether banks are stable or not should be the concern of the Central Bank,
not that of guarantee institutions. InStead, the export guarantee facility
should be open to all banks who wish to endorse an export loan for a
guarantee. This is important especially if the export financing system is
to be modernized along the lines suggested above. To minimize the
occurrence of loan default, GFSME and Philguarantee should link up with
exporters association in building a profile of the creditworthiness of
exporters, particularly the small-and medium-size exporters. Exporters
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know very well producers who have the potential for becoming direct
exporters since they have been in constant contact with them through sub-
contracting or other means.
As may be gathered from the discussion above, most of the
recommendations have focused on policy and institutional reforms as well as
on improving the guarantee system. These are the major bottlenecks to
export financing identified earlier. At the national level, export
financing does not seem to be a major problem. In Table VII.l, we have
reproduced the figures for pre- and post-export financing requirement. We
have also estimated co_aercial banks' outstanding loans and discounts for
1989 to 2000 assigning a 14 percent growth rate and a four percent
22/
•depreciation rate of the peso• vis-a-vis tDe U.S. dollar. A comparison
of these two sets of figures suggests that the resources of _rcial
banks can very well cover the d_nand for export financing. The problem,
however, is that such resources have not flowed to the export sector,
especially the small- and medium-exporters who typically have insufficient
collateral and are considered highly risky by banks.•
C. Scoi_e for ADB Assistance
There are some areas by which ADB can assist the country in its export
drive. One is to continue its policy dialogue with the Philippine
Goverr_nent. The export sector cannot thrive well if the policy environment
is hostile towards it. The discussions should focus on the ways by which
22__/
The 14 percent was the average growth rate of loans and discounts
during the period 1980-84 (see Table V.5). The years 1985-87 were excluded
because of the abnormal drop in loans and discounts during this period that
was mainly brought about by the transfer of non-performing assets of the
Philippine National Bank to the National Government.
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Table VII.I
PROJECTED BANKS' LOANS AND DISCOUNT,
AND PRE- AND POST-EXPURT FINANCING
Pro3ected Banks' Loans 2/ Pre- and Post
Year Exchange Rate and Discounts Export Financing
(P/US$) i/ Requirement 3/
1989 21.93 4.7 1.15
1990 22.81 5.1 1.29
1991 23.72 5.6 1.45
1992 24.b7 6.1 1.65
1993 25.66 •6.7 1.92
•1994 26.69 7.4 2.26
1995 27.75 8.1 •2.62
1996 28.86 8._ 2.97
1997 30.02 9.7 3.40
1998 31.22 10.6 3.85
199_ 32.47 £1.7 4.37
2000 33.77 12.8 4.95
i/
The assumed depreciation rate is 4 percent per year.
2/
Assumed to De growing at the rate of 14 percent.
3/
From Table VI.9.
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exports can be given an "extended neutral status." Another area is to
provide the Philippine Government with technical assistance in modernizing
the pre-shipment export financing system. The assistance should be
directed to a committee representing various government agencies and
private export associations who will study the issues involved in
modernizing the pre-shipment export financing system, formulate the
_echanisms for implementing such program, and monitor the progress of the
program. Still another way by which ADB can assist the country in its
export desire is toprovide both GFSME and Philguarantee with technical and
financial assistance. The technical assistance may be directed at two
levels. One is human resource development aimed at improving the technical
know-how of the staff of these guarantee institutions. The other involves
improvement in the procedure for delivering the guarantee programs. This
would include improvement in {nformation dissemination, processing
procedures for applications and claims, and collection and litigation. As
regards financial assistance, ADB may either directly invest in or provide
long-term soft loans to both GFSME and Philguarantee. Additionally, ADB
may buy shares of the Credit Investigation Bureau (CIB) which is now being
privatized.
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Annex A
LIST OF PERSONS/INSTITUTIONS VISITED
I. Mr. Armando Tetangco
Director, DER-International
Central Bank of the Philippines
2. Ms. Purita Neri
Director, DER-Domestic
Central Bank of the Philippines
3. Ms. Cecilia Arguelles
Director, Loans and Discounts Department
Central Bank of the Philippines
4. Mr. Jose Tirona
Director
Export Department
Central Bank of the Philippines
5. Mr. Jesus Ta_edo
Executive Vice-President
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
6. Mr. Manuel Batallones
Manager, Export Credit Guarantee Corporation
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee CorpOration
7. Ms. Evanor Palac
Assistant Director .
Business Development and Marketing Group :
Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises
8. Dr. Gloria Arroyo
Undersecretary
Department of Trade and Industry
9. Mr. Victor Lim
Vice-President
Financial Executive Institute of thePhilippines
10. Atty. Jose Hisamoto
Officer-in-Charge
Philippine Exporters Foundation
ii. Ms. Clara Lapus
President
Philippine Federation of Food Exporters
12. Mr. ReynaldQ Vergara
President
Philippine Chamber of Handicraft Industries
13. Ms. Dalisay
Director
Purchase Order Financing
14. Mr. Manuel Colayco
Executive Vice-President
Philippine International Trading Corporation
15. Mr. Tony Honrado
Assistant Managing Director
Export Industrial Modernization Program
Tecnnology & Livelihood Resource Center
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16. Mr. Nestor Mijares
Director
NEDA Region VII
17. Mr. Ernesto Balangue
Director
NEDA Region XI
18. Mr. Arnel Salva
Division Chief
Bureau of Export Trade Promotion
19. Ms. Ria Ramirez
Bureau of Export Trade Promotion
20. Ms. Minerva Franco
Executive Director
Product Development and Design Center of the Philippines
21. Mr. Alfonso Villaverde
Executive Director
Philippine Shippers' Council
22. Ms. Lina Batallones
investment One-Stop Action Center
23. Ms. Becky Estalilla
Marketing Manager ,_
Credit Information Bureau, Inc.
24. Mr. Conrado San Juan
APEX Financing
25. Ms. Zeny Galatera
Director
Export Development Assistance Program
Technology and Resource Livelihood Center
26. Ms. Leny Abe!la
Exponet
27. Ms. Helen Alvarez
International Coffee Organization - Certifying Agency
28. Ms. Ma. Angelina Angeles
Deputy Executive Director
Philippine Trade Training Center
29. Ms. Gigi Quiazon
Office of Policy Research
Department of Trade and InduStry
30. Ms. Plavia Tan
Assistant Director
Loans and Credit Department
Central Bank of the Philippines
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_nnex E
.1PHIL_PPll_E EXPOrt _ FOREIGm LO_ _ CZ)RPO_TIOI_
5th Tloor, £xec_tlve Building Center, T_n. Gil _. l_yat Cozier ttaka_ &venue
)takati, Metro Man£1a
STATEMENT O_ _O_ME ARD _SES
For The Three _uarters Ending _ept-_her _0, 1988
{Unau_Lited}
INCOME
Guarantee and Commitment Fees P I0,344,553._5
Interest on Investments an8 Deposits 20,841,.5.52.70
Processing and other Fees ana Charges 13,693,588.55
Lease Income I_,205,391.68
GFI-Linked NPAs 17,549,596.62
GROSS INCOM_ P 77,634,682.80
OPERATING EXPENSES
Salaries and Other Personnel Expenses P 3,515,992.83
Vtilities 1,692,778 _84
Professional Fees 742,410.83
Depreciation - Equipment 106,5%3.89
Other Operating Expenses 84¢,079.42
GFI-Linked NPAs .15,017,845.65
TOTAL OPERATZNG EXPENSES 21_,922,621_-46_
OPERATING INCOME (LOSS) BEFORE
EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS P 55,712,061.34
Foreign Exchange Gains 256,489.18
Interest and Financial Chax_es
Regula_ P 4_,712,420.25
GFI-Linked NPAs _74,_95,222.95 220 [907 _643.20
NET I4_OME (LOSS) (P164,939,092.68)
Executive Vice President
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Annex E (Cont'd.)
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND _OREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION
5th Floor, Executive Building Center, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Corner Makati Avenue
Makati, Metro Manila
BALANCE SHEET
As of September 30, 1988
(Unaudited)
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and Due From Banks _ 6,734,126.18
Short Term Investments 220,711,787.99
Guarantee Fees Receivable (Net) 5,248,590.39
Accounts Receivable (Net) 1,280,305.28
Prepaid Expenses 12,247,247.34
Total Current Assets _ 246,222,057.18
Investment in Government Securities 31,471,283.56
Fixed Assets 347,348.38
Other Assets
Advances and Other Receivables
on Guaranteed Loans _ 328,308,249.42
Other Advances 947,908.97
Acquired Assets 521,598,570.21
Contract Mortgage Receivable 163,100.00
Debenture Bonds 194,296,135.87
Notes Receivable 94,123,000.00
Miscellaneous Assets 522,902.85
Assets for Transfer to National
Government 5,493,233,137.56
Total Other Assets 6,633,193,004.88
TOTAL ASSETS /6,911,233,694.00
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LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' E_UITY
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Liabilities for Transfer to
National Government _ 132,015,544.14
Income Tax Payable 89,149,205.31
Interest PayaDle 24,541,312.14
Accounts Payable and Other
Liabilities 11,631,878.91
Total Current Liabilities _ 257,337,940.50
Advances from National Treasury _ 332,442,039.87
Advances fromNational Treasury
(related to NPAs for Transfer
to National Government) _ 488,918,160.99
Long Term Liabilities
Loans Payable _ 816,891,711.30
Liabilities for Transfer
to National Government 2,653,951,588.81
Total Long Term Liabilities 23,470,843,300.11
Total Liabilities _4,549,541,441.47
Deferred Credits 10,746,594.02
Deferred Credits (related to NPAs
for Transfer to National
Government 149,801,525.03
Stockholders' Equity
Capital Stock (Authorized and
Subscribed - PI0._B) _3,230,438,657.00
Retained Earnings (Deficit) ( 864,355,430.84)
Profit (Loss) ( 164,939,092.68)
Total Stockholders' Equity 2,2_i,144,133.48
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' E_UITY _6,911_233,694.00
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Annex F
EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAM ••
FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUST•_IES
BANK.GUARANTEE LINE
PURPOSE : To raise the level of preshipment
financing available and accessible
to creditwortny but collateral-
deficient small and medium-size
export enterprises.
To simplify and facilitate the
delivery of financial assistance and
guarantee support to deserving exporters.
CONCEPT : Philguarantee shall, in addition to
•the existing Individual Account
Guarantee Facility, extend Bank
Guarantee Lines in favor of private
banks participating under the ECGP-SMI.
Subject to conditions embodied in a new
agreement, Philguarantee shall delegate
authority to participating banks to ••
approve and grant preshipment credits
to small and medium-size exporters
secured • by the guarantee of the corporation.
ACCREDITED BANKS : Citytrust Banklng Corporation
•• Far East Bank and Trust Company
Philippine Commercial International Bank
Pi!ipinas Bank
Rizal COmmercial Banking Corporation
SolidbanK Corporation•
GUARANTEE•LINE : 2"25 Million per participating bank
renewable annually for the same amount
based on the bank's overall performance
in the ECGP-SMI.
GUARANTEE COVERAGE : Maximum of 70% of the outstanding
principal and accrued interest
GUARANTEE FEE : 1.5% per annum
PERFORMANCE : Past due ratio must not exceed 20%.
STANDARDS AND Otherwise, the facility shall be auto-
SANCTIONS matically suspended.
A default ratio must not exceed the 10%.
Otherwise, the facility shall be auto-
matically terminated.
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Annex F (Cont'd.)
ELIGIBLE LOAN : Preshipment Export Credit granted
against irrevocable letter of credit
or acceptable confirmed purchase order
GUARANTEE CEILING : Small enterprise - maximum of _6500
thousand
Medium enterprise - maximum of ivl.5
million
LOAN UTILIZATION : Purchase of inventories, payroll and
other operating expenses to service
export orders
MINIMUM COLLATERAL : Assignment of irrevocable letter of
REQUIREMENT credit or confirmed purchase order
JSS of principals in their personal
capacity
QUALIFIED BORROWERS : A small or medium-size export enter-
prise with total assets of at least
P500 thousand but not exceeding _w'i0 million
OWNERSHIP Majority-owned Filipino firm
BUSINESS ACTIVITY : Processing, production or manufacturing
and marketing of non-traditional
products directly for exports
TRACK RECORD : At least one (i) year export performance
or 4-5 negotiated shipments with
a total value of at least $100 thousand
FINANCIAL STANDING : a. Unimpafred capital of _250 thousand
(net of pre-operating expenses)
b. Debt-Equity ratio of 80:2_ after
financing
CREDIT RECORD : Satisfactory credit dealing as certified
by past/present creditors for the
enterprise and its principals
No derogatory findings for the enter-
prise and its principals
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Annex G
PROPOSED GUARANTEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FOR OVERSEAS CONTRACTORS
OBJECTIVE : To facilitate bonding for POCB-accredited
contractors in order for tBese firms to maintain
their competitiveness in service exports.
CONCEPT : Pnilguarantee shall provide guarantees to
a pool of selected/pre-qualified POCB-
registered overseas contractors who are
encountering difficulties due to the rather
stringent collateralpolicy of most banks.
These contractors have been successful in
their undertakings and the program aims to
ensure that these accomplishments continue.
PROPOSED
SCHemE : i. Project Qualified under tne Program:
* Labor Subcontracts to established
foreign contractors (i.e. Japanese,
U.S., Italian, Korean) as determined
by POCB;
* Officer In Charge of Construction
(OrCC) Projects.
2. Ou_ified Contractors:
Some ten (10) qualified firms shall be
chosen among the "surviving" POCB registered
contractors. The selection process to be
undertaken in close coordination with POCB
shall be based on the following factors:
* Historical Net FX Remittance
per POCB Records
* Accreditation with POCB
* Contracting Ability of the firms
based on Net Worth, Projects
Finished/Ongoing
* Dollar Remittance and Employment
to be generated by the Project
* Credit Record
256
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3. Types of Guarantee Available:
Performance Bond, Advance Payment
or Peso Working Capital for
Mobilization Expenses
4. Guarantee Ceiling: $5_0 Thousand
maximum exposure to each qualified
contractor; P100.0 Million ceiling
on all issuances under this program.
5. Guarantee Coverage:
The total guarantee requirement of the
firm shall be shared proportionately
among Philguarantee, Bank and the
Contractor in the following manner:
* 50% Philguarantee
* 25% Bank
* 25% Contractor's Equity
Contribution
6. Collateral Requirement:
Pnilguarantee's exposure shall be
secured by the assignment of_.contract
proceeds plus the JSS of company's
principals. Any other collateral
held by the bank shall be shared
par ri-passu with Philguarantee.
7. Fees:
Commitment Fee - 1/4 of 1% p.a.
commencing on
the 90th day
upon approval.
Guarantee Fee - Minimum of 2.0%
p.a.
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